
Class L 

Book 

Ccpiglrti\°- 



COraRIGHT DEPOSm 



NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
LIEUT. GOMDR. CHARLES C. GILL, U.S.N. 




NATIONS AT WAR WITH GERMANY (or h 
Turkey and Buli!nria);— 

Serbia (vs. Austria July 28, 1914), Russia (August i, 1QI4). France 
(August 3, 1914), BelKium (August 4, IQ14), Great Britain (August 4, 
1914), Montenegro (vs. Austria August 8, 1914). Japan (August 23, 
1914), Italy (vs. Austria May 24, igis), San Marino (vs. Austria May 
24, iQis), Portugal (March 9, 1016), Rumania (vs. Austria August 27. 
1916), United States (April 6, 1917). Cuba (April 7, 1917), Panama 
(April 7. 1917), Greece (Prov. Govt. Nov. 28, 1916, Govt. 0! Alex. July 
2, 1917), Siam (July 22, 1917), Liberia (August 4, 1917), China (August 
14, 1917), Brazil (October 26, 1Q17). 



allies, Austria 



THE WORLD Aim, DECEMBER, 191 7 

NATIONS THAT HAVE IIONS NEUTRAL BUT CHIEF NEUTRA. 

SEVERED RELATIONS IVOURABLE TO THE NEUTRAL 

WITH GERMANY:— ILIES:— NATIONS:— 



1917) 



Bolivia (April i. 
Honduras (May - , , 
Haiti (June 17, 1917) 
Costa Rica (Sept. 21, 
Uruguay (Oct. 7. iQi?) 
Guatemala (April 27, igi7) 
Nicaragua (May 18, 1017) 
Peru (October 6, 1917) 
Ecuador (Dec. 8, 1917) 



ILIES:— 

917) irgentina, Paraguay 
'9'" hili, Salvador 



Norway, Sweden, Denmark, 
Holland, Spain, Switzerland, 
Mexico. Venezuela, Colombia.' 



NOTE:--Central and South America are more or less 
mvolved, but in a diplomatic rather than a miUtary 
sense. As Africa has been practically annexed by 
European powers the whole continent is involved 
except the ancient empire of Abyssinia and unap- 
propriated portions of the Libyan Desert Prac 
t.cally all Asia is involved. Although Persia has 
not declared war there has been considerable fight- 
ing there. The South Arabian revolt has aligned 
tHat country against Turkey. 



NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

. GEOGRAPniCAL INDirATIONS 

natio^d'e^an'Sta^^ou^e" Thist™'ri?aTn 'alf naff™" Sf ? '"f'''', "^^ ^^'^"^ '—'I """■ 
In an mternational war neutrality has become d!ffir,nff„.IH" '""* "V^.^" ""^ """""'ly dependent, 
annihilated the theory of national isolation ^ dangerous. The experience of this war has 

scatteredthr^rh™? tt S'" Allied rvTcoZr'has"™'!!.'^^'' '"''', ^"1^""^' f™"'-" "»«"-""- 
of this force against the enemy "' '""' '"^''^ P'"*^''''^ ""e slow but sure concentration 

an a?s"crup'utol;s"u'rof lh";.^lrrii^"Ge"™anv^':'h'' ""? ''™'^"' ^''"f ' """ '"'l-"' G^"™-^ '« 

to thl'seaTo^ bnd™?k:d'"aU ns 'a"n"Jl rsfrate i Tafue'lir^"' "P™ '."^ -"■;*.? n^lr'of'lrlrjutiets 
verge such as Panama, Suel^Gibraluran^tg' D^rllaVeU^^ "^'"^ '" "''"'• ^'^^ "■'■"'-''^^ ->"■ 
* rresident Wtlson, 



\ 



NAVAL POWER 
IN THE WAR 

(1914-1917) 



BY 

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER 

CHARLES CLIFFORD GILL 

UNITED STATES NAVY 




NEW YORK 
GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY 



J] 58 
.&5 



COPYRIGHT, 1918, 
BY GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY 



JAN 28 I9f8 



PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 



©CI.A492082 



PREFACE 

The eleven chapters in this work, with one ex- 
ception, were contributed to The New York Ti?nes 
Current History Magazine during the year 1917 
and now appear in revised form. The exception is 
the sixth chapter — The Dardanelles Operations — 
which was written to complete the series covering 
the major naval operations of the war and is now 
published for the first time. 

The author takes occasion to extend his ac- 
knowledgments and thanks to the editors of The 
New York Times Current History Magazine 
for permission to republish which they have kindly 
given. 

Acknowledgment is also made to Allan West- 
cott, Ph.D., Instructor in the United States Naval 
Academy, for maps and diagrams contributed and 
for help given in editing the text. Sincere 
thanks are expressed to Mr. T. G. Frothingham, 
to the Staff of the English Department of the 
United States Naval Academy, and to the Officers 
of the Oklahoma and the Seattle for many help- 
ful suggestions cordially given throughout the 
progress of these studies. 

Charles C. Gill. 



INTRODUCTION 

The present volume had its origin in lectures 
delivered by Lieutenant Commander Gill at the 
United States Naval Academy in the winter of 
1915-16 to midshipmen who have since been grad- 
uated and are now in active service. For this 
audience, the facts and lessons of recent naval his- 
tory had a special signihcance, as a very practical 
preparation for the responsibilities they were soon 
to undertake. To quote the words of Napoleon, 
"The happiest inspiration in battle is often a rec- 
ollection of the past." 

The discussion was afterward continued in The 
New York Times Current History Magazine, and, 
with the sanction of the Navy Department, is now 
published in book form. In selecting and prepar- 
ing the material, the author had in mind not only 
the special needs of young naval officers, whether 
midshipmen or volunteers now entering the naval 
service, but also the general popular interest in 
naval affairs. The book is to be used this year 
by the Department of English at the Naval Acad- 
emy in the teaching of naval history. 



viii INTRODUCTION 

Undertaking these studies before the entry of 
the United States into the war, the author has 
maintained throughout the standpoint of the tech- 
nical student of naval warfare, rather than that 
of the philosophical historian. Needless to say, 
he is not without strong sympathies and convic- 
tions; but these, from the nature of the investiga- 
tion, are subordinated to the search for truth. In 
other words, the book is not partisan and is not 
propaganda; it has no special thesis to maintain 
— except an underlying belief in the importance 
of naval power to a nation whose boundaries are 
the two oceans, and whose interests extend 
throughout the Seven Seas. 

The wisdom of attempting to write naval his- 
tory at such close range may be questioned. The 
question may be answered by pointing out that 
the book aims to draw the significant naval les- 
sons, rather than to chronicle events in minute de- 
tail. Whatever the paucity of the data, it is im- 
portant that these lessons should be drawn im- 
mediately. Frank discussion clears the air. 

There is an advantage also in the contemporary 
point of view, with its appreciation of concurrent 
events and the feeling of the hour. If distant 
perspective gives proper proportion, it also throws 
a haze over the scene. And in naval history par- 
ticularly, the facts are not always clearer with the 



INTRODUCTION ix 

lapse of time. Historians a century ago could 
have determined, more easily than it can be deter- 
mined to-day, the exact manner in which Nelson 
brought his fleet into action at Trafalgar; and a 
century ago there was a recognition — more in- 
stinctive and less reasoned, perhaps, but not less 
genuine than to-day — of the greatness of that vic- 
tory and its meaning in the Napoleonic War. 

Students of naval history, therefore, may feel 
indebted to the writer for this book — written un- 
der pressure of duties afloat which since our par- 
ticipation in the war have left slight leisure for 
outside work. 

Allan Westcott, 
Department of English, 
U. S. Naval Academy. 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER PAGE 

I SIGNIFICANCE OF NAVAL POWER 

IN THE WAR 1 

II DEFINITIONS AND ESTIMATE OF 

THE SITUATION 9 

Sea Power 9 

Sea Control 11 

Plans of Warring Navies .... 14 

III OPENING ACTIVITIES 19 

Strength and Disposition of Fleets 19 
"Goeben" and "Breslau" Episode . 24 
Attacks on Cable and Wireless Sta- 
tions 28 

IV NAVAL ACTION IN HELIGOLAND 

BIGHT 33 

V CORONEL AND FALKLAND EN- 
GAGEMENTS 44 

Battle off Coronel 44 

Falkland Islands Engagement . . 51 

VI DARDANELLES OPERATIONS . . 59 

yil NORTH SEA BATTLES 83 

Dogger Bank Encounter .... 83 

Battle of Jutland (Part 1) ... 88 

VIII NORTH SEA BATTLES (Cont.) ... 101 

Battle of Jutland (Part 2) . . . 101 

xi 



xii CONTENTS 

CHAPTER PAGE 

IX SUBMARINE WARFARE . ." . . 120 

X ANTI-SUBMARINE TACTICS ... 132 

XI NAVAL LESSONS OF THE WAR . . 145 

APPENDIX 

(1) Comparative Strength of Navies . . . . 161 

Excerpts from a compilation by T. G. 
Frothingham, reprinted by courtesy of 
Current History _ 161 

Table prepared and arranged by C. H. Fos- 
ter, U. S. N. A 192 

Table published by office of U. S. Naval 
Intelligence 19-2 

(^) "Emden' Exploits 195 

Excerpts from articles by Comdr. L. A. 
Cotton, U. S. N., and Lt. H. von Miicke 
(executive officer of Emden), the latter 
translated by Lt. Comdr. J. H. Klein, Jr., 
U. S. N., reprinted by courtesy of 
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings . . 195 

(3) America's Part in the Development (f Naval 

Weapons and Tactics 206 

By T. G. Frothingham, reprinted by 
courtesy of the U. S. Naval Institute 
Proceedings 206 



MAPS AND DIAGRAMS 

Map of the World Indicating Barred Zones 
AND Location of Chief Naval Events . 

Frontispiece 

PAGE 

. . 21 



North Sea and Baltic 
Map of Eastern Mediterranean 
Map of German North Sea Coast 
Diagram of Battle off Coronel 



25' 
35 •" 



Diagram of Falkland Islands Engagement . 55 

Map of Dardanelles, Sea of ]\Iarmora and 
Bosporus (The Approaches to Constanti- 
nople) 65*^ 

Diagram of Dogger Bank Encounter . . . 85"^ 

Diagram of Battle of Jutland 93 '^ 

British Fleet Formation 103' 

Diagram Indicating Fleet Movements after 

Battle of Jutland 113*^ 



ILLUSTRATIONS 

PAGE 

U. S. S. Constitution 207 

American Letter of Marque Brig Grand 

Turk of Salem 211' 

American Armed Brig Tenbdos 213' 

U. S. S. Niagara 21V 

American Armed Barque Stamboul . . , . 215' 

U. S. S. P/?.v.Y.s)7.r.(.N7.i, 1887 SIG-" 

U. S. S. Pennsylvania, 1916 217*^ 



NAVAL POWER IN 
THE WAR 

CHAPTER I 

Significance of Naval Power im the War 

SEA power in the present war has been exerted 
for the most part behind the scenes. It is 
hard to realise that the achievements of the Allied 
fleets, accomplished with so little fighting, have 
proved, in their influence upon the war, more im- 
portant than the much heralded land battles in- 
volving enormous loss of life and property. The 
German Government admitted this potency of sea 
power, when, in April, 1917, Hindenburg an- 
nounced that it was only necessary for the Ger- 
man armies to hold their own on land while on the 
sea the U-boats hemmed in Great Britain and so 
crippled the ocean trade supplying men, food and 
munitions to Allied armies as to compel the ac- 
ceptance of peace terms pleasing to the Prussian 
leaders. 



2 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

It is strange that Germany's first soldier should 
have made the point, that the submarine, the only 
naval weapon able to evade the Allied blockade, 
promised a respite and a hope that the German 
armies could not give, even though the latter had 
been successful on all fronts and had conquered 
entire countries. Thus Germany recognised the 
principle well taught by the distinguished Ameri- 
can naval officer, Admiral Mahan, that in all great 
wars between commercial nations land power is 
ancillary to sea power. 

At this stage of the war there can be no doubt 
of the effect upon its grand tactics of command 
of the sea. In this war, as in past wars, the 
force of sea power is slowly but surely shaping 
the issues. As the arteries of sea-borne commerce 
to the Teutonic Powers are more and more effec- 
tually blocked, and as the U-boat terror subsides 
while new strength and vigour from America, Af- 
rica and Asia is transported more and more eas- 
ily to France, England and Italy — the realisation 
will slowly but surely be forced home, that Pan- 
Germanism has been defeated and Germany must 
give up the evil policies of her present Govern- 
ment which she has fought so desperately to propa- 
gate and defend. 

In following the developments of the present 
war it is of interest to note that in the main noth- 



SIGNIFICANCE OF NAVAL POWER J3 

ing startling has happened to upset expert predic- 
tions, either as to the part sea power would take, 
or as to which of the belligerent navies would 
dominate. In the course of the fighting there have 
not been any great surprises. Generally speaking, 
results have corresponded with the degree and kind 
of peace time naval preparation made by the war- 
ring nations. 

The statement that there have been no great sur- 
prises should be modified by one exception, sub- 
marine warfare against merchant ships. Before 
the British blockade forced Germany to plan her 
unscrupulous submarine campaign against com- 
merce it is doubtful if any country, not except- 
ing Gennany, ever thought seriously of such a 
campaign as a contingency of modern civilised 
war. It came therefore as a surprise, and 
its temporary success was due to the fact that 
in the years of pre-war time development of the 
submarine there had been no contemporaneous de- 
velopment of naval weapons to combat it as a 
commerce destroyer. The submarine had always 
been looked upon as a lawful weapon for use 
against enemy fighting ships, and its meagre suc- 
cess in this capacity shows that the preparations 
made against it were adequate; but the submarine 
as an unscrupulous commerce raider had thirty 
years' start of the weapons science designed to use 



ii NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

against it in this new and unexpected role. If it 
had been foreseen thirty years ago that subma- 
rines would be used in this way, step by step with 
the development of underwater craft, there would 
have been a corresponding improvement in scien- 
tific contrivances for safeguarding commerce; and 
had this been the case it is reasonable to suppose 
that the U-boat would never have reaped its grim 
harvest of peaceful shipping. 

So this exception goes to prove the rule that 
naval weapons both for offence and defence are 
highly scientific products resulting from long years 
of development. There is alwaj^s the chance, of 
course, that one side or the other will hit upon 
some revolutionising invention. Nor does it nec- 
essarily follow because none has appeared in three 
and one-half years of fighting that none will ap- 
pear in the future; but there is, nevertheless, evi- 
dence that in shaping a policy of defence it is safer 
to heed the lessons of experience than to rely on a 
mere theory of inventive abilities adequate to 
meet any situation. 

Neither an army nor a navy can be improvised, 
but it is an important difference between them 
that an army can be prepared more quickly and 
easily than can a navy. At the outbreak of this 
war Great Britain's army was small, but her pow- 
erful fleet was ready. Under the protection of 



SIGNIFICANCE OF NAVAL POWER 5 

this first line of defence a great army was recruit- 
ed from British possessions all over the world, 
and equipped, and trained. Navies cannot so 
readily be built up; it takes years to construct a 
battleship fleet and train the personnel to fight it. 
When the war began Germany's army was ten 
times as strong as Great Britain's army, but three 
and one-half years later there was no such dif- 
ference between the two and in some respects the 
British army was superior to that of Germany. 
On the other hand, in 1914 Germany's sea power 
was about two-thirds the strength of England's 
sea power, and approximately this same relative 
strength has been maintained up to the present 
time. It takes so long to build fighting ships and 
the demand on a nation's resources are such that 
Germany could hardly hope to construct during 
the war a fleet to rival that of her enemy. But it 
is different in the case of land forces. Great 
Britain is rapidly overcoming an initial discrep- 
ancy in armies much grea.ter than was the naval 
discrepancy facing Germany in July, 1914. 

Careful analysis of the battles fought in previ- 
ous wars has contributed much to naval science, 
and the general theories previously deduced have 
been verified by the events of this war. There is, 
however, by reason of improvements in ships and 
weapons, continuous change in the conditions af- 



6 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

fecting the application of strategic and tactical 
principles. This makes it advisable to alter rules 
of practice in the light of lessons learned from 
day to day. In attempting a study of the naval 
operations of the present war the handicap of in- 
sufficient and unreliable data is admitted, but 
even if some of the premises are slightly in error, 
still, the inferences drawn will have value so long 
as they are logical and square with accepted na- 
val opinion. 

Secrecy forms an important part of naval strat- 
egy and is favoured by nature. The sea isolates 
and frequently swallows up all testimony of the 
fighting done. Hence in the present war, the 
Admiralty announcements of both sides have been 
laconic. Notwithstanding this, however, there is 
plenty of evidence that the silent navies have not 
been idle. This is indicated by a summary of the 
losses sustained up to November, 1917. 

It is reported that in first line ships Great Brit- 
ain and her Allies have lost six dreadnoughts and 
sixteen pre-dreadnoughts, while Germany and her 
allies have lost one dreadnought and three pre- 
dreadnoughts. The Allies have lost eighteen ar- 
moured, cruisers and twelve light cruisers, against 
six armoured cruisers arid twenty-four light cruis- 
ers lost by the Central Powers. In other types the 
figures are less reliable, but the Allies have lost 



SIGNIFICANCE OF NAVAL POWER 7 

about forty-five destroyers, twenty torpedo boats, 
twenty-nine submarines, and forty-eight converted 
cruisers and auxiliaries, while the Central Powers 
have lost about twenty-eight destroyers, fourteen 
torpedo boats, between fifty and one hundred sub- 
marines, and forty-two converted cruisers and 
auxiliaries. In addition to these, both sides have 
lost numerous small craft, including air scouts, 
patrol boats, yachts and mine sweepers. 

This list of losses, however, indicates only a 
part of the naval work accomplished. Difficult 
and important operations are frequently unat- 
tended by losses. A complete narrative of the 
war would include not only the engagements 
fought, but in addition all the activities incident 
to mobilising, blockading, commerce destrojang, 
transporting, convoying, patrolling, scouting, 
raiding, and mine laying. It will be many 
years before the data for such a work will be 
available. 

The scope of this brief study is limited, there- 
fore, to the more important naval events. These 
will be discussed not so much with a view to com- 
pleteness in detail as with the aim of bringing 
out the points of policy, strateg)% and tactics nec- 
essary to an understanding of the general prin- 
ciples governing the size, composition, training, 
and uses of battle fleets. These principles are 



8 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

important as the starting point from which more 
difficult scientific deductions proceed. To deter- 
mine the latter is the function of naval experts 
who have devoted years to the exhaustive study 
of technical naval problems. The former com- 
prise a portion of general knowledge which even 
a casual student of world politics can ill afford 
to neglect. 



CHAPTER II 

Definitions and Estimate of the Situation 

Sea Power — Sea Control — Plans of Warring Navies 

SEA POWER 

THE sea power of a nation may be said to 
comprise all its means for contesting the 
control of the sea. It includes the battle fleets 
and their auxiliaries, cruisers, destroyers, subma- 
rines, aircraft, also naval bases and stations, for- 
tified or naturally protected harbours, coast de- 
fences, the merchant marine (embracing armed 
and unarmed vessels engaged in commerce and 
passenger traffic), in short, everything the country 
possesses that may be useful, directly or indirectly, 
for the purposes of naval warfare. 

Big-gun ships comprise the main reliance in 
battle and are known as "dreadnoughts," These 
are divided into dreadnought battleships and 
dreadnought battle cruisers, the difference between 
the two being that a certain amount of the gun 
power and armour of the battleship is sacrificed 

9 



10 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

in the battle cruiser in order to get speed. Pre- 
dreadnought battleships differ from dreadnought 
battleships in that, instead of carrying all big 
guns and torpedo defence guns, they carry some 
big guns and some smaller or intermediate bat- 
tery guns, thus tapering down to the torpedo de- 
fence guns. The armoured cruiser carries a mixed 
calibre battery like her running mate, the pre- 
dreadnought battleship, but is faster by reason of 
having less armour and less powerful guns. 

Both pre-dreadnought battleships and armoured 
cruisers are discredited as shown by the fact that 
no more are being built, but they are by no means 
useless and still form an important part of the 
strength of the more powerful navies. The light 
cruiser, used for commerce destroying and scout- 
ing, is a fast vessel without armour and carries 
torpedoes as well as a light battery of intermedi- 
ate calibre guns. The light cruiser type, which 
has shown considerable usefulness in the present 
war, may be regarded as a development of the 
torpedo boat destroyer, as it is larger, more sea- 
worthy, more habitable and better armed. The 
torpedo boat is a smaller edition of the destroyer, 
and the submarine requires no definition. An aux- 
iliary cruiser or a converted cruiser is a merchant 
ship or private vessel requisitioned by the Govern- 
ment for naval purposes. Such a vessel is usually 



ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION 11 

armed for both offence and defence. She loses her 
character of a merchant ship engaged in peaceful 
pursuits and becomes a part of the fighting navy 
with the status of a regular man-of-war. 

On the other hand, an armed merchantman is 
armed simply for defence. She is not a part of 
the fighting navy, and her character is determined 
by her employment. If she is still engaged in the 
peaceful pursuits of trade the fact that a ship car- 
ries one or two guns for defence only does not 
change her character into that of a man-of-war. 

Strategy and tactics comprise the science and 
art of using sea power with the object of getting 
control of the seas. The word strategy' conveys 
the idea of preparation for the fighting and tac- 
tics that of execution of the fighting. But before 
discussing the points of naval strategy and tactics 
exemplified in the present war, it is well to explain 
the uses of naval power and to outline the mari- 
time situation in July, 1914. 



SEA CONTROL 

When nations of maritime importance are at 
war, relative control of the sea, or certain parts 
of the sea, belongs to the belligerent whose sea 
power has practically driven the sea power of the 
other from the areas in question, so that the mari- 



12 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

time operations of the former, both naval and 
commercial, are practically unhindered, while the 
maritime operations of the latter are for the time 
being practically non-existent. For example, it is 
generally considered that since the beginning of 
the war the Allies have had control of the Atlan- 
tic. This does not mean that the maritime oper- 
ations of the Central Powers in these waters have 
been literally extinguished. It would appear im- 
possible, in the face of an enterprising and re- 
sourceful enemy, to prevent completely the opera- 
tions of submarines and occasional commerce de- 
stro5^ers. But since these have not materially af- 
fected the maritime operations of the Allies it is 
proper to say that the latter have controlled the 
Atlantic. There are varying degrees of sea con- 
trol, and the more extensive the submarine and 
commerce destroying activities of the weaker bel- 
ligerent, the less completely does the stronger 
enemy control the sea areas in question. 

Theoretically, in times of peace at least, the 
seas are free to all, but even then certain areas are 
said to be potentially controlled by certain nations 
by virtue of their relatively superior sea power in 
these respective waters. For example, the supe- 
rior sea power of Japan in Asiatic waters gives her 
in peace times what might be called potential con- 
trol of those seas, and it may be assumed that this 



ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION 13 

potential control increases the weight of her voice 
in international affairs of the Far East, 

In times of war also the potential sea power of 
neutrals may easily prove an important factor. 
For example, at the beginning of the war had the 
United States possessed a navy superior to the 
navies of the Allies, although, relatively speak- 
ing between the belligerent powers, the Allies 
would still have controlled the Atlantic Ocean, 
the superior sea power of the United States would 
have given this country a potential control of this 
ocean, which might have affected the conduct of 
the maritime operations of all the belligerents, 
particularly in matters concerning the lawful in- 
terests of the United States. 

International law is not very clearly codified, 
and it is natural that different nations should 
look at things from different angles. This means 
that when great wars are going on potential sea 
power may prove especially valuable in securing 
respect for neutral rights. 

At the beginning of the war the Allies had su- 
perior sea power and consequent potential control 
in the Atlantic, Pacific, Indian Ocean, Mediterra- 
nean Sea, Black Sea, North Sea — in short, in all 
sea areas excepting those adjacent to the ports and 
naval bases of the Central Powers, namely, the 
Adriatic near Austria's ports, the North Sea and 



U NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

the Baltic adjacent to Germany's ports, and the 
Sea of Marmora, the Dardanelles, and the Bos- 
porus, under the control of Turkey. 

Making a similar estimate of the situation at 
the close of the first three and one-half years of 
war, we find no material alteration. The fighting, 
which has changed the potential control into ac- 
tive control, followed a course quite to be ex- 
pected, and maritime operations have been singu- 
larly free of surprises. The Allies made a nota- 
ble attempt to wrest control of the Dardanelles, 
Sea of Marmora, and Bosporus from Turkey and 
her allies, but it failed, and, with the possible ex- 
ception of the battle off the Jutland Peninsula, 
there has been no other active struggle to alter the 
areas of sea control as determined by the pre- 
wartime disposition of sea power. This appor- 
tionment of the seas has been manifestly disad- 
vantageous to the Teutonic powers, but the sea 
power of the latter, the part their navies have 
played, and the waters they have controlled, have 
by no means been negligible. 

PLANS OF WARRING NAVIES 

.Broadly speaking, Great Britain's plan of naval 
campaign at the outbreak of hostilities aimed : — 
first, to destroy the enem)^ fleets with superior 



ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION 15 

forces, or, failing in this, to confine the enemy 
fleets and restrict his trade by a system of distant 
blockades; second, to convert potential control 
of the high seas into active control by destroy- 
ing, capturing, or bottling up enemy men-of-war 
operating on foreign stations. 

On the other hand, the weaker German and 
Austrian navies instituted a different kind of cam- 
paign. The Teutonic powers planned: — first, to 
operate the home fleets so as to protect their coast 
lines and control as wide as possible sea areas be- 
yond, thereby preventing a close blockade and 
permitting commercial intercourse with neighbour- 
ing neutral countries; second, to use their naval 
vessels abroad so as to inflict the greatest possible 
damage on their enemies before being cornered 
and destroyed by superior Allied sea power or es- 
caping to the shelter of home or friendly ports, 
as was the case when the Goebcn and Breslau 
eluded numerous enemy ships in the Mediterra- 
nean and steamed safely through the Dardanelles 
to Constantinople; third, to interfere with and 
damage enemy commerce by means of submarines 
and commerce destroyers, such as the Moewe; and 
fourth, the Teutonic powers planned to lessen the 
disparity of force between their navies and the 
superior navies of their enemies by so-called attri- 
tion warfare, harassing and menacing the enemy 



16 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

in all possible ways, instituting raids with fast air 
and sea squadrons, attacking with mines and tor- 
pedoes, and watchfully seeking opportunity to 
fall upon a detached portion of the enemy fleet 
with a superior force. 

How have these plans worked out"? What has 
Teutonic sea power accomplished ? What has Al- 
lied sea power accomplished? 

Early in the war German commerce destroyers, 
of which the Emden is a historic example, did 
considerable damage to Allied shipping. Turkey, 
aided by Germany, defeated the Allies at the Dar- 
danelles, where a costly attempt was made to 
wrest from Turkey waterways over which she had 
exercised authority practically since the beginning 
of modern history. The potential defensive pow- 
er proved adequate when put to the test of active 
resistance. The exploits of submarines have as- 
tonished the world. The British shores have been 
raided both by air and by sea attacks. In minor 
engagements as well as in the battle of Jutland, 
Germany, hitherto without traditions of the sea, 
has made a record in fighting efficiency which, 
ship for ship, places her fleet in the front rank. 

But to what purpose*? The superior naval 
power of the Allies has slowly but surely swept 
the German flag from the seas. In the first month 
of the war, the German cruisers in American and 



ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION 17 

Far Eastern waters were skillfully drawn away 
from enemy-infested areas and concentrated un- 
der the command of Vice Admiral von Spee off 
the west coast of South America. Here they 
gained a brief respite by defeating an inferior 
British squadron. But they were doomed ships, 
and it was only a question of time before the more 
powerful enemy navies would find and destroy 
them. This happened in the Falkland Islands en- 
gagement, which took place a month after the 
German victory off Coronel. With no navy to 
protect them, the German colonies have been cap- 
tured one by one. On the other hand, the colo- 
nies of the Allies have been secure, and a source 
of aid and comfort to their mother countries. 
German submarines have inflicted enormous losses 
but have not succeeded in closing the sea highways 
to the Allies. Supplies and munitions of war con- 
stantly stream into their ports. Transports bring 
their troops from all parts of the world. 

It was the pressure of naval power which com- 
pelled Germany as a last hope to undertake her 
lawless submarine campaign against commerce. 
This precipitated the United States into the war. 
Again it is the ability of the naval power of the 
United States to check the submarine menace in 
the Atlantic which has made the money, food, and 
man power of America transported over-seas to 



18 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

the support of hard-pressed England, France, and 
Italy a decisive factor of the war. 

Naval events in this war, therefore, have sup- 
plied corroborative evidence to inductions ground- 
ed in the experience of past wars, thus clarifying 
rather than confusing the principles already more 
or less firmly established. Naval power dominates 
the military situation. Unless there is an over- 
whelming discrepancy, the armies of the belliger- 
ent denied the sea will surely weaken and be over- 
come by the armies fed and equipped and sup- 
ported by means of ocean traffic. 



CHAPTER III 

Opening Activities 

Strength and Disposition of Fleets — Goeben and Breslau 
Episode — Attacks on Cable and Wireless Statioas. 

STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION OF FLEETS 
(JULY, 1914) 

WHEN hostilities opened, the naval fleets of 
the countries involved were concentrated 
in well-defined theatres of operations. Disregard- 
ing the small detachments on independent or for- 
eign service, the bulk of Great Britain's fleet faced 
the German high sea fleet in North Europe, while 
the French navy was opposed to the Austrian navy 
in the Mediterranean and Adriatic. Russia's navy 
had not been rehabilitated since the Russo-Japa- 
nese war, but the few ships she had guarded Rus- 
sian Baltic and Black Sea coasts. The relative 
strengths of these belligerent navies at the begin- 
ning of the great war may be approximately in- 
dicated by the following figures. 

Great Britain's navy consisted of sixty-three 
battleships, ten battle cruisers, thirty-four ar- 

19 



20 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

moured cruisers, seventy-four cruisers, two hun- 
dred destroyers, eighty-five torpedo boats and 
seventy-eight submarines. Of these, two of the 
older battleships, three battle cruisers, sixteen 
cruisers, and a few destroyers were on foreign sta- 
tions, 

Germany's navy consisted of thirty-five battle- 
ships, five battle cruisers, nine armoured cruisers, 
forty-five light cruisers, one hundred and forty- 
three destroyers, and about thirty-five submarines. 
This fighting strength was concentrated in home 
waters except for one battle cruiser, two armoured 
cruisers, eight light cruisers, and one destroyer on 
duty abroad. 

The French navy comprised twenty-two battle- 
ships, nineteen armoured cruisers, twelve light 
cruisers, eighty-four destroyers, one hundred and 
thirty-five torpedo boats, and seventy-eight sub- 
marines. As early as 1912, the Entente Cordiale 
between Great Britain and France resulted in the 
general scheme that France would look out for 
British naval interests in southern Europe, while 
Great Britain would protect French naval inter- 
ests in northern Europe. France had only four 
cruisers engaged in distant service. 

Austria's navy numbered twelve battleships, ten 
cruisers, eighteen destroyers, sixty-three torpedo 
boats, and ten submarines. All of these, with the 




21 



22 



NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 



exception of one armoured cruiser on the China 
station, were in home waters. 



Table (approximate) of Belligerent Fleets 
July, 1914^ 





Battle- 
ships, 
dread- 
nought 
type 


Battle- 
ships 


Battle 
cruis- 
ers 


Ar- 
moured 
cruis- 
ers 


Cruis- 
ers 


De- 
stroy- 
ers 


Tor- 
pedo 
boats 


Sub- 
ma- 
rines 


Coast 
defense 
vessels ^ 


England .... 
Germany . . . 

France 

Russia 

Austria- 
Hungary. . 


231 
152 

4 



4 


40 
20 
18 

7 

6 


10 
5 






34 
9 

19 
6 




74 
45 
12 
9 

10 


200 
143 
84 
91 

18 


85 



135 

14 

63 


78 
30 
78 
30 

10 



2 
1 
2 

6 



1 Assuming 2 Queen Elizabeth class practically completed. 

2 Assuming 2 Koenig class practically completed. 

Just before the outbreak of war the British fleet 
had been mobilised at Spithead, and early on Au- 
gust 4th, the day. of Great Britain's war declara- 
tion against Germany, this fleet put to sea under 
sealed orders. Less is known about the exact dis- 
position of the German forces, but probably they 
were equally ready and concentrated in the vi- 
cinity of the fortified bases at either end of the 
Kiel canal connecting the North and Baltic seas. 

On August 5th the British ship Drake cut two 
cables off the Azores, thus severing this means of 
communication between the German ships abroad 
and their Admiralty at home. On the same day, 

^ For further details of all the navies finally engaged in the 
war, see Appendix. 



OPENING ACTIVITIES 23 

the crew of a fishing boat reported that they had 
seen a large merchant ship in the North Sea throw- 
ing things overboard. A British destroyer flotilla 
of four ships was sent to investigate and soon gave 
chase to the steamer Koenigen Louise. A shot 
across the bow was unheeded, thus confirming the 
suspicions that the fleeing steamer had been con- 
verted by Germany into a mine layer. An en- 
gagement lasting about six minutes followed, dur- 
ing which the mine layer was repeatedly hit and 
finally sunk by gun fire. Fifty of her crew of one 
hundred and thirty were saved and made prison- 
ers. The next day the British light cruiser Am- 
phion struck a mine, probably one of those laid 
by the Koenigen Louise, and was destroyed. On 
August 9th a flotilla of German submarines made 
an unsuccessful attack against the light cruiser 
Birmingham^ which escaped unharmed after sink- 
ing by gun fire the German U-15. 

These early happenings give an idea of how 
the struggle on the seas began. As fast as the 
war news spread throughout the world the fight- 
ing ships and merchant ships of the nations in- 
volved proceeded, in accordance v/ith instructions, 
to modify their conduct and movements to meet 
the change from peace to war conditions. The 
German warships at large did what they could 
to safeguard their own commerce, destroy enemy 



24 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

commerce, and evade destruction themselves. The 
Allied navies set to work blockading enemy coasts, 
protecting Allied commerce, clearing the seas of 
enemy flags, rendering assistance to the expedi- 
tions sent to reduce German colonies, and trans- 
porting troops with their impedimenta from all 
parts of the world to the fighting front. 

Although the primary purpose of battleships is 
to give battle, it is readily seen that naval war- 
time work covers a wide and varied field. Some- 
times there are important naval happenings with- 
out attendant losses or even without fighting. 
The escape of the Go eh en and Breslau may be 
cited as of conspicuous political significance. 

"goeben" and "breslau" episode 

It is reported that during the first few days 
of the war the German battle cruiser Goeben and 
light cruiser Breslau bombarded the Algerian 
coast, sank a few ships in Bona harbour, and then 
proceeded to Messina, arriving there on August 
5th, 1914. It is also rumoured that while off 
the northern coast of Africa the two German 
cruisers, when hard beset by enemy forces, escaped 
during misty weather by the aid of the ruse of 
placing some musicians on a raft to attract the 
attention of enemy patrols by playing German 




25 



26 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

airs, while the warships laid their course for Mes- 
sina. 

From the pre-wartime disposition of forces it 
may be assumed that the Allies had in the Medi- 
terranean at this time numerous men-of-war, in- 
cluding very likely two or three British battle 
cruisers, several fast light cruisers, and many de- 
stroyers. International law required that the Ger- 
man warships leave the neutral port of Messina 
within twenty-four hours. The chances for es- 
cape appeared dubious to say the least, and the 
following version of the manoeuvre, purporting to 
be based on the log of the Goeben, is of interest: 

On Aug. 6, 1914, just before sailing from Messina the 
German commander issued these orders : "News about 
the enemy is uncertain, I presume his strength lies in 
the Adriatic and that he is watching both exits to the 
Messina Strait. Our object is to break through to the 
east and reach the Dardanelles. I want to create the 
impression that we intend to go to the Adriatic. In case 
I so succeed I will veer round in the night and make 
for Cape Matapan, if possible throwing the enemy off 
our track." 

As the ships — flags flying and music playing — were 
reaching the open sea the following wireless message 
from the Kaiser reached the Admiral : "His Majesty 
expects the Goeben and the Breslau to succeed in break- 
ing through." 

Shortly after leaving the harbour the English cruiser 



OPENING ACTIVITIES ^7 

Gloucester appeared on the horizon. The English 
cruiser was emitting signals in three groups. The word 
"Mumfu" frequently occurred and it was clear that it 
referred to the Goeben. The wireless receivers inter- 
preted the signal of the British cruiser as follows: ''Goe- 
ben making for the Adriatic." 

The German wireless officer argued thus : "I can jam 
him. If I break my waves against his perhaps I can 
confuse, hold up, destroy his messages. Shall I jam his 
wireless?" he asked the Admiral. 

"Shall we fire?" asked the Commander. 

"No," was the answer to both questions. No one 
apart from the staff understood the Admiral. This is 
how he argued, however: "This boat is evidently a 
patrol, intending to wireless our movements to the main 
British fleet. He shall save us, not ruin us. He shall 
do his work. We will neither fire at nor jam him. Let 
him wireless that the Germans are making for the Adri- 
atic, 'whereas the Dardanelles is our object." 

It was dark. The Breslau closed in. It was 10 o'clock 
in the evening; then came the order from the bridge: 
"Starboard; make for Cape Matapan." 

The watching British cruiser saw the manoeuvre, but 
before she could wireless the news that the Germans were 
making for the east the following order flashed out from 
the Admiral: "Jam the wireless; jam it like the devil." 

For hours the Germans were travelling eastward with- 
out obstacle, while the patrol boat tried to make itself 
understood in vain. Where did the error of our enemy 
lie ? In England the excuse was advanced that the Ger- 
mans had acquired knowledge of the British secret wire- 
, less code and so deceived the latter into waiting. Is it 
worth while contradicting such stuff? The English 



28 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

should have waited before the Strait of Messina, and 
nowhere else. But so confident were they that the Goe- 
ben and Breslau must try and break through to the Adri- 
atic in order to reach an Austrian port, that they thought 
it safe to wait in the Strait of Otranto, which is forty 
sea miles wide. So positive were they on this point that 
the thought of our making for the Dardanelles never 
seems to have occurred to them. 

When the wireless messages of the Gloucester finally 
reached the British fleet it was too late. The German 
ships were en route for Constantinople. 

That this episode caused the Allies considerable 
chagrin may well be imagined. The British com- 
mander was afterwards relieved. A little later, 
apparently as an alternative to disarming and 
being interned, the Go eh en and Breslau were sold 
by Germany to Turkey, a transaction without pre- 
cedent and involving a question of international 
law. Sharp representations were made by the Al- 
lies to Turkey, claiming that the latter had vio- 
lated her neutrality and demanding immediate 
repatriation of the officers and crews. Turkey 
, failed to comply with this demand and it is rea- 
sonable to suppose that the presence of the two 
warships in Constantinople had considerable in- 
fluence in persuading the Turkish Government to 
join Germany and Austria in the war. 

At this initial period in near Eastern affairs 
determined action on the part of the Allies to- 



OPENING ACTIVITIES 29 

ward Turkey might possibly have had important 
effects. 

Suppose, for example, that a powerful com- 
bined British and French naval force had steamed 
through the Dardanelles up to Constantinople and 
demanded the surrender of the Goebcn and Bres- 
lau because of Turkey's alleged violation of neu- 
trality laws. Suppose, also, if Turkey had for- 
bidden this passage and refused these demands, 
that the Allied force had fought its way through 
the Dardanelles and either captured or destroyed 
the Goeben and Breslau in spite of any armed 
resistance which might have been offered. It is, 
of course, problematical how much strength Tur- 
key could have shown at this time, but it is not 
an unreasonable supposition that a resolute naval 
demonstration in the Dardanelles might have been 
successful and might have had a decisive influence 
on the wavering Turks, with consequently far- 
reaching effects upon the general course of the 
war. 

ATTACKS ON CABLE AND WIRELESS STATIONS 

As another example of the kind of naval activ- 
ity frequently overlooked because unmarked by 
fighting, the work of destroying the enemy's cable 
and wireless service and safeguarding one's own, 
may be mentioned. 



30 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

Means of transmitting information are most 
important factors in modern strategy. These are 
now so efficient that it is extremely difficult for 
commerce destroyers of the nation of weaker sea 
power to escape the net drawn about them by 
the stronger navies dominating the seas. That 
the German ships on foreign stations well realised 
the part wireless and cable would play in their 
final downfall is evidenced by some interesting 
attempts made by them to destroy wireless sta- 
tions and cable stations. 

An instance of this was the visit of the Niirn- 
berg and a German collier to the British cable 
station at Fanning Island, situated about four 
hundred miles south of the Hawaiian group in 
the mid-Pacific. It was in the morning of Sep- 
tember 7, 1914, that the German cruiser rudely 
intruded upon the usually quiet and uneventful 
life of Fanning. 

The cable employes were hard at work, when 
they were paralysed to see a German officer at 
the door of the operating room with a revolver. 
"Take your hands off those keys, all of you!" he 
commanded. The men were made to line up 
against the wall, while the sailors with axes 
smashed the delicate and costly instruments. 
Heavy charges of dynamite were planted and the 
cable was blown to atoms. In the meanwhile the 



OPENING ACTIVITIES 31 

collier grappled for the cable further out to sea, 
with the intention of doing additional damage. 
A search was then made by the officers, and a num- 
ber of papers were found which revealed that sev- 
eral valuable instruments were buried in reserve 
for just such contingencies, and that a quantity of 
hidden arms and ammunition existed, all of which 
were quickly uncovered and confiscated/ 

Later on the Niirnberg formed a part of Ad- 
miral von Spec's squadron, which after the vic- 
tory off Coronel attempted to raid the Falkland 
Islands, just as Fanning had been raided. But 
this time the British Navy did the surprising, and 
instead of a defenceless wireless station the Ger- 
mans found Vice Admiral Sturdee on guard with 
a battle cruiser division. 

Another instance of cable attack, also unhappy 
in its results for the raiders, occurred in the Far 
East at the Cocos Islands. The valiant Captain 
Miiller of the Emden attempted one of his bogus- 
funnel ruses as a means of taking by storm the 
cable and wireless station on Keeling-Cocos Isl- 
and. But the ruse was detected — and well ahead 
— by those in charge on shore, who promptly ad- 
vised by wireless several British men-of-war with- 
in call. This led to the Emden's ultimate doom. 
Moreover, a rush cable message was sent out to 

* Chas. Bright, igth Century Magazine, April, 1915. 



32 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

the Navy Office at Melbourne, and the alertness 
and intelligence of the cable and wireless Super- 
intendents showed that they had well learned the 
lesson taught by the raid on Fanning Island. The 
Emden landing parties did, indeed, succeed in cut- 
ting two cables, but were too late. The intelli- 
gence which proved fatal had already passed over 
the wires. 

The story of the operator's part in the sinking 
of the Emden is one of those records of ready wit 
and efficiency which make the best of romance. 
The guns of the Sydney sent the Emden on the 
rocks, but those guns would not have come into 
play had not the operator at Cocos Island quickly 
recognised the enemy in all her disguise and dis- 
patched the warning message throughout the 
world which brought the Sydney up in time. It 
is almost disturbing to think that before the boat's 
crew had landed from the Emden the warships 
were moving to the rescue and London was mak- 
ing arrangements for repairing the cable and wire- 
less station. 

The superior sea power of the Allies, however, 
has made German attempts on Allied wireless and 
cable stations difficult, and, when successful, of 
only temporary embarrassment, while the over- 
seas German stations, without ships to defend 
them, have passed permanently into the hands of 
the Allies. 



CHAPTER IV 

Naval Action in Heligoland Bight 

THE first noteworthy naval engagement of 
the war occurred off Heligoland in August, 
1914. In connection with this action which at 
once and so dramatically brought this strategi- 
cally commanding naval fortress to the world's 
attention, it is interesting to keep in mind the 
events that gave to Germany this island outpost 
and the double base of the Kiel canal. 

It has been a strange fatality that Great Brit- 
ain's foreign policy throughout the 19th Century 
has strengthened the sea power of her enemies 
both off her own shores and at the Dardanelles, 
while at the same time her contemporary naval 
policy has carefully ' maintained a navy strong 
enough to dominate all rivals. This illustrates 
the necessity in any country for mutual under- 
standing and co-operation between the Foreign 
Office and the Navy department in shaping for- 
eign policies. 

The island of Heligoland had been a British 
possession from 1807, but in the late eighties was 

33 



34 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

ceded to Germany in exchange for concessions in 
Africa. In times of peace the African explorer 
Stanley is said to have called this transfer of 
Heligoland for concessions in Africa, ''The ex- 
change of a trouser button for a whole suit.'' A 
German interviewer now reports that the Kaiser, 
"with joy and pride," spoke of a recent visit to 
Heligoland, and adapted the above figure to pre- 
sent conditions by saying, "Today this trouser but- 
ton holds our whole suit together T 

Heligoland is situated 35 miles northeast of 
Cuxhaven and 43 miles north of Wilhelmshaven, 
and it guards the naval bases and the North Sea 
entrance of the Kiel canal. As a part of the Ger- 
man program of naval expansion prior to the war 
it had been converted into an impregnable forti- 
fication, and the Bight of Heligoland has become 
an outwork of the German bases which has greatly 
increased their tactical value. The Bight forms a 
channel eighteen miles wide leading to the ports 
of the Elbe and it is a nest of mines and lurking 
submarines. 

The chief point of interest in the action of Au- 
gust 28, 1916, is the spirited dash against the out- 
skirts of these dangers by Admiral Beattie's squad- 
ron, and his escape without serious damage after 
inflicting losses upon the Germans. 

The action of August 28th took place about 




rt 



it»ii ;■■>.' y 






^ 



tq 







^ 



■m 






^ 



W 



-4- 







3S 



36 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

seven miles north of Heligoland. Reconnoitring 
British submarines had reported German light 
cruisers and smaller craft in the vicinity of Heli- 
goland. The British plan was to draw these enemy 
ships away from the protecting guns of the fortress 
island and then to destroy them. Detailed official 
reports have not been published, but various ver- 
sions appearing in the press indicate a British 
scheme carried out in some such way as is de- 
scribed in the following paragraphs. 

Three submarines were to steam ahead on the 
surface of the water to act as decoys, and to re- 
treat before the German ships which were ex- 
pected to give chase. The light cruisers Are thus a 
and Fearless were assigned the mission to cut the 
enemy off from their home bases. A squadron of 
light cruisers was detailed to support these two 
ships, while other light cruisers and battle cruis- 
ers were held in reserve farther away in the north- 
west. British destroyers accompanied each of 
these three cruiser detachments. Vice Admiral 
Beatty was in chief command of the British forces. 

All ships being in their allotted positions at 
daybreak of the 28th, the three decoy submarines 
showing their hulls advanced at half speed to- 
ward Heligoland. They were accompanied by 
five sister ships steaming submerged and followed 
by two destroyers. This detachment was soon 



ACTION I\ HELIGOLAND BIGHT 37 

sighted, and German destroyers gave chase, fol- 
lowed by the light cruisers Ariadne and Strass- 
hurg. 

At about 7 a. m. this chase was being con- 
ducted toward the British reserve force in the 
northwest, while the supporting detachment, con- 
sisting of the Arethusa and the Fearless with ac- 
companying destroyers, was steaming toward the 
eastward to cut off the German retreat. At 8.10 
a. m. these two cruisers were engaged by enemy 
cruisers, and a stubborn action ensued in which 
the Arethusa was damaged. At 8.25 a six-inch 
projectile from the Fearless wrecked the forward 
bridge of the Ariadne, killing her captain, and the 
German ships then withdrew. At about 9 o'clock 
the Fearless towed the Arethusa to the westward, 
where she was able to make temporary repairs 
which permitted her to return to the engagement 
about an hour later. 

Meanwhile lively destroyer actions were in 
progress. The German V-187 boldly attacked a 
superior number of enemy destroyers, but was 
overpowered by gun fire and sank with her crew 
cheering and firing their guns as long as the muz- 
zles were above water. 

During a lull in the fighting the British de- 
stroyers Goshawk and Defender lowered boats to 
rescue survivors of the V-187, but the German 



38 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

light cruiser Mainz interrupted this operation and 
forced the destroyers to abandon two of their 
small boats. The commander of the submerged 
British submarine E-4 happened to be nearby 
watching this episode through his periscope. Tak- 
ing in the situation he manoeuvred his submarine 
for a rescue, and surprised the two small boats by 
suddenly coming to the surface midway between 
them. The Britishers and their rescued prisoners 
were quickly taken aboard, and the E-4 again sub- 
merged. 

At about 10 o'clock the British destroyers 
Lurcher and Firedrake, which were in company 
with the decoy submarines, reported that they 
were being chased by two fast enemy cruisers. 
The Arethusa^ Fearless^ and two more light cruis- 
ers armed with 4-inch guns went to the rescue and 
engaged the Strassburg, which vessel was soon 
supported by the Koln and Mainz. The larger 
guns carried by the German cruisers proved too 
strong for the lighter armed British cruisers, and 
calls for assistance were sent to the reserve force 
of battle cruisers and light cruisers previously sta- 
tioned in the northwest. 

In the meantime (at 11 a.m.) this reserve 
force had been attacked by three German subma- 
rines. This attack was frustrated by rapid ma- 



ACTION IN HELIGOLAND BIGHT 39 

noeuvring, and four British destroyers made a 
counter-attack. Shortly after eleven Vice Admiral 
Beatty, flying his flag in the battle cruiser Lion, 
received word that the British light cruisers were 
being hard pressed, and he ordered the Falmouth, 
carrying eight 8-inch guns, and the Nottingham, 
carrying nine 6-inch guns, to go to their support. 
A little later further calls for assistance were re- 
ceived, and the battle cruisers, having worked up 
to full speed, proceeded to the scene of the action. 
When the hion and Queen Mary appeared out of 
the mist their heavy guns quickly decided the 
battle. 

The noonday sun cleared away the mist which 
had masked the large guns of Heligoland during 
the engagement, and by evening both British and 
German forces had retired to their respective home 
ports. The Germans lost three light cruisers, 
Koln, Mainz and Ariadne, and one destroyer, 
V-i8y, sunk. The light cruiser Strassburg suf- 
fered severe damage as did also other of the Ger- 
man destroyers and small craft. The British lost 
no ships sunk, but the light cruiser Arethusa 
and some of the destroyers were hard hit and 
compelled to limp back to home navy yards for 
extensive repairs before returning again to active 
service. 



40 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

The following is Admiral Beatty's report of the 
engagement : 

//. M. S. Lion, September l, 1914. 

Sir. — I have the honor to report that on Thursday, 
August 27, at 5 a. m., I proceeded with the First Battle 
Cruiser Squadron and First Light Cruiser Squadron in 
company, to rendezvous with the Rear Admiral, Invinci- 
ble. 

At 4 a. m., August 28, the movements of the flotillas 
commenced, as previously arranged, the Battle Cruiser 
Squadron and Light Cruiser Squadron supporting. The 
Rear Admiral, Invincible, with Nezv Zealand and four 
destroyers, having joined my flag, the squadron passed 
through the prearranged rendezvous. 

At 8.10 a. m. I received a signal from the Commodore 
(T), informing me that the flotilla was in action with the 
enemy. This was presumably in the vicinity of their pre- 
arranged rendezvous. From this time until 11 a. m. I 
remained about the vicinity ready to support as neces- 
sary, intercepting various signals, which contained no in- 
formation on which I could act. 

At 11 a. m. the squadron was attacked by three sub- 
marines. The attack was frustrated by rapid maneuver- 
ing, and the four destroyers were ordered to attack them. 
Shortly after ) 1 a. m. various signals having been re- 
ceived indicating that the Commodore (T), and Com- 
modore (S) were both in need of assistance, I ordered the 
Light Cruiser Squadron to support the torpedo flotillas. 

Later I received a signal from the Commodore (T), 
stating that he was being attacked by a large cruiser, and 
a further signal informing me that he was being hard 
pressed, and asking for assistance. The Captain (D), 



ACTION IN HELIGOLAND lilGHT 41 

First Flotilla, also signalled that he was in need of help. 

From the foregoing the situation appeared to me crit- 
ical. The flotillas had advanced only two miles since 8 
a. m., and were only about 25 miles from two enemy 
bases on their flank and rear respectively. Commodore 
Goodenough had detached two of his light cruisers to 
assist some destroyers earlier in the day, and these had 
not yet rejoined. (They rejoined at 2.30 p. m.) As the 
reports indicated the presence of many enemy ships — one 
a large cruiser^ — I considered that his force might not be 
strong enough to deal with the situation sufficiently rap- 
idly, so at 11.30 a. m. the battle cruisers turned to ESE. 
and worked up to full speed. It was evident that to be 
of any value the support must be overwhelming, and car- 
ried out at the highest speed possible. 

I had not lost sight of the risk of submarines, and pos- 
sible sortie in force from the enemy's base, especially in 
view of the mist to the southeast. 

Our high speed, however, made submarine attack diffi- 
cult, and the smoothness of the sea made their detection 
comparatively easy. I considered that we were powerful 
enough to deal with any sorties except by a battle squad- 
ron, which was unlikely to come out in time, provided our 
stroke was sufficiently rapid. 

At 12.15 p. m. Fearless and First Flotilla were sighted 
retiring west. At the same time the Light Cruiser Squad- 
ron was observed to be engaging an enemy ship ahead. 
They appeared to have her beat. 

I then steered NE. to sounds of firing ahead, and at 
12.30 p. m. sighted Arethusa and Third Flotilla retiring 
to the westward engaging a cruiser of the Kolberg class 
on our port bow. I steered to cut her ofc from Heligo- 



42 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

land, and at 12.37 p. m. opened fire. At 12.42 the enemy 
turned to NE., and we chased at 27 knots. 

At 12.56 p. m. sighted and engaged a two-funnelled 
cruiser ahead. Lion fired two salvos at her, which took 
effect, and she disappeared into the mist, burning furi- 
ously and in a sinking condition. In view of the mist 
and that she was steering at high speed at right angles 
to Lion, who was herself steaming at 28 knots, the Lions 
firing was very creditable. 

Our destroyers had reported the presence of floating 
mines to the eastward, and I considered it inadvisable to 
pursue her. It was also essential that the squadrons 
should remain concentrated, and I accordingly ordered a 
withdrawal. The battle cruisers turned north and circled 
to port to complete the destruction of the vessel first en- 
gaged. She was sighted again at 1.25 p. m. steaming 
SE., with colors still flying. Lion opened fire with two 
turrets, and at 1.35 p. m., after receiving two salvos, she 
sank. 

The four attached destroyers were sent to pick up sur- 
vivors, but I deeply regret that they subsequently re- 
ported that they searched the area but found none. 

At 1.40 p. m. the battle cruisers turned to the north- 
ward, and Queen Mary was again attacked by a sub- 
marine. The attack was avoided by the use of the helm. 
Lowestoft was also unsuccessfully attacked. The battle 
cruisers covered the retirement until nightfall. By 6 
p. m., the retirement having been well executed and all 
destroyers accounted for, I altered course, spread the 
light cruisers, and swept northwards in accordance with 
the Commander-in-Chief's orders. At 7.45 p. m. I de- 
tached Liverpool to Rosyth with German prisoners, seven 



ACTION IN HELIGOLAND BIGHT 43 

officers and 79 men, survivors from Mainz. No further 
incident occurred. I have the honor to be, sir, your 
.obedient servant, 

(Signed) David Beattv, Ftce Admiral. 
The Secretary of the Admiralty. 



CHAPTER V 

CORONEL AND FALKLAND ENGAGEMENTS 
BATTLE OFF CORONEL 

AT the beginning of the war the British ar- 
moured cruisers Good Hope and Mon- 
??iouth, together with the light cruiser Glasgow 
and the transport Otranto^ were in Atlantic wa- 
ters off the coast of the Americas. These ships 
rendezvoused off Brazil under the command of 
Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock and proceeded 
south around Cape Horn, evidently with the mis- 
sion to find and destroy German vessels. The 
old battleship Canopus was also under his com- 
mand, but apparently did not cruise in company 
with the other ships because of her inferior speed. 
At this time German ships in the Pacific in- 
cluded the armoured cruisers Scharnhorst and 
Gneisenau, the light cruiser Niirnberg, and the 
light cruiser Leipzig. These ships in the Pacific, 
together with the light cruiser Dresden, then in 
South Atlantic waters, proceeded at the outbreak 
of the war, apparently in accordance with a pre- 
arranged plan, to rendezvous off the coast of South 
America. 

44 



CORONEL— FALKLAND ENGAGEMENTS 45 

A comparison of the strategic dispositions of the 
belligerents in this rather remote theatre of war, in 
the latter part of October, 1914, shows that the 
British Admiral had under his command two ar- 
moured cruisers, one light cruiser, and one battle- 
ship, while the German Admiral, Count von Spec, 
had two armoured cruisers and three light cruisers, 
thus giving the British a superiority of about 
8,000 tons in displacement and about 2,200 
pounds in weight of broadside. These figures, 
however, are misleading, because they do not truly 
measure the fighting values of the two groups. 
The German ships were newer and their squadron 
more homogeneous in both guns and speed. The 
British ships were a heterogeneous collection of 
less modern vessels, with the principal fighting 
strength in an old battleship of only sixteen knots 
speed, which did not get into the engagement at 
all. With the Canopus out of the battle line, the 
Germans had considerable advantage in tonnage 
and in weight of broadside.^ 

'The following figures indicate the strength of the British 
ships actually engaged. For the strength of the German squad- 
ron, see table for Falkland Islands engagement, p. 53 



Name 


Type 


Date 


Dis- 
place- 
ment 
(Tons) 


Belt 
ar- 
mour 


Guns 


Speed 


Good Hope .... 

Monmouth 

Glasgow 


.\rmoured Cruiser . . . 
.\rmourcd Cruiser . . . 
Light (scout) Cruiser 


1903 
1903 
1911 


14,100 
9,S00 
4.800 


f>-inch 
4-inch 
none 


2-9.2', 16-6', 14-3' 
14-6', 8-3' 
2-6', 10-4' 


24 
24 
26.5 



46 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

The information now available seems to afford 
evidence of superior strategy on the part of Ger- 
many, All the more credit is due on account of 
Germany's marked inferiority in total of sea pow- 
er, with consequently greater difficulties confront- 
ing Admiral von Spec, beset as he was by Japa- 
nese squadrons as well as by British squadrons, 
and without any naval bases in which to seek ref- 
uge and comfort. 

The movements of these squadrons up to the 
day of the battle have been considered as strateg- 
ical because they were in preparation for fighting. 
We now turn to the tactical phases which have to 
do with the execution of the fighting. 

On the afternoon of November l, 1914, the 
British squadron was spread out in scouting for- 
mation, steaming along the coast of Chile, look- 
ing for enemy ships. The light cruiser Glasgow 
had been dispatched to Coronel to send cables. 
She left there at 9 a. m., November 1, and while 
steaming to the northward sighted the German 
squadron about 4 p. m. At about 5 p. m. the 
British ships formed in line ahead, the Good Hope 
leading, followed by the Mon??iouth, Glasgow^ 
and Otranto. The battleship Canopus was about 
250 miles to the southward. Admiral von Spec 
formed his ships in line ahead, the Scliarnhdrst 
leading, followed by the Gneisenau, with the 



5^ OTRANTOO 

"'■D . GLASGOWO 
""^ MONMOUTH^ 
a< 5 (\ 

Z OSGOOD HOPEVJ 

*^ F « 
■^ o 9^ 



6lP7_ 

14,600 yds. 



6:20 _ 

13,600 yds. 



I _6l34 

y 11,260 yds. 



GOOD HOPE t)it. 

OTRANTO^'' 
escapes S.W^^ 



6:39 



6:53 



• NURNBERG ("far In rear") 

I DRESDEN ("l mile behind") 
1 GNEISENAU 
i SCHARN HORST 



German ships close 1 point. 



/ Open fire 

Tumbes Pt. 
Resume southerly course. 



. .'-°^—\ One point off. 
-<fe- 6,500 yds.\ 

\ 5,300 V 7:26, Cease Rrer 
MONMOUTH Q V-'yjj~ 
ceases fire, 7:20;V V 
sunk by NURNBERG, 8:5'6, 'K^ 



^^\, 7:45, 



GLASGOW// 

escapes S.W.K 



GOOD HOPEK 

ceases fire, 7:23: V 
sunk, 8:20iV._,' 



s"^ Increase 
Y;^^^^ distance." 
^■^j Light cruisers 
\i in pursuit. 



^ 



Wind S. 2 points E. 
Heavy head/ 
sea." 



STA.MARIA ( S^ 



P.Lauapie 





Concepcion 



Coronel 



DIAGRAM OF B.\TTLE OFF CORONEL 



47 



48 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

Dresden about one mile in the rear and the Ts! urn- 
berg far behind. At 6.07 p. m. the two squad- 
rons were on nearly parallel southerly courses, 
about 15,000 yards apart, with the German line 
inshore. 

There was a heavy sea and strong wind from 
one to two points to the eastward of south, and 
the German ships were able to make their course 
a little to the westward of south, bringing this 
heavy sea on their unengaged bow. On the other 
hand, the British carried wind and sea a little on 
the engaged bow, a marked disadvantage, making 
their six-inch guns, especially the lower tier, prac- 
tically useless. It is to be noted that the German 
8.2-inch guns were mounted higher and were bet- 
ter for fighting in a seaway. Practically all that 
the British had to oppose the twelve 8.2-inch guns 
of the Germans were two old 9,2-inch turret guns 
on board the Good Hope. An additional disad- 
vantage was that the British ships were outlined 
against the western sky, supplying an excellent 
point of aim for the Germans. 

At this time Admiral Cradock was no doubt 
doing some hard thinking. Should he engage 
with such big odds against him'? There was the 
Canopus, his main fighting strength, 250 miles 
to the southward. By bearing off sharply to the 
westward, even at this late hour, the speeds of the 



COROXEL— FALKLAND ENGAGEMENTS 49 

two squadrons were so nearly equal that he could 
have avoided engaging that night, and by morn- 
ing he might have joined the Canopus and fought 
the battle on a more equal footing. It would be 
interesting to know what thoughts flashed through 
the Admiral's mind and what counsels prevailed 
upon him to make the courageous but fateful de- 
cision embodied in his signal to the Canopus at 
6.18 p.m., "I am going to attack the enemy 
now." 

The two squadrons gradually neared one an- 
other on converging courses, and Vice Admiral 
von Spec describes the resulting battle as follows: 

Wind and swell were head on and the vessels had 
heavy going, especially the small cruisers on both sides. 
Observation and distance estimation were under a severe 
handicap because of the seas which washed over the 
bridges. The swell was so great that it obscured the 
aim of the gunners at the six-inch guns on the middle 
deck, who could not see the sterns of the enemy ships at 
all and the bows but seldom. At 6.20 p. m., at a dis- 
tance of 13,400 yards, I turned one point toward the 
enemy, and at 6.34 opened fire at a distance of 11,260 
yards. The guns of both our armoured cruisers were 
effective, and by 6.39 already we could note the first 
hit on the Good Hope. I at once resumed a parallel 
course instead of bearing slightly toward the enemy. 

The English opened their fire at this time. I assume 
that the heavy sea made more trouble for them than it 



50 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

did for us. Their two armoured cruisers remained cov- 
ered by our fire, while they, so far as could be deter- 
mined, hit the Scharnhorst but twice and the Gneisenau 
only four times. 

At 6.53, when 6,500 yards apart, I ordered a course 
one point away from the enemy. They were firing more 
slowly at this time, while we were able to count numer- 
ous hits. We could see, among other things, that the 
top of the Monmouth's forward turret had been shot 
away and that a violent fire was burning in the turret. 
The Scharnhorst, it is thought, hit the Good Hope about 
thirty-five times. 

In spite of our altered course the English changed 
theirs sufficiently so that the distance between us shrunk 
to 5,300 yards. There was reason to suspect that the 
enemy despaired of using his artillery effectively and 
was manoeuvring for a torpedo attack. The position of 
the moon, which had risen at 6 o'clock, was favourable 
to this move. Accordingly I gradually opened up 
further distances between the squadrons by another de- 
flection of the leading ship at 7.45. In the meantime it 
had grown dark. The range finders on the Scharnhorst 
used the fire on the Monmouth as a guide for a time, 
though eventually all range finding, aiming, and obser- 
vations became so inexact that firing was stopped at 
7.26. 

At 7.23 a column of fire from an explosion was no- 
ticed between the stacks of the Good Hope. The Mon- 
mouth apparently stopped firing at 7.20. The small 
cruisers, including the Nilrnberg, received by wireless at 
7.30 the order to follow the enemy and to attack his 
ships with torpedoes. Vision was somewhat obscured at 



CORONEL— FALKLAND ENGAGEMENTS 51 

this time by a rain squall. The light cruisers were not 
able to find the Good Hope, but the Nurnberg encoun- 
tered the Monmouth, and at 8.58 was able by shots at 
closest range to capsize her without a single shot being 
fired in return. Rescue work in the heavy sea was not 
to be thought of, especially as the Nurnberg immedi- 
ately afterward believed she had sighted the smoke of 
another ship and had to prepare for a new attack. 

The small cruisers had neither losses nor damage in 
the battle. On the Gneisenau there were two men slightly 
wounded. The crews of the ships went into the fight 
with enthusiasm, every one did his duty and played his 
part in the victory. 

In concluding the account of this battle it is 
difficult to find any fault in the tactics used by 
Vice Admiral von Spec. He appears to have 
manoeuvred so as to secure the advantage of Hght, 
wind, and sea. He also suited himself as regards 
the range. The Good Hope and Monmouth were 
destroyed, the Glasgow had a narrow and lucky 
escape, while the German losses were two slightly 
wounded. 



FALKLAND ISLANDS ENGAGEMENT 

After the battle off Coronel, while the German 
squadron coaled at Valparaiso and made its way 
in no great hurry around Cape Horn, the British 
were not idle. Within ten days of the receipt of 



52 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

the news of the British disaster in the South Pa- 
cific the dreadnought battle cruisers Invincible 
and Injiexible, under command of Vice Admiral 
Sturdee, were on their way to the Falkland Isl- 
ands, a wireless and coaling station off the south- 
east coast of South America. It would appear 
that Admiral von Spee contemplated an attack on 
the Falklands, and it would also appear that he 
did not anticipate the vigorous and alert strategy 
of his enemy. Had he done so he surely would 
have either tried to time his visit earlier or else 
have abandoned it entirely. 

As a matter of ordinary precaution it seems 
strange that he did not send a scout ship ahead 
to reconnoitre. At least he might have planned 
to arrive in the late afternoon, which would have 
given his ships a good chance to escape from a 
superior force under cover of darkness. On the 
other hand, little criticism can be made of Eng- 
land's strategy. On the morning of December 8, 
when the German squadron hove in sight of the 
lookout ship off the Falkland harbour entrance, an 
opposing fighting force had been provided, and 
lay at anchor within, consisting of two battle 
cruisers, the Invincible and Inflexible; three ar- 
moured cruisers, the Carnarvon^ Cornivall, and 
Kent; the light cruisers Bristol and Glasgow; and 
the predreadnought battleship Canopus. 



COROXEL— FALKLAND ENGAGEMENTS 53 

The German squadron was the same as off Cor- 
onel — two armoured cruisers, the Scharnhorst and 
Gneisenau^ and three light cruisers, the Leipzig^ 
Ni/rnberg^ and Dresden. 

The total tonnage of the British ships was 
87,000 — nearly three times that of the German 
tonnage, 3c;, 500. The total weight of the Brit- 
ish broadside was 9,566 kilograms, nearly five 
times that of the German broadside, which was 
2,032 kilograms. 

The following table gives the details of the 
opposing squadrons : 



BRITISH SQUADRON 



Name 



Invincible 

Inflexible .... 
Carnan-on . . . 

Cornwall 

Kent 

Bristol 

Glasgow 

CaDopus 

Scharnhorst . . 
Gneisenau . . . 

Leip^io: 

Nurnberg .... 
Dresden 



Type 



Battle Cruiser 

Battle Cruiser. 

.\rmoured Cruiser . 
Armoured Cruiser. 
Armoured Cruiser . 

Scout Cruiser 

Scout Cniiser 

Coast Defense Ship 





DLs- 


Belt 


Date 


place- 
ment 
(Tons) 


ar- 
mour 


1908 


17,250 


7-inch 


1908 


17,250 


7-inch 


1904 


10,850 


6-inch 


1901 


9.800 


4-inch 


1903 


9,800 


4-inch 


1911 


4,800 


none 


1911 


4,800 


none 


1897 


12.950 


6-ineh 



Guns 



8-12', 16-4' 
8-12", 16-4' 
4-7.5', 6-6' 
14-6' 
14-6' 

2-6', 10-4' 
2-6', 10-4' 
4-35cal. 12', 12-6* 



Speed 



26.5 
26.5 
23.0 
23.5 
23.0 
26.5 
26.5 
16.5 



GERMAN SQUADRON 



Armoured Cruiser . 
.Armoured Cruiser . 
Protected Cruiser. 

Scout Cruiser 

Scout Cruiser 



1907 


11,600 


6-inch 


1907 


11,600 


6-inch 


1906 


3,250 


none 


1908 


3,4.50 


none 


1908 


3,600 


none 



8-8.2', 6-6' 
8-8.2'. 6-6' 
10-4' 
10-4' 
10-4' 



23.5 
23 5 
23.0 
24.0 
24.0 



In addition to the fighting ships just mentioned, 
the converted cruiser Macedonia was acting as a 



54 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

lookout ship for the British, and the steamships 
Bade?! and Sa?ita Isabel were in the train of the 
German squadron. The British ships had arrived 
at 10.30 a. m. the day before and had begun 
coahng at once. At the time of the engagement 
the battle cruisers, though not filled up, had suf- 
ficient fuel on board, and the fact that they were 
a little light in draft favoured their speed. 

At 8 a. m. the German ships were sighted, and 
orders were .given to raise steam for full speed. 
The high land hid the main British force, and at 
9.20 the Gneisenau and the Ni'/rnberg, with guns 
trained on the wireless station, had closed to with- 
in 1 1,000 yards of the Canopus, which latter ves- 
sel opened fire at themi across the low land with 
her twelve-inch guns. The Germans hoisted their 
colours and turned away from their hidden foe, 
but a few minutes later turned to port, as though 
to close on the Kent, at the entrance of the har- 
bour. Then the British battle cruisers were sight- 
ed, and the two German ships altered course and 
increased their speed to join their consorts. 

At 9.45 a. m. the British squadron got under 
way and headed for the German ships, which were 
clearly in sight, hull down. The sea was calm, 
with a light breeze from the northwest. The visi- 
bility was at a maximum, under a bright sun in 
a clear sky. At 10.20 signal for a general chase 



56 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

was made, but the battle cruisers eased speed to 
twenty knots, to allow the other cruisers to get in 
station. 

Three enemy ships, probably transports or col- 
liers, were sighted off Port Pleasant, and the Bns- 
tol was ordered to take the Macedonia in com- 
pany and destroy the transports. 

The British squadron, as a whole, was not able 
to close on the German squadron, and at 11.20 
Vice Admiral Sturdee decided to attack with his 
faster ships, the Invincible^ Inflexible, and Glas- 
gow. These three all had a speed of twenty-six 
and one-half knots, and were able to close quickly 
on the Schar?ihdrst and Gneisenau, which had a 
speed of only twenty-three and one-half knots. 
At 12.55 th^ battle cruisers opened fire on the 
German light cruiser Leipzig at a range of 16,500 
to 15,000 yards. Soon after opening fire, the 
German light cruisers turned to the southwest and 
spread, in an effort to escape. The armoured 
cruisers Cornwall and Kent and the light cruiser 
Glasgow gave chase, while the battle cruisers and 
the Carnarvon kept on after the Scharnhorst and 
Gneisenau. Admiral Sturdee maintained, for the 
most part, a range of between 16,000 and 12,000 
yards, destroying the enemy with his twelve-inch 
guns in rather leisurely fashion, without getting 
within the effective range of the German 8.2-inch 



CORONEL— FALKLAND ENGAGEMENTS 57 

guns. At 4.17 p.m. the Scharnhorst sank, with 
her flag flying. The Gneisenau kept up the une- 
qual fight, but at 6 p. m. she also sank with her 
flag flying. 

In the chase after the light cruisers the Glasgow 
was the only ship with superior speed, but she was 
able to engage the Ni/rtiberg and Leipzig^ delay- 
ing them enough to give the Cor?2waIl and Kent a 
chance to get into action. The Leipzig sank at 
9 p. m. and the N limber g was sunk by the Kent 
at 7.27 p. m. 

The Dresden escaped, and made a precarious 
commerce destroying cruise, which lasted until 
March 14, 1915, when she was discovered near 
Juan Fernandez island and destroyed by the Kent, 
Glasgozv, and auxiliar}^ cruiser Orama. 

Hindsight is always better than foresight, and 
we should be slow to criticise without knowing 
full particulars, but one cannot help wondering 
at the tactical disposition of the Bristol and ques- 
tioning if the Dresden would have escaped had 
the Bristol been on hand to help the Glasgois:. It 
is to be noted that the Bristol, a sister ship to the 
Glasgow, was faster and better armed than any 
of the German light cruisers, and was also three 
and one-half knots faster than the British ar- 
moured cruisers Carnarvon, Cornwall and Kent. 
The reasons for sending a twenty-six-and-one- 



58 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

half-knot ship instead of a twenty- three-knot ship 
after the transports are not very clear, especially 
as the Bristol and the Glasgow were the only two 
ships besides the battle cruisers fast enough to 
catch the Niirnberg and the Dresden. The Bris- 
tol, to be sure, accomplished her assigned mission 
in destroying the German steamships. But could 
not the three-knot slower armoured cruiser Car- 
narvon have done this equally well? As it was, 
the Carnarvon served no useful purpose, and no 
avail was made of the valuable speed asset of 
the Bristol. 

The British lost nine killed and about the same 
number wounded. All the German ships except 
the Dresden were sunk, and only about 2oo men 
were saved from the total complements. This 
decisive naval action gave the Allies practically 
undisputed control of the high seas. 



CHAPTER VI 

Dardanelles Operations 

TURKEY entered the war on October 31, 
1914, and four days later the outer forts 
of the Dardanelles were bombarded for about ten 
minutes by Allied men-of-war. What useful pur- 
pose this bombardment served the Allied cause is 
not clear. There seems to have been no intention 
of pushing the attack home, and simply as a di- 
version it would appear calculated to put the en- 
emy on guard without gaining any commensurate 
military advantage. 

As early as November 25, 1914, the idea of 
making a serious attack on the Dardanelles was 
discussed at a meeting of the British War Coun- 
cil. In addition to political benefits expected to 
result from a military success in this war theatre 
and the obvious value of opening a way to Rus- 
sia's Black Sea ports, the argument was advanced 
that the best way to protect India and Egypt was 
to threaten Turkish communications, or better yet 
to cut them by capturing Constantinople. The 

59 



60 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

Council admitted the points in favour of the pro- 
ject, but because of the critical situation on the 
Western front and the shortage of tonnage for 
transport service the question for the time being 
was dismissed. 

On January 2, 1915, a telegram from Petro- 
grad stating that Russia v^^as hard pressed in the 
Caucasus and expressing the hope that a demon- 
stration would be made against the Turks from 
some other quarter, spurred the British War Coun- 
cil to a reconsideration of the Dardanelles pro- 
ject. In the ensuing deliberations the need of 
Russia seems to have introduced a question of 
expediency which hampered the development of 
plans strictly in accord with sound military prin- 
ciples. 

At this time naval and military opinion seems 
to have agreed that if a serious attack was to be 
made against the Dardanelles fortifications it was 
highly desirable to make it a joint naval and mili- 
tary operation. 

The original estimate of the British War Office 
was that an army of 150,000 men would be re- 
quired for a combined naval and military attack. 
The difficulty of supplying this force and the 
urgency of doing something for Russia led to a 
discussion of the advisability of making a purely 
naval demonstration with a view either to with- 



DARDANELLES OPERATIONS 61 

drawin<^ if the opening bombardment were not 
successful, or continuing the attack with such mil- 
itary support as could be provided on the spot, 
it the results of the preliminary demonstration 
warranted further operations aiming at the ulti- 
mate capture of Constantinople, 

In these discussions a strong opinion developed 
that the Dardanelles might be forced by the fleet 
alone, and in consequence, while the War Office 
made certain military preparations in the Eastern 
war theatre, important transactions took place be- 
tween the Admiralty office and Vice Admiral Car- 
den, then commanding the British forces in the 
Mediterranean. 

On January 3, 1915, the following telegram 
was dispatched from the Admiralty to Vice Ad- 
miral Carden : — 

"Do you think that it is a practical operation to force 
the Dardanelles by the use of ships alone ? It is assumed 
that older battleships would be employed, that they 
would be furnished with mine sweepers, and that they 
would be preceded by colliers or other merchant vessels 
as sweepers and bumpers. The importance of the result 
would justify severe loss. Let us know what your views 
are. 

On January 5th, Vice Admiral Carden replied 
to the Admiralty telegram of the third, in the fol- 
lowing terms: — 



62 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

"I do not think that the Dardanelles can be rushed, 
but they might be forced by extended operations with a 
large number of ships." 

On January 6th, the below telegram was 
sent from the First Lord to Vice Admiral Car- 
den : — 

"High authorities here concur in your opinion. For- 
ward detailed particulars showing what force would be 
required for extended operations. How do you think it 
should be employed, and what results could be gained?" 

On January i ith, Vice Admiral Garden replied 
to the telegram sent to him from the Admiralty 
on the 6th. Four operations he said were possi- 
ble. These were: — 

(a) The destruction of the defences at the en- 
trance to the Dardanelles. 

(b) Action inside the straits, so as to clear the 
defences up to and including Cephez Point Bat- 
tery N8. 

(c) Destruction of defences of the narrows. 

(d) Sweeping of a clear channel through the 
mine field and advance through the narrows, fol- 
lowed by a reduction of the forts further up, and 
advance into the Sea of Marmora. 

He estimated that it would take a month to 
carry out all these operations. 



DARDANELLES OPERATIONS 63 

At a meeting of the war council on January 
13, 1915, a decision was made and this decision 
as noted by Premier Asquith reads : — . 

"The Admiralty shoulci prepare for a naval ex- 
pedition in February to bombard and take the 
Gallipoli peninsula, with Constantinople as its 
objective." 

On January 15th, the Chief of the Naval War 
Staff reported his opinion on Admiral Carden's 
proposal. His memorandum began with the fol- 
lowing remark: "Concur generally in his plans." 
After dealing at some length with the detailed 
proposals this memorandum concluded by saying: 
"I would suggest (a) might be approved at once, 
as the experience gained would be useful." Un- 
less the experience gained from (a) and (b) jus- 
tified it, the undertaking of (c) and (d) was not 
recommended. 

On February 16th, a very important informal 
meeting of ministers was held. Owing to events 
in Egypt and to changes in plans in the West, it 
was decided to mass a considerable military force 
iri the Mediterranean to be used as occasion might 
require. The decisions, which were eventually in- 
corporated with those of the war council, were as 
follows : — 

"1. The 29th division, hitherto intended to 
form part of Sir John French's army, to be des- 



64 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

patched to Lemnos at the earliest possible date. 
It is hoped it may be able to sail within nine or 
ten days. 

"2. Arrangements to be made for a force to 
be dispatched from Egypt, if required. 

"3. The whole of the above forces, in conjunc- 
tion with the battalions of Royal Marines already 
despatched, to be available in case of necessity to 
support the naval attack on the Dardanelles. 

"4. Horse boats to be taken out with the 
29th division, and the Admiralty to make arrange- 
ments to collect small craft, tugs, and lighters in 
the Levant. 

"5. The Admiralty to build special transports 
and lighters suitable for the conveyance and land- 
ing of a force of 50,000 men at any point where 
they may be required." 

It had been intended that the 29th division 
should be ready to sail for the Mediterranean by 
the 22nd of February, but on the 20th the War 
Office decided that the general situation was such 
that this division could not be despatched as 
planned. On March 10th the situation on other 
fronts had changed and the War Office announced 
that the decision to send the 29th division was 
again operative. This change of mind entailed 
a delay of three weeks in despatching these troops. 

In the meantime during January and February 




65 



66 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

British and French forces in the Mediterranean 
were preparing for extensive operations against 
the Dardanelles. The island of Tenedos was 
seized. Under an agreement with Venizelos, the 
Greek Premier, the island of Lemnos was occu- 
pied, and Mudros with its large harbour converted 
into an advanced naval and military base. Lem- 
nos was less than fifty miles from Gallipoli, while 
Tenedos was only twenty-two miles distant from 
the Turkish coast. It has been said that there 
was also an arrangement with Venizelos to supply 
a Greek military expeditionary force, but, as the 
event proved, this aid could not be relied on. 

By the middle of February a large British fleet 
had been assembled, including the new superdread- 
nought Queen Elizabeth, carrying 15-inch guns, 
the battle cruiser Inflexible, the predreadnought 
battleships Agamemnon, Irresistible, Vengeance, 
Triumph, Albion, Lord Nelson, Ocean, Majestic, 
and a number of light cruisers, destroyers, subma- 
rines, mine sweepers, and other small craft. In 
addition to these the French contributed a fleet 
including the predreadnought battleships Charle- 
magne, Gaulois, Sufern, and Bouvet, with attend- 
ing destroyers and submarines. 

Naval operations began on the morning of Feb- 
ruary 19, 1915, at 8.00 a. m., when the combined 
fleet, with Vice Admiral Garden in supreme com- 



DARDANELLES OPERATIONS 67 

mand and Rear Admiral Guepratte in command 
of the French division, arrived off Gallipoli, and 
began a long range bombardment of the outer 
forts. In the middle of the afternoon three Brit- 
ish and three French battleships closed the forts 
and by darkness apparently all the outer shore 
batteries had been silenced. 

The demolition, however, did not prove perma- 
nent and bad weather prevented further opera- 
tions until February 25th, when another bombard- 
ment took place and by 5 o'clock in the afternoon 
the forts had again been silenced. 

Mine sweepers then cleared the way for the 
larger ships and on the next day a division of 
battleships steamed four miles up the straits and 
bombarded Fort Dardanos, a battery mounting 
5.9-inch guns. This fort together with a number 
of concealed batteries were silenced and marines 
were then landed to complete the demolition. 
This work was successfully accomplished, except 
at Kum Kale, where a strong force of Turks drove 
the landing party back to their boats. 

Bad weather again intervened, permitting the 
Turks to rehabilitate Fort Dardanos and the hid- 
den shore batteries. On March 1st the operations 
were resumed and mine sweepers cleared the chan- 
nel to within one and one-half miles of the Nar- 
rows. Durintr the next four days the bombard- 



68 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

ment and demolition by landing parties went on. 
A French squadron bombarded the Turkish line 
of communications at Bulair, with the hope of 
embarrassing the enemy's food and munition sup- 
ply, but without success. Also, as a diversion, a 
combined Allied fleet bombarded Smyrna, but this 
does not appear to have had much military sig- 
nificance. 

On March 6th and 7th violent naval attacks 
were made both by battleships well within the 
straits at close range and by the Queen Elizabeth, 
Agamemnon and Ocean at long range from the 
Gulf of Saros. The indirect fire of these battle- 
ships was controlled by airmen, who watched the 
fall of shell striking beyond the heights of the 
Peninsula and signalled spot corrections to the 
ships. As the angle of fall was such that the Eu- 
ropean forts could not be reached, the indirect fire 
was concentrated on the forts near Chanak on the 
Asiatic side. It was thought that this bombard- 
ment caused the Turks much discomfiture, and 
that the 15-inch shrapnel from the Queen Eliza- 
beth inflicted heavy losses. But the forts were 
not permanently silenced and although the heavy 
shrapnel fire was temporarily effective against en- 
emy personnel there was not a sufficient number 
of high explosive shells dropped in the fortifica- 



DARDANELLES OPERATIONS 69 

tions to damage them beyond repair. The result 
of these bombardments appears to have been ex- 
aggerated both in the minds of the naval com- 
manders on the spot and in the hopes of the Al- 
lied people at large. 

From A Larch 7 th to March 18th, there was a 
lull in the operations at the straits. It was realised 
that there would be need to land troops, and by 
March 15th the British forces gathered at Mudros 
together with the French force assembled at Biz- 
erta totalled somewhat over 100,000 fighting men, 
while the naval forces had been increased to the 
strength indicated in the following table.^ 

Allied Fleet at Dardanelles 

BRITISH battleships 

Weight in Pounds of a 

Broadside Salvo 
Heavy Secondary 

Name Guns Guns Guns 

Queen Elizabeth. Eight 15-inch, twelve 6-inch 15,600 600 

Inflexible Eight 12-inch, sixteen 4-in. 6,800 372 

Lord Nelson Four 12-inch, ten 9.2-inch. . 5,300 

Agamemnon " " " " . . 5,300 

Swiftsure " lo-inch, fourteen 7.5- 
inch 3,312 

Triumph Four lo-inch, fourteen 7.5- 
inch 3i3i2 

Comwallis Four 12-inch, twelve 6-inch 3,400 600 

Queen " " " " 3,400 600 

Implacable " " " '' 3,400 600 

London " " " " 3,400 600 

Irresistible " " " " 3,400 600 

^ Naval Inst. Proc, pp. 1735 and 1736, 191 5. 



70 



NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 



Name 



Gruns 



Four 12-inch, twelve 6-inch. 



GoHath 

Ocean 

Vengeance " " " " 

Albion " " " " 

Canopus « 

Prince George. ..." " " " 

Majestic " 

BRITISH CRUISERS, ETC. 

Euryalus Two 9.2-inch, twelve 6-inch 

Dublin Eight 6-inch 

Minerva Eleven 6-inch 

Doris " " 

Talbot " " 

Phaeton Two 6-inch, eight 4-inch . . . 

Amethyst Twelve 4-inch 

Sapphire " " 

Hussar Two 4.7-inch, four 6-pound- 



Weight in Pounds o£ a 

Broadside Salvo 
Heavy Secondary- 
Guns Guns 


3,400 


600 


3,400 


600 


3,400 


600 


3,400 


600 


3,400 


600 


3,400 


600 


3,400 


600 




1,360 




500 
600 




600 




600 




355 




217 




217 



BRITISH MONITOR 

Humber Two 6-inch, two 4.7-inch. . . 

BRITISH DESTROYERS 

Scorpion One 4-inch, three 12-pound- 



290 



Wolverine One 4-inch, three 12-pound- 

ers , . 

Pincher One 4-inch, three 12-pound- 

ers 

Renard One 4-inch, three 12 -pound- 
ers 

Chelmer Four 12-pounders 

FRENCH BATTLESHIPS 

Suffren Four 12-inch, ten 6.4-inch . . 3,880 

Gaulois " " " 5.5-inch.. 3,880 

Charlemagne.... " " " " .. 3,880 

St. Louis " " " " .. 3,880 

Bouvet Two 12-inch, two 10.8 inch, 

eight 5.5-inch 2,060 

Henri IV Two io.8-inch, seven 5.5- 
inch 1,124 

Jaureguiberry . . . .Two 12-inch, two 10.8-inch, 

eight 5.5-inch 2,416 



495 
330 
330 
330 

308 

264 

264 



DARDANELLES OPERATIONS 71 

Weight in Pounds of a • 

Broadside Salvo 
Heavy Secondary 
Name Guns Guns Guns 

FRENCH CRUISERS 

Kl^ber Eight 6.5-inch, four 3.9-inch . . 754 

Jeanne d'Arc Two 7.6-inch, fourteen 5.5- 
inch 763 

D'Entrecasteaux.Two 9.4-inch, twelve 5.5- 
inch I1I46 

RUSSIAN CRUISER 

Askold Twelve 6-inch 623 

Soon after this concentration unforeseen diffi- 
culties intervened, and the plan for early joint 
operations did not materialise. Early in March 
it had been decided to send out Sir Ian Hamilton 
to command the troops being assembled near the 
Dardanelles. His instructions contained the fol- 
lowing passage: — 

"The fleet has undertaken to force the passage of the 
Dardanelles. The employment of military forces on any 
large scale at this juncture is only contemplated in the 
event of the fleet failing to get through after every effort 
has been exhausted. Having entered on the project of 
forcing the Straits, there can be no idea of abandoning 
the scheme." 

At this time, in March, important telegrams 
passed between the Admiralty and Admiral Car- 
den. The First Lord, Mr. Winston Churchill, on 
March 1 1 th, asked whether the time had not ar- 
rived when "You will have to press hard for a 



72 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

decision," adding: — "Every well-conceived action 
for forcing a decision, even should regrettable 
losses be entailed, will receive our support." 
In his reply Admiral Garden said: — 

"I consider stage when vigorous action is necessary 
for success has now been reached. I am of opinion that 
in order to insure my communication line immediately 
Fleet enters the Sea of Marmora, military operations on 
a large scale should be opened at once." 

On March 15th the First Lord of the Admiralty 
sent another telegram to Admiral Garden, in 
which he said: — 

"When General Hamilton arrives on Tuesday night 
concert with him in any military operation on a large 
scale which you consider necessary. . . . The 29th divi- 
sion (18,000 additional men) cannot arrive until April 
2nd." 

On March 16th, Admiral Garden was forced 
to resign his command for reasons wholly based 
on the state of his health. He was succeeded by 
Vice Admiral de Robeck. On March 17th Sir 
Ian Hamilton arrived at Lemnos to take chief 
command of the Allied armies. A conference at 
once took place, attended by Vice Admiral de Ro- 
beck, Rear Admiral Guepratte commanding the 
French naval forces. General d'Amade command- 



DARDANELLES OPERATIONS 73 

ing the French land forces, and Sir Ian Hamilton. 

At about this time it was discovered that the 
transports had been improperly loaded; guns and 
munitions needed at once on landing were inac- 
cessible, being buried under tents and other sup- 
plies. Sir Ian Hamilton strongly demurred 
against launching a land attack immediately and 
made the point that in order to assure an effective 
landing practically the entire transport fleet must 
return to Eg}'pt and be reloaded. 

The decision of the conference hung on two al- 
ternatives — whether to make a combined attack 
at once under the handicap of improperly loaded 
transports, or to delay the land attack until the 
difficulty could be corrected with the penalty of 
losing valuable time. The latter course was de- 
cided upon and many hold that it was the fatal 
error of the campaign. It gave the Turks time 
to organise their defence. 

Enver Pasha the Turkish leader is reported to 
have declared at a later date: — "Their delay en- 
abled us thoroughly to fortify the peninsula, and 
in six weeks' time we had taken down there over 
two hundred Austrian Skoda guns." 

The decision to delay the landing of troops did 
not deter Vice Admiral de Robeck from carrying 
out the naval attack. On March 17th the Allied 



74 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

fleet sailed from Mudros, arriving off the straits 
at daylight on the i8th. 

The serious losses to the Allies during the bom- 
bardment of this date are told in an official state- 
ment from the British and French Admiralties 
from which the following extracts are taken : 

Mine-sweeping having been in progress inside the 
straits, a general attack was delivered by the British and 
French fleets March 18 on the fortresses at the narrows. 
At 10.45 ^' "^- ^1^^ Queen Elizabeth, Inflexible, Agamem- 
non and Lord Nelson bombarded forts, while the Tri- 
umph and the Prince George fired at batteries. A heavy 
fire was opened on the ships. At 12.22 p. m. the French 
squadron, consisting of the Suffren, Gaulois, Charle- 
magne and Bouvet, advanced up the Dardanelles and 
engaged the forts at closer range, and the forts replied 
strongly. Their fire was silenced by the 10 battleships 
inside the straits, all the ships being hit several times 
during this part of the action. By 1.25 p.m. all the 
forts had ceased firing. The Vengeance, Irresistible, 
Albion, Ocean, Swiftsure and Majestic, then advanced 
to relieve the six old battleships inside the straits. As 
the French squadron, which had engaged the forts in a 
most brilliant fashion, was passing out, the Bouvet was 
blown up by a drifting mine. She sank in 36 fathoms 
in less than three minutes. At 2.36 p. m. the relief bat- 
tleships renewed the attack on the forts, which again 
opened fire. The attack on the forts was maintained, 
while the operations of the mine sweepers continued. 

At 4.09 p. m. the Irresistible quit the line, listing 
heavily, and at 5.50 p. m. sank, having probably struck 



DARDANKLLES OPERATIONS 75 

a drifting mine. At 6.05 p. m. the Ocean, having also 
struck a mine, sank. Both vessels sank in deep water, 
practically the whole of their crews having been removed 
safely under a hot fire. The Gaulois was damaged by 
gun fire. The Inflexible had her forward control posi- 
tion hit by a heavy shell and required repair. The bom- 
bardment and the mine sweeping operations terminated 
when darkness fell. The losses of the ships were caused 
by mines drifting with the current, which were encoun- 
tered in areas hitherto swept clear, and this danger will 
require special treatment. 

The British casualties among personnel were not 
heavy, considering the scale of the operations, but prac- 
tically the whole of the crew of the Bouvet was lost with 
the ship, an internal explosion apparently having super- 
vened on the explosion of the mine. 

Vice Admiral de Robeck said, in part: "The 
power of the fleet to dominate the fortresses by 
superiority of fire seems to be established. Vari- 
ous other dangers and difficulties will have to be 
encountered, but nothing has happened which jus- 
tifies the belief that the cost of the undertaking 
will exceed what always has been expected and 
provided for. The British casualties in the per- 
sonnel are 61 men killed, wounded and missing. 
I desire to bring to the notice of Your Lordships 
the splendid behaviour of the French squadron. 
Their heavy loss leaves them quite undaunted. 
They were led into close action by Rear Admiral 
Gueprette with greatest gallantry." 



76 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

On March 19th Admiral de Robeck telegraphed 
the Admiralty that having had a satisfactory in- 
terview with Sir Ian Hamilton, General d'Amade 
and Admiral Wemyss, he proposed to proceed 
with the attack on the following day. It is sig- 
nificant that a meeting of the War Council in 
London was held on the same day of this de- 
spatch, March 19th, at which it was decided "to 
inform Vice Admiral de Robeck that he could 
continue the naval operations against the Darda- 
nelles if he thought fit." The attitude of Sir Ian 
Hamilton and the menace of mines and torpedoes, 
however, influenced Admiral de Robeck to change 
his mind and discontinue naval operations. 

Sir Ian Hamilton had witnessed the naval at- 
tack of March 18th and telegraphed the War Of- 
fice on the 19th: "I have not yet received any re- 
port on the naval action, but from what I actually 
saw of the extraordinarily gallant attempt made 
yesterday I am being most reluctantly driven to- 
wards the conclusion that the Dardanelles are less 
likely to be forced by battleships than at one time 
seemed probable, and that if the Army is to par- 
ticipate its operations will not assume the subsid- 
iary form anticipated. The Army's share will not 
be a case of landing parties for the destruction 
of forts, etc., but rather a case of a deliberate 
and progressive military operation carried out in 



DARDANELLES OPERATIONS 77 

force in order to make good the passage of the 
Navy." 

On March 23rd another telegram from Sir Ian 
Hamilton said: — "I have now conferred with Ad- 
miral de Robeck and we are equally convinced 
that to enable the fleet effectively to force the 
passage of the Dardanelles the co-operation of the 
whole military force will be necessary." On the 
same day Admiral de Robeck telegraphed the Ad- 
miralty that the mine menace was proving greater 
than he had expected; that time was required to 
make arrangements to meet this menace; that a 
decisive operation about the middle of the next 
month appeared better than to take great risks for 
accomplishing what might well prove to be only 
half measures; and that it did not appear practi- 
cable to land a sufficient force inside the Darda- 
nelles to carry out the service. On the 26th he 
added: — "The check on the 18th is not, in my 
opinion, decisive, but on the 22nd of March I met 
General Hamilton and heard his views, and I now 
think that, to obtain important results and to 
achieve the object of the campaign, a combined 
operation will be essential." 

From this time onward two points became per- 
fectly clear. One was that the Government had 
no intention of abandoning the attack on the Dar- 
danelles; the second was that the attack would 



78 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

be made both by the Navy and by Military forces 
employed on a large scale. Sir Ian Hamilton 
withdrew to Egypt to reload the transports and 
perfect preparations for landing in force, while 
the combined fleets made the necessary arrange- 
ments to do their share when the time came for 
making the grand effort. 

About six weeks later (April 25th to 26th) took 
place the famous combined land and sea attack, 
in which the Allied troops attained at a great cost 
a slight footing on the peninsula. The guns of 
the fleet afforded a covering fire for the troops, 
but there was no serious bombardment of the 
point of landing. The Turks evidently had made 
the most of the six weeks' delay and were well 
prepared. 

From the time of this landing it may truthfully 
be said that the naval force was used only as an 
auxiliary of the land forces, although the Navy 
performed arduous duties in the campaign which 
followed. On land, in spite of desperate fight- 
ing, the Allies made no great headway. There 
was another landing in August, which was almost 
as costly as the first — again without tactical re- 
sults — and the undertaking was abandoned in 
January, 1916. 

In this campaign the Allies lost five British pre- 
dreadnoughts, one French predreadnought and 



DARDANELLES OPERATIONS 79 

about 115,000 men killed, wounded or missing, 
with about 10,000 more sick. The cost of the 
expedition, ship losses not included, was about 
$1,000,000,000. As a diversion to hold an enemy 
force away from other fields it succeeded; but in 
the attainment of its main objective it was a 
failure. 

The decision to attempt forcing the Dardanelles 
has been much criticised, and it appears indeed to 
have been a formidable undertaking. But wheth- 
er or not it was unwise to attempt it is a debatable 
question. A successful attack upon the Darda- 
nelles might well have become of the very first 
importance and produced results which would 
have quickly been felt in the main eastern and 
western theatres of the war. Consider for a mo- 
ment the position of Russia at that time: a vast 
empire, with millions of men mobilised, crammed 
with surplus stores of wheat, yet for all practical 
purposes more cut off from the rest of the world 
than Germany. The White Sea was ice-bound, 
and Archangel, which is indifferently served by 
its railway, would not be open until some time in 
May. The Baltic was practically sealed. The 
way to the Black Sea was closed by the Darda- 
nelles and the Bosporus. Vladivostok was too far 
away to be of much use. Russia was in bonds, 
and it was the duty of her allies to burst them if 



80 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

they could. Immeasurable advantages would fol- 
low from the opening of a clear way to Odessa. 
Ships laden with wheat would stream outward 
and ships laden with the stores and equipment, 
which Russia so greatly needs, would stream in- 
ward. Moreover, the resources of fighting men, 
food supplies, and raw materials from Turkey in 
Asia would be cut off from the Central Powers 
and any possible menace to India, the Suez, and 
Egypt removed. 

The political results would have been equally 
great. The effect upon the hesitancy of the Bal- 
kan kingdoms and other neutrals would have been 
instant, and would have counteracted the impres- 
sion created by the successful German operations 
against the Russians. The fall of Constantinople 
would probably further have meant the collapse 
of the Turkish offensive. The Turks would never 
survive a blow at their heart. The bombardment 
of the Dardanelles, therefore, if the Allies had 
been able to carry it to its logical conclusion, 
would have had far-reaching effects on the con- 
duct of the war. 

It is interesting here to note the analogy be- 
tween the circumstances influencing the Allies to 
attempt to force the Dardanelles and the circum- 
stances during our civil war which influenced the 
North to open up the Mississippi. In the civil 



DARDANELLES OPERATIONS 81 

war it was desired to cut the Confederacy in two, 
so as to shut off the resources of Arkansas, Texas, 
and Louisiana from the Confederate armies and 
at the same time to open up communications be- 
tween the Gulf and the Northern States via the 
Mississippi and its tributaries. Moreover, just as 
forcing the Dardanelles would have been a de- 
terrent to Bulgaria's entering the war on the side 
of the Central Powers and would perhaps have 
influenced Greece and Rumania to declare for the 
Allies, so Farragut's capture of New Orleans de- 
terred France from action hostile to the Union 
and caused Louis Napoleon to abandon his scheme 
to despatch a formidable fleet to the mouth of the 
Mississippi and join an equal force from England 
with the object of repudiating the blockade as 
ineffectual and demanding free egress and ingress 
for merchantmen. 

There is also some analogy between the condi- 
tions confronting Admiral Farragut, requiring 
him to force his way by the Confederate forts in 
the. lower Mississippi on his way to attack New 
Orleans, and the conditions facing Admiral de 
Robeck, supposing that his mission was to force 
the Dardanelles in order to attack Constantinople. 
Admiral Farragut was brilliantly successful in 
running the forts and capturing New Orleans, 
while the Dardanelles operations ended in bitter 



82 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

disappointment to the Allies. It would not be 
wise to push the analogy too closely, as erroneous 
inferences might be drawn; but one cannot help 
reflecting upon and comparing the circumstances, 
methods, and results attending these two great 
enterprises. 

Instead of condemning offhand the attempt to 
capture Constantinople as foolhardy in concep- 
tion, it might be better to ponder the possible 
causes of failure. Failure cei:ainly was never 
due to lack of fighting qualities in the Allied sail- 
ors and soldiers, for there is probably no more 
heroic page in history than that recording the 
brave deeds done in this struggle for the Darda- 
nelles. 



CHAPTER VII 

North Sea Battles 

dogger bank encounter 

WITHIN a few months after the outbreak 
of hostiHties the pressure of superior Al- 
lied sea power had effectively confined the Ger- 
man fieet. It is probable that the German Ad- 
miralty felt the need tor some show of naval ac- 
tivity. Submarines and mines had accomplished 
some successes, but their more spectacular use had 
not yet developed, and cruiser raids against the 
British were instituted, most notable of which was 
the attack on the defenceless coast towns Scar- 
boro, Hartlepool and Whitby, in which 99 people 
were killed. This occurred on December 16, 1914- 
These raids accomplished no military result, but 
the attempted raid of January 24, 1915, led to 
a running fight in the North Sea between two bat- 
tle cruiser squadrons, during which the German 
armoured cruiser Bliicher was sunk, having been 
abandoned by her retreating consorts. No Eng- 
lish ship was lost. 

83 



84. 



NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 



The battle cruiser engagement off the Dogger 
Bank was the first between modern big-gun ships. 
Particular interest is also attached to it because 
each squadron was accompanied by scouting and 
screening light cruisers and destroyers. It was 
fear of submarines and mines, moreover, that in- 
fluenced the British to break off the engagement, 
and it is also reported that a Zeppelin airship 
and a seaplane took part, and perhaps assisted in 
the fire control of the Germans.^ 

At daybreak on January 24, 1915, Vice Ad- 
miral Sir David Beatty's battle cruiser squadron, 
consisting of the Liofz, Princess Royal, Tiger, New 
Zealand, and Indojnitable, were patrolling in com- 
pany with four light cruisers, while three light 

^The principal details of the vessels in the respective squad- 
rons follow: 



Name 



Com- 
pleted 



Displace- 
ment 



Speed 



Main 
Armament 



Armour 
Belt 



Lion 

Tiger 

Princess Royal. 
New Zealand . . . 
Indomitable 



Derfflinger. 
Sevdlitz . . . 
Moltke.... 
Blucher 



1912 
1914 
1912 
1912 
1908 

1914 
1913 
1911 
1910 



26,350 
28,000 
26,350 
18,800 
17,250 

28,000 
24,640 
22,640 
15,550 



28.5 

28 

28.5 

25 

26 

27 
29 2 
28.4 
25.3 



8 13.5-in. 

8 13.5-in. 

8 13.5-in. 

8 12-in. 

8 12-in. 

8 12-in. 

10 11-in. 

10 11-in. 
12 8.2-in. 



9-in. 
9-in. 
9-in. 
8-in. 
7-in. 

11-14-in. 

11-14-in. 

11-14-in. 

6-in. 



There were 40 heavy guns in each squadron, but whereas 
the British included twenty-four 13.5-inch and sixteen 12-inch, 
the German comprised eight 12-inch, twenty ii-inch, and 
twelve 8.2-inch. 



86 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

cruiser flotilla leaders, with their destroyers, were 
in station ahead. At 7.25 a. m. the Aurora^ one 
of these flotilla-leading light cruisers, engaged an 
enemy ship. This scouting and screening force 
got in touch with and guided the British battle 
cruisers toward the enemy battle cruiser squad- 
ron, under Rear Admiral Hipper, consisting of the 
battle cruisers Seydlitz, 'D erf linger^ and Moltke, 
with the armoured cruiser Blucher. The Ger- 
man capital ships were also accompanied by 
light cruisers and destroyers. It was a stern- 
chase fight, in which ranging shots were tried 
at about 20,000 yards and hits reported at 
about 18,000 yards. Practically all the fight- 
ing between the battle cruisers was done at long 
ranges. The slower armoured cruiser Blucher 
dropped astern, and early in the fight developed 
engine trouble. Her 8.2-inch guns were of little 
use, and at 10.48 she drew out of line in a de- 
feated condition. At. 12. 37 she sank, having re- 
ceived, very likely, her deathblow from a torpedo. 
Disregarding the Bliicher, the stern fire of the 
German battle cruisers consisted of four twelve- 
inch and sixteen eleven-inch, as opposed to the 
British bow fire of twelve 13.5-inch guns from 
the leading three ships and the bow twelve-inch 
from the New Zealand and Indomitable. These 
latter two ships, however, being two or three knots 



NORTH SEA BATTLES 87 

slower than the other three, fired for the most part 
only at the Bliicher. At 1 1 .03 the flagship Lion 
was put out of action, and she was later towed 
into port with a considerable list. Considering 
the long range, the gunnery on both sides appears 
to have been excellent, and it is hard to say which 
side did the better shooting or whose battle cruis- 
ers suffered the more damage. 

The light cruisers and destroyers took little part 
in the actual fighting. The British flotillas were 
kept most of the time on the unengaged quarter 
of Admiral Beatty's squadron. At about 9.30 the 
German destroyers threatened an attack, and one 
division of the British destroyers manoeuvred so 
as to pass ahead of the battle cruisers and screen 
them; but the threatened attack was not made. 
Later on the German destroyers again appeared 
to be preparing for an attack, and the Lion and 
Tiger opened fire on them, causing them to retire 
and resume their original course. Shortly before 
noon, about seventy miles from Heligoland, the 
engagement was broken off by the British because 
of the presence of enemy submarines. 

The conditions surrounding this battle were 
ideal for illustrating the functions of battle cruis- 
ers. The German warship raid on the British 
coast of the previous month was still fresh in 
mind; and when this situation off the Dogger 



88 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

Bank arose, the timely interposing of Admiral 
Beatty's superior force, the fast chase, the long- 
range fighting, the loss of the Bli/cker, and the 
hasty retreat of the enemy, were all particularly 
pleasing to the British people. As a result the 
battle cruiser type of ship attained great popu- 
larity. 

The question of speed, armour, and armament, 
however, is a perplexing problem. Before going 
deeper into this question it is advisable to con- 
sider further data on the war-time usefulness of 
battle cruisers. This type of ship will therefore 
be adverted to later on. 

BATTLE OF JUTLAND Part I 

In a narrative of the principal events of the 
battle of Jutland, together with a discussion of 
some of the points in strategy and tactics illus- 
trated, it should be appreciated that many of the 
details are lacking. Some of these details will be 
uncovered in the course of time, but many — hav- 
ing been lost in the sea along with the ships that 
went down — can only be matter for speculation. 

The battle of Jutland was fought between the 
British Grand Fleet and the German High Seas 
Fleet during the late afternoon and evening of 
May 31, 1916, with torpedo attacks continuin;:; 



NORTH SEA BATTLES 89 

throughout the night. A decisive engagement was 
probably prevented by thick weather and ap- 
proaching darkness, but hard blows were given 
and sustained on both sides. 

It is a well-recognised experience of history that 
the public gauges the magnitude of a battle by 
the consequent changes in the political and mili- 
tary situation. At times a comparatively minor 
engagement between relatively small forces where- 
in little actual fighting occurs will, if followed 
by a decided change in an international situation, 
assume in the public eye the proportions of a big 
battle. On the other hand, it sometimes occurs 
that a great battle, measured by the size and 
power of the forces involved and the actual fight- 
ing done, will, if indecisive and unproductive of 
changes in the status quo, appear small in the pub- 
lic eye and often arouse popular dissatisfaction on 
both sides. It may be that history will place the 
battle of Jutland in this latter class. But, even 
so, when one considers the actual fighting done, 
and judges by the size, number, and various types 
of the ships engaged, their ability to manoeuvre, 
their power to give and their power to sustain hard 
blows, this battle is far and away the greatest the 
world has ever seen. Never before has there been 
brought together such an array of fighting ma- 
chines — dreadnoughts, battle cruisers, scout cruis- 



90 ^A^'AL POWER IN THE WAR 

ers, destroyers, submarines, and aircraft. More- 
over, it took intelligence, nerve, and endurance 
of the personnel to operate this powerful machin- 
ery under varying conditions of wind, sea, and 
weather. Assuredly it would seem that in this 
action and all that it exemplifies both in the ships 
engaged and in the requirements demanded of the 
personnel there must have been illustrated the 
best there is of naval art and naval science. 
The British Grand Fleet comprised : 

(a) An advance force under Vice Admiral Beatty, 
consisting of six battle cruisers, (four Lions of 28.5 
knots speed, each carrying eight 13.5-inch guns, and two 
Lndefatigables of 25 knots speed, each carrying eight 12- 
inch guns,) supported by the Fifth Battle Squadron, 
under Rear Admiral Evan-Thomas, (four 25-knot bat- 
tleships of the Queen Elizabeth class, each carrying eight 
15-inch guns). 

(b) The main body, under Admiral Jellicoe — flying 
his flag in the Iron Duke — consisting of a fast wing 
under Rear Admiral Hood, ( three 26-knot battle cruisers 
of Invincible class, each carrying eight 1 2-inch guns), a 
division of four armoured cruisers under Rear Admiral 
Arbuthnot, and twenty-five dreadnoughts in three squad- 
rons commanded by Mce Admirals Burney, Jerram, and 
Sturdee. 

(c) About twenty light cruisers and 160 destroyers, 
divided between the advance force and the main body. 

The German High Sea Fleet comprised : 



NORTH SEA BATTLES 91 

(a) An advance force under Vice Admiral Hipper, 
consisting of five battle cruisers (three Derjflingers of 
probably 27 knots speed, each carrying eight 1 2-inch 
guns, and two Moltkes of probably 28 knots speed, each 
carrying ten 11 -inch guns). 

(b) The main body under Admiral Scheer, consisting 
of sixteen dreadnoughts and six predreadnought battle- 
ships. 

(c) About twenty light cruisers and eighty or ninety 
destroyers, divided between the advance force and the 
main body. 

At 2.30 p. m., May 31, 1916, the naval situa- 
tion in the North Sea was approximately as fol- 
lows: The German advance force of five battle 
cruisers under Vice Admiral Hipper was some 
eighty or a hundred miles to the northwestward 
of Horn Reef, while fifteen miles to the south and 
west of him was Vice Admiral Beatty with the 
British advance force of six battle cruisers, sup- 
ported by four fast dreadnought battleships under 
Rear Admiral Evan-Thomas. Admiral Jellicoe, 
in command of the British Grand Fleet, was about 
fifty miles distant with the main body to the 
northeastward, while Admiral Scheer, in command 
of the German High Seas Fleet, was about the 
same distance away with his main body to the 
southeastward. German submarines were sighted 
soon after the beginning of the engagement. Brit- 
ish and German aircraft were present, but do not 



92 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

appear to have figured very prominently in the 
conflict. 

It is convenient to divide the battle into the 
following four phases: 

First Phase: British advance force encounters Ger- 
man advance force. Six British battle cruisers, sup- 
ported by four dreadnought battleships, engaged with 
five German battle cruisers, (3.49 p.m. to 4.45 p.m.). 

Second Phase: Action between British advance force 
and van of High Seas Fleet. Four British battle cruis- 
ers and four dreadnought battleships engaged with five 
German battle cruisers and van of German battle fleet, 
(4.45 p.m. to 6.15 p.m.). 

Third Phase: British Gratid Fleet engaged with Ger- 
man High Seas Fleet, (6.15 p. m. to dark). 

Fourth Phase: Torpedo attacks and screening opera^ 
tions during the night, {May 31 to June 1). 

Each one of these phases will be taken up sep- 
arately in the order named. 

First Phase: Encounter Betvjeen the Battle 
Cruiser Squadrons Commanded by Vice Admiral 
Beatty (British) and Vice Admiral Hipper {Ger- 
man). 

The British Grand Fleet had left its bases on 
the 30th, and was sweeping through the North 
Sea to the southward with Vice Admiral Beatty's 
force cruising well in advance of the main body. 
Besides the six battle cruisers led by Vice Admiral 
Beatty in the Lion and the four 25-knot battle- 




DIAGRAM OF BATTLE OF JUTLAND 



93 



94 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

ships of the Elizabeth class, led by Rear Admiral 
Evan-Thomas in the Barham, this advance force 
was accompanied by three light cruiser squadrons 
and four flotillas of destroyers. At 2,20 p. m. the 
light cruiser Galatea reported the presence of Ger- 
man ships in considerable force and at 2.25 a Brit- 
ish seaplane was sent from its mother ship Enga- 
dine to scout to the northeastward. Visibility at 
this time was good. The wind was southeast. 

At 3.31 the German battle cruiser squadron 
(five ships) under Vice Admiral Hipper was 
sighted to the northeastward at a range of 23,000 
yards. The two squadrons formed for battle, and 
approached each other on slightly converging 
southeasterly courses. Light cruisers and destroy- 
ers of both sides assumed screening formations, 
and the opposing light cruisers in the more ad- 
vanced stations were engaged during the battle ap- 
proach. At 3.48 fire was opened simultaneously 
by both sides at about 18,500 yards' range. The 
squadrons fought on parallel courses curving to 
the southeast. At 4,08 the battleships under Rear 
Admiral Evan-Thomas opened fire at 20,000 
yards' range, but it is doubtful if these ships got 
close enough to do any effective work during this 
phase of the battle. About this time submarines 
were reported both on the engaged and unen- 
gaged beams of the British battle cruisers. De- 



NORTH SEA BATTLES 95 

stroyers were active in attempts to screen the big 
ships from underwater attack. 

Ten minutes after the engagement became gen- 
eral an explosion occurred in the Indefatigable^ 
and she sank almost immediately. At 4. 15 twelve 
British destroyers moved forward to attack the 
German battle cruisers; German light cruisers 
and destroyers made a similar advance at the same 
time. A fierce engagement ensued between these 
light craft at close quarters. The Germans did 
not press their torpedo attack, but six of the Brit- 
ish destroyers continued the advance under a 
heavy shell fire, and fired torpedoes at the Ger- 
man lines. At 4.30 a mighty explosion occurred 
in the Queen Mary, and she went down so quickly 
that the following ships in the formation are re- 
ported as having steamed right over her. At 4.42 
the German battle fleet was sighted to the south- 
east, and the British ships turned right about (16 
points ^ 180 degrees) in succession. The Ger- 
man battle cruisers also altered course 16 points, 
and the action continued on a ' northwesterly 
course, beginning what we will call the second 
phase. 

According to German Admiralty reports, during 
the first phase, lasting about an hour, from 3.49 
to the time the British changed course 16 points 
at 4.45, the British battle cruiser Indefatigable 



96 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

(tonnage 18,750, main battery eight 12-inch, car- 
rying 899 men) was sunk at 4.05, and the Queen 
M<3rj (tonnage 27,000, main battery eight 13.5- 
inch guns, carrying 1,000 men) was destroyed at 
about 4.35. It is also reported that the British 
lost four destroyers and the Germans two. Be- 
fore taking up the second phase of the battle, a 
few points bearing on the first phase will be brief- 
ly discussed. 

Different theories have been advanced as to the 
probable causes of the loss of the two British bat- 
tle cruisers. It is reported that both ships suf- 
fered heavy explosions which appeared to come 
•up through turret tops. This has led to the opinion 
that enemy shells exploded in the respective tur- 
rets, and, igniting chains of powder to the mag- 
azines, caused the blowing up of the magazines. 
This is not at all unlikely, and directs attention 
to the need of safety precautions in the supply of 
ammunition to turret guns. 

Following the engagement there was comment 
to the effect that Admiral Jellicoe violated the 
principle of concentration of forces by sending 
in advance a squadron of four battleships to sup- 
port Admiral Beatty's battle cruisers. The con- 
sensus of professional opinion, however, does not 
appear to support any such criticism. This ad- 
vance force was composed entirely of fast ships 



NORTH SEA BATTLES 97 

(the battleships had the unusually high speed of 
25 knots), operating on interior lines between the 
supporting British fleet and the enemy main fleet, 
with little or no chance of being cut off by a su- 
perior enemy force. 

There is also more or less criticism to the ef- 
fect that Admiral Beatty rashly exposed his com- 
mand; that the Germans counted on his impetuos- 
ity; and it has been said that he did just what 
Admiral Hipper expected him to do and wanted 
him to do. On the other hand, it may be ar- 
gued that at the start of the action the situation 
was not unfavourable to the British because Ad- 
miral Hipper was almost cut oif by a superior 
force and in danger of being compelled to turn 
toward the British Grand Fleet. The plan of co- 
ordination between the main body under Admiral 
Jellicoe and the British advance force is not clear, 
but it is evident that Admiral Beatty tried to get 
to the southward of Admiral Hipper, and upon 
the approach of the High Seas Fleet was com- 
pelled to make a right about turn, a manoeuvre 
likely to prove disastrous if attempted under gun 
fire. Reports are somewhat obscure as to just 
what happened at this time, but it seems that the 
British ships accomplished the turn without suffer- 
ing much damage, and that the German battle 
cruisers turned around at about the same time. 



98 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

Probably the battleships under Admiral Evan- 
Thomas were used to provide a covering fire while 
Admiral Beatty countermarched. Some incline 
to the opinion that Admiral Hipper failed to take 
advantage of his speed to draw ahead to a semi 
T-ing or capping position where he might have 
hammered Admiral Beatty's ships on the knuckle 
of their pivoting point without subjecting his own 
ships to anything worse than a long range fire 
from the 15-inch guns of the enemy battleships. 
It may be that the German battle cruisers did 
not have enough speed to do this, or it may be 
that Admiral Hipper was intent only on drawing 
the enemy into the fire of the approaching Ger- 
man battle fleet. At any rate, whatever the ac- 
tual circumstances, neither side lost any ships at 
this time and the battle continued on northerly 
courses, beginning the second phase. 

Second Phase: Action Between British Advance 
Force of Battle Cruisers, Supported by Four Bat- 
tleships, and German Battle Cruisers, Supported 
by German Fligh Seas Battle Fleet. 

The Fifth Battle Squadron is reported to have 
closed the German battle cruisers on an opposite 
course, engaging them with all guns, when Ad- 
miral Beatty signalled Admiral Evan-Thomas the 
position of the German battle fleet and ordered 
him to alter course 16 points. At 4.57 the Fifth 



NORTH SEA BATTLES 99 

Battle Squadron fell into line astern the battle 
cruisers and came under the fire of the leading 
ships of the German battle fleet, which, in the 
meanwhile, had joined the line of battle in rear 
of Admiral Hipper's battle cruisers. The action 
continued at about 14,000 yards' range on north- 
westerly courses curving north and then northeast- 
erly. At 5.56 Admiral Beatty sighted the lead- 
ing ships of the British Baltic battle fleet bearing 
north, distant five miles, and altered course to east, 
increasing speed to the utmost, thereby reducing 
the range to 1 2,000 yards, and opening a gap be- 
tween his battle cruisers and Rear Admiral Evan- 
Thomas's supporting battleships. The German 
van also turned eastward. 

This completed the second phase of the battle, 
during which four British battle cruisers and four 
battleships were engaged for about one hour and 
a half with the van of the German fleet led by five 
battle cruisers followed by battleships of the Koe- 
nig class. Light cruisers and destroyers were also 
intermittently engaged during this phase and a 
few isolated but determined torpedo attacks were 
pushed home. These apparently met with little 
success, the attackers suffering severe punishment. 

In this second phase, while at first glance it ap- 
pears that four British battle cruisers supported 
by four battleships were engaging the entire Ger- 



100 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

man High Seas Fleet, such was not strictly speak- 
ing the case. The superior speed of the British 
squadrons enabled them to keep in the van, out of 
range of the enemy centre and rear. At this time 
the advantage of light was with the Germans, be- 
cause the British ships had a sky brightened by the 
setting sun for background, while the German 
ships were more obscured in the mist by reason of 
their dark background. But the British Vice Ad- 
miral reports administering severe punishment to 
enemy ships during this phase. It is not clear 
whether the Germans turned to the eastward to 
avoid being capped or T-ed by the faster enemy 
ships, or whether they originated the easterly 
change of course because of the approaching Brit- 
ish battle fleet, but this manoeuvre put the Brit- 
ish fleet in a tactically favourable position for gun 
fire as well as ultimately placing them between 
the German fleet and its bases. 



CHAPTER VIII 

North Sea Battles {Continued) 

BATTLE OF JUTLAND Part II 

Third Phase: British Grand Fleet Engages 
with Gerjuan High Seas Fleet. 

DURING the first and second phases of the 
battle the British Grand Fleet was closing 
at utmost fleet speed on a southeast by south 
course. Three battle cruisers, led by Rear Ad- 
miral Hood in the Invincible., together with screen- 
ing light cruisers and destroyers, were in advance 
operating as a fast wing. At 5.45 an outpost light 
cruiser was engaged with a division of German 
light cruisers. At 6.10 Admiral Beatty's engaged 
squadron was sighted by the Invincible. At 6.21 
Admiral Hood led his squadron into action, taking 
station in the van just ahead of the Lion and clos- 
ing at 6.25 to a range of 8,000 yards. A few min- 
utes later the Invincible was sunk by gun fire. 

In the meanwhile the British battle fleet was 
coming into action, filling the previously men- 
tioned gap opened up between Admiral Beatty 
and Rear Admiral Evan-Thomas. At ^.^^ ad- 

lOI 



102 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

vanced British armoured cruisers, light cruisers, 
and destroyers were engaged with German cruisers 
and destroyers. At 6.16 the armoured cruis- 
ers Warrior^ Black Prince, and Defence under 
Sir Robert Arbuthnot were drawn between the 
lines and disabled by close-range lire from the 
German battleships. At 6.14 Admiral Jellicoe 
formed the Grand Fleet in battle line, and dur- 
ing deployment at 6.17 the first battle squadron 
opened fire on a German battleship of the Kaiser 
class. At 6.30 the other battle squadrons engaged 
ships of the Konig class. The four battleships of 
the Elizabeth class, previously engaged during the 
second phase, formed astern of the main battle 
fleet. At this time the Warspite of this fifth bat- 
tle squadron had her helm jam with right rud- 
der, causing her to turn toward the German line, 
where she was subjected to severe fire, but the 
trouble being soon corrected she was extricated 
from this predicament. Admiral Jellicoe reports : 

Owing principally to the mist, but partly to the smoke, 
it was possible to see only a few ships at a time in the 
enemy's battle line. Toward the van only some four or 
five ships were ever visible at once. More could be seen 
from the rear squadron, but never more than eight to 
twelve. . . . The action between the battle fleets lasted 
intermittently from 6.17 p.m. to 8.20 p.m., at ranges 
between 9,000 yards and 12,000 yards. During this time 
the British fleet made alterations of course from south- 





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104 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

east by east to west (168^ degrees) in the endeavour to 
close, but the enemy constantly turned away and opened 
the range under cover of destroyer attacks and smoke 
screens. The alterations of course had the effect of 
bringing the British fleet (which commenced the action 
in a position of advantage on the bow of the enemy) to 
a quarterly bearing from the enemy's battle line, but at 
the same time placed us between the enemy and his bases. 
During the somewhat brief periods that the ships of the 
High Seas Fleet were visible through the mist the heavy 
and effective fire kept up by the battleships and battle 
cruisers of the Grand Fleet caused me much satisfaction, 
and the enemy vessels were seen to be constantly hit, 
some being observed to haul out of the line and at least 
one to sink. The enemy's return fire at this time was 
not effective and the damage caused to our ships was 
insignificant. 



From the reports it appears that the area of 
the battle was covered by mist and smoke of vary- 
ing density, interspersed with sections wherein op- 
posing ships could see each other at the battle 
range. This gave rise to a series of local actions 
during which all ships of the battle fleet became 
engaged, but at no time simultaneously. These 
detached actions were for the most part between 
few ships for brief periods. The aggregate fight- 
ing, however,- seems to have been considerable, as 
may be gathered from the following synopsis of 
the principal incidents reported by Admiral Jel- 



NORTH SEA BATTLES 105 

licoe and Vice Admiral Beatty. The following ex- 
tract is from the report of the former: 

At 6.17 the third battle squadron engaged German 
battleships, battle cruisers, and Hght cruisers at a range 
of 11,000 yards. The fourth battle squadron, in which 
was placed the Commander in Chief's flagship Iron 
Duke, engaged the battle squadron, consisting of the 
Konig and Kaiser classes, as well as some of the Ger- 
man battle cruisers and light cruisers. The mist ren- 
dered range taking difficult, but the fire of the squad- 
ron was effective. The Iron Duke opened at 6.30 on 
a battleship of the Komg class at 12,000 yards range, 
hitting on the second salvo, and continuing to hit until 
the target ship turned away. The fire of other ships 
of the fourth squadron was principally directed at enemy 
battle cruisers and cruisers as they appeared out of 
the mist. The ships of the second battle squadron were 
in action with vessels of the Kaiser and Konig classes 
between 6.30 and 7.20, and fired also at a battle cruiser 
which had dropped back, apparently severely damaged. 
The first battle squadron received more of the return 
fire than the remainder of the main fleet. The Colos- 
sus was hit, but not seriously damaged, and other ships 
were straddled with fair frequency by the German 
salvos. 

Admiral Jellicoe made special mention of the 
Marlborough of the third battle squadron, stating 
that at 6.17 she hred seven salvos at a German 
battleship of the Kaiser class, then engaged a 
cruiser and again a battleship. At 6.54 she was 



106 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

hit by a torpedo and took up a considerable list 
to starboard, but at 7.03 reopened on a cruiser, 
and at 7.12 fired fourteen rapid salvos at a battle- 
ship of the Konig class, hitting her frequently un- 
til she turned out of line. These details in the 
case of the Marlborough permit some rather inter- 
esting speculations. It seems that this ship alone 
fired approximately between 200 and 250 13.5- 
inch shells, each one weighing about 1,240 pounds, 
aggregating in the neighbourhood of 140 tons of 
high explosive steel shell, at the effective battle 
range of 1 2,000 yards in the beginning, and closing 
to 9,000 yards during the course of the action. If 
this is at all indicative of the fighting done by 
the other battleships of the main body it is ap- 
parent that a considerable weight of metal was let 
loose. In the first and second phases it is esti- 
mated that each of the ships under Vice Admiral 
Beatty and Rear Admiral Thomas fired four or 
five times this amount (about 600 tons each) and 
the Germans quite as much, if not more. 

After the injury to the Marlborough Vice Ad- 
miral Burney transferred his flag to the Revenge. 

It appears that the British battle cruisers, after 
the loss of the Invincible were out of action for 
about half an hour. At about 6.50 the two re- 
maining ships of Admiral Hood's squadron were 
ordered to prolong Admiral Beatty's line astern, 



NORTH SEA BATTLES 107 

and, having lost sight of the enemy, the battle 
cruiser squadrons reduced speed to 18 knots. 
Course was gradually changed to south and then 
to southwest in an effort to regain touch with the 
enemy. At 7.14 two German battle cruisers and 
two battleships were sighted at about 15,000 
yards' range, bearing northwesterly. At 7.17 Ad- 
miral Beatty's ships re-engaged and increased 
speed to 22 knots. At 7.32 the British battle 
cruisers had again reduced speed to 18 knots. 
German destroyers advanced, emitting clouds of 
dark grey smoke, under which screen the German 
capitar ships turned away and were lost sight of 
at 7.45. British light cruisers were ordered to 
sweep westward to regain touch, and at 8.20 Ad- 
miral Beatty ordered a westerly course in support. 
Soon afterward German battle cruisers and bat- 
tleships were heavily engaged at 10,000 yards' 
range. Admiral Beatty reports that the leading 
ship was hit repeatedly by the Lion and turned 
out of line eight points, emitting high flames; that 
the Princess Royal set fire to a three-funnel bat- 
tleship, and that the Nezv Zealand and Indomita- 
ble both engaged the third ship, forcing her to 
haul out of line on fire and heeling over. The 
mist at this time shut them from view, but the 
Yahnovth reported the German ships as last seen 
at 8.38, steaming to the westward. The British 



108 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

battle cruisers did not regain touch, and at 9.24 
changed to the southerly course set by Admiral 
Jellicoe for the battle fleet. 

During the third phase the conditions of mist 
and failing light favoured torpedo attack, but few 
details have been reported. Light cruisers of the 
fourth squadron occupied a position in the van 
until 7.20 p. m., when they carried out orders to 
attack German destroyers. Again at 8.18 p. m. 
these light cruisers moved out to support the 
eleventh destroyer flotilla in a torpedo attack. 
They came under a heavy fire from the enemy bat- 
tle fleet at ranges between 6,500 and 8,000 yards, 
but succeeded in firing torpedoes at German bat- 
tleships. 

At 6.25 the third light cruiser squadron at- 
tacked the German battle cruisers with torpedoes, 
and the Indomitable reported that a few minutes 
later a German battle cruiser of the Derfflinge? 
class fell out of line. This may have been tht 
Liitzow, as at about this time Vice Admiral Hip- 
per, while under a heavy fire, transshipped his flag 
in a destroyer from the disabled Liitzow to the 
Derfflinger. 

It is thus seen that during the third phase, last- 
ing from 6.15 to about 8.30 p. m., practically the 
entire British Grand Fleet was engaged with prac- 
tically the entire German High Seas Fleet. Earl} 



NORTH SEA BATTLES 109 

in the phase the British armoured cruiser Defence 
(tonnage 14,600, carrying four 9,2-inch guns and 
755 men) was sunk. At the same time the ar- 
moured cruiser Warrior (tonnage 13,500, carry- 
ing six 9.2-inch guns and 704 men) and her sister 
ship, the Black Prince^ were disabled. The War- 
rior was taken in tow by the Engadine, but broke 
away during rough weather in the night, and sank 
after the crew had been taken off. The Black 
Prince came in close contact with a German bat- 
tleship during the night and was sunk by gunfire. 
Rear Admiral Hood's flagship, the Invincible 
(tonnage 17,250, carrying eight 12-inch guns and 
750 men), was sunk soon after engaging. 

Between 6 and 6.30 the Germans lost the light 
cruiser Wiesbaden. The German battle cruiser 
Liitzow (tonnage 28,000, carrying ten 12-inch 
guns and 750 men) was disabled, and sank while 
returning to port. The German battleship Pom- 
mem (tonnage 13,040, carrying four 1 i-inch guns 
and 750 men) was probably disabled during the 
day battle and sunk in the night by a torpedo. The 
German light cruisers Frauenlob and Rostock 
were destroyed in the evening fighting, while the 
light cruiser Elbing was abandoned because of 
damage due to collision with another German 
ship. According to official admission, each side 
seems to have lost about four destroyers, either 



110 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

during this phase or during the night fighting. 

The details of how Admiral Jellicoe manoeu- 
vred his ships into action were not disclosed in his 
report, but the British battle fleet probably ap- 
proached with squadrons or divisions in line or 
line of bearing. That is, the ships were in several 
parallel columns on a southerly course, with the 
leading ships in a line approximately east and 
west, at such a distance apart as to permit all 
ships to swing into one column, heading either 
east or west. The deployment into a battle line 
heading easterly seems to have been skillfully ef- 
fected under trying conditions. Just what the 
relative positions of the two fleets were during 
this phase is not known, but the British would ap- 
pear to have had a tactical advantage in turning 
the German van. The conditions of poor visibil- 
ity, however, did not permit them to get full bene- 
fit of it, although they had the German ships 
backed b)^ the twilight sky, an important advan- 
tage, which must have increased as darkness ap- 
proached. 

Some criticism has been made of Admiral Jel- 
licoe for not pressing the retiring enemy ships 
more closely, but it is to be remembered that re- 
tiring ships are in a favourable position for using 
mines and torpedoes. Moreover, the mist and the 



NORTH SEA BATTLES 111 

direction of the wind were helpful to the de- 
stroyers in making a good smoke screen for the 
Germans. 

Fourth Phase: Torpedo Attacks and Fighting 
During the Night of May j/ to June i. 

Admiral Jellicoe reports that after the arrival 
of the Grand Fleet the tactics of the Germans 
were generally to avoid further action, in which 
they were favoured by conditions of visibility. 

At this stage of the battle, shortly after 8.40, 
Admiral Jellicoe quotes Vice Admiral Beatty as 
follows: 

In view of the gathering darkness, and the fact that 
our strategical position was such as to make it appear 
certain that we should locate the enemy at daylight un- 
der most favourable circumstances, I did not consider 
it desirable or proper to close the enemy battle fleet dur- 
ing the dark hours. 

Admiral Jellicoe then reports : 

At 9 p. m. the enemy was entirely out of sight, and 
the threat of torpedo boat destroyer attacks during the 
rapidly approaching darkness made it necessary for me 
to dispose of the fleet for the night, with a view to Its 
safety from such attacks, while providing for a renewal 
of action at daylight. I accordingly manoeuvred to re- 
main between the enemy and his bases, placing our 
flotillas in a position in which they would afford protec- 



112 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

tion to the fleet from destroyer attack and at the same 
time be favourably situated for attacking the enemy's 
heavy ships. 



The British fleet, after making dispositions to 
guard against night torpedo attacks, steamed at 
moderate speed on southerly courses. Consequent- 
ly during the night the British heavy ships were 
not engaged, but Admiral Jellicoe reports that the 
British Fourth, Eleventh, Twelfth, and Thir- 
teenth Flotillas delivered a series of successful 
torpedo attacks. 

Apart from the proceedings of the flotillas, the 
second light-cruiser squadron, stationed in the 
rear of the battle fleet, was in close action for 
about fifteen minutes at 10.20 p. m. with a Ger- 
man squadron, comprising one large cruiser and 
four light cruisers. In this action the South- 
hampton and the 'Duhlin suffered rather heavy 
casualties, although their steaming and fighting 
qualities were not seriously impaired. 

This night fighting comprises an interesting 
and perhaps an important phase of the battle, but 
too little is known about it at this time to permit 
profitable discussion. During both the day and 
night conditions were favourable for the use of 
torpedoes. Destroyer attacks seem to have been 
numerous, persistent, and daring. It may be as- 



475 Miles ^ . 
to the X \ 
Orkney Is. \ ^ ^ 




\ 
\ 


\ 

\skagerrack 


f r^^\ 




\ 


\ "^ 


^->: / 




\ 


\ 


GERMAN X\ J(\ 
FLEET \V^ ^. 




Si 


1 
1 


lO P.M. y^^ \ 




III 

_ll 


1 






5/ 


\ 


450 Miles \ \ \ 

to Edinburgh \ \ \ 




/ 


Si 


\x.^^ \\ 






^ ^V \ 








^\ ^ \ 


\ 


y 




\^^ 


\ 


Y 


^ 




llHl 


'TPtZX 


*'JELLIC0E 




1 




3 A.M. 








June l 




Vi' 


'"' V<\ bL. 










180 Miles 




-<^ o _^ 




/ 


To Heligoland 




^ §-3 




/ 










)^ 


Kiel Canal 


' 


n—g— 1_ 









DIAGRAM INDICATIXG FLEET MOVEMENTS AFTER BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

113 



114 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

sumed that a great many torpedoes were fired, but 
the resulting damage does not appear to have 
been very extensive. 

Early on the morning of June i (3 a. m.) Ad- 
miral Jellicoe's battle fleet was to the westward 
of Horn Reef, some ninety miles from the bat- 
tlefield, as shown on the chart. The British fleet 
then turned to the northward and retraced its 
course. 

Visibility was three to four miles. Admiral 
Jellicoe reports that the British fleet remained in 
the proximity of the battlefield and near the line 
of approach to German ports until 11a. m., June 
1 ; that the position of the British fleet must have 
been known to the enemy, because at 4 a. m. the 
fleet engaged for about five minutes a Zeppelin 
which had ample opportunity to note and sub- 
sequently to report the position and course of the 
British fleet; that the waters from the latitude of 
Horn Reef to the scene of the action were thor- 
oughly searched, but no enemy ships sighted; and 
that at 1.15 p. m., it being evident that the Ger- 
man fleet had succeeded in returning to port, 
course was shaped for British bases, which were 
reached without further incident. By 9.30 p. m. 
of the next day, June 2, the fleet having fueled 
and replenished with ammunition, was reported 
ready for further action. 



NORTH SEA BATTLES 115 

The conduct of the British fleet in the night of 
May 31 and on the morning of June 1 raises a 
good many perplexing questions. In the morning 
the British ships retraced their tracks to the north- 
ward, taking about the same lane they had fol- 
lowed in the night. 

With the Grand Fleet in position to put itself 
between the German High Seas Fleet and its 
bases, why was there no decisive engagement"? 
A study of the chart on page 113 indicates that 
the fleets could not have been very far apart. 
Considering that the June nights between evening 
and morning twilight are only five hours long in 
these latitudes, and also considering the numer- 
ous scouts, both German and British, it looks as 
though they should have been pretty well in- 
formed of each other's whereabouts. But before 
criticising Admiral Jellicoe for not pressing a re- 
newal of the engagement, it might be well to re- 
flect upon the conditions confronting him on that 
morning: Visibility only three to four miles; close 
to enemy bases and comparatively far from home 
bases; a fleet somewhat knocked about after the 
previous day's fighting, and no doubt a number 
of the ships short of both fuel and ammunition; 
destroyers and light cruisers scattered, many more 
or less damaged, and perhaps the majority with 



116 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

torpedoes expended; an enemy skilled in the use 
of submarines and mines. 

It is hard for persons unused to the sea to vis- 
ualise the conditions and circumstances attend- 
ing this engagement. Even seagoing men of ex- 
cellent balance are liable, when transplanted tem- 
porarily to the tranquillity of a war college, to 
be somewhat influenced by environment, and, 
while in enthusiastic search of illustration for pet 
theories, they may overlook or fail to give due 
weight to modifying factors which cannot be sim- 
ulated on the game board. Students of tactics on 
shore make their decisions after study and discus- 
sion in the comfortable quiet of a well-lighted 
room, and then use T square and ruler to move 
their miniature ships on a' motionless wooden 
ocean. The fighters of the Jutland battle faced 
quite a different proposition. Decisions had to be 
made quickly, accurately transmitted by signal, 
and promptly carried out on a sea darkened by 
mist, smoke, and approaching night. All this had 
to be done, moreover, in the midst of battle, un- 
der the strain of apprehension, in the uncertain- 
ties of meagre and conflicting information. 

The actual results of the Battle of Jutland did 
not change the military situation. The British 
control of the sea remained an absolute factor, as 
before the battle, and the German High Seas Fleet 



NORTH SEA BATTLES IIT 

continued to be a fleet in being and a menace to its 
enemies. Consequently the battle must be classed 
as indecisive. 

Moral effect is an important factor in war, and, 
although the military situation was not changed 
by the Battle of Jutland, there is no question of 
the fact that the German public was elated by 
the statement from Berlin that the British fleet 
had been withdrawn from the field of battle. This 
manoeuvre, however, was because of night-fall and 
was toward the German base of Heligoland, not 
toward British home bases. This should be con- 
vincing rebuttal to Germany's claim that her fleet 
had gained a victory. 

The disposition of the British fleet for the night 
has been a source of much controversy in England 
since the facts have become known, and in evolv- 
ing the history of the war it will probably re- 
main for years a matter of debate. The question 
under discussion is whether or not the threat of 
torpedo and submarine attack was sufficient to jus- 
tify losing all touch with the German fleet, which 
was inferior in numbers, in gun power, and in 
speed. 

Those who support Admiral Jellicoe in his de- 
cision not to close the enemy battle fleet during 
the dark hours, maintain that, inasmuch as naval 
superiority was essential to the Allied cause, it 



118 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

should not have been risked upon such a hazard 
as would have been involved by continuing the 
battle under the conditions which have been de- 
scribed. On the other hand, many hold the opin- 
ion that the destruction of the German fleet was of 
such urgent importance as to justify this risk. It 
is too soon to seek a final solution of so intricate 
a problem. 

The following is the British statement of losses : 



BATTLE CRUISERS 



Tipperary 

Turbulent 

Fortune 

Sparrow Hawk . 

Ardent 

Nomad 

Nestor 

Shark 





Ton- 
nage 


Armour 
Belt 


Main 
Battery 


Speed 


Men 


G'p'd 




27,000 
18,750 
17,250 


9 in. 
Sin. 

7 in. 


8 i3.S-in. 
8 i2-in. 
8 i2-in. 


28 
26 
26 


1,000 
899 
750 


'13 




'11 




'08 






ARMOURED CRUISERS 




14,600 
13,550 
13,550 


6 in. 
6 in. 
6 in. 


4 9.2-in. 
6 9.2-in. 
6 9.2-in. 


23 

20.5 

22 .9 


755 
704 
704 


'08 




•06 




'08 






DESTROYERS 



920 
950 
950 



3 4-in. 
3 4-in. 



I op 
100 
100 



The German losses reported by the German Ad- 
miralty are: 



NORTH SEA BATTLES 119 

BATTLESHIP 

Ton- Anna- Date 

nage ment Speed Completion 

Pommem 13.040 4 ii-in. 19 1907 

14 6.7-in. 

BATTLE CRUISER 

Lutzow 28,000 8 i2-in. 27 1915 

12 6-in. 

LIGHT CRUISERS 

Rostock 4,820 12 4.1-in. 27.3 1914 

Frauenlob 2,656 10 4.1-in. 21.5 1903 



NEW LIGHT CRUISERS 



Elbing 

Wiesbaden. 



DESTROYERS 
Five 



TOTAL TONNAGE LOST 

British 117,150 

German 60,720 

TOTAL PERSONNEL LOST 

British 6,105 

Gennan 2,414 



CHAPTER IX 

Submarine Warfare 

SINCE the outbreak of hostilities the subma- 
rine has been a conspicuous naval weapon, 
and German science has developed it with char- 
acteristic energy, system, and thoroughness. Early 
in the war the more powerful Allied navies prac- 
tically swept the seas of all enemy merchant ships 
and contained the battle fleets of the Central Pow- 
ers within comparatively narrow limits. Beyond 
these limits, except for a few raids on commerce 
by surface cruisers, the naval operations of both 
German)^ and Austria have been restricted to the 
use of submarines. 

Considering the disadvantages inherent in un- 
derwater navigation, the results attained have 
been truly astonishing. The following incidents 
may be mentioned as examples of various and nu- 
merous submarine activities. In the first days of 
the war one small German submarine sank three 
British armoured cruisers in less than one hour. 
On Oct. 7, 1916, the U-53 appeared in Newport 



SUBMARINE WARFARE 121 

Harbor, exchanged official calls, read the daily 
papers, sent dispatches, and departed a few hours 
after her arrival. The next day the U-boat de- 
stroyed off Nantucket four British traders and one 
Dutch trader. In the Spring of 1917 peaceful 
Funchal was suddenly bombarded by a German 
submarine. 

The underwater mine layer has become an ac- 
complished fact — it is disturbing to think of this 
huge mechanical fish secretly threading the ocean 
highways, laying its engines of destruction. In 
addition to all this Captain Konig has introduced 
to us the Deutschland^ a successful trans-Atlantic 
underwater blockade runner. 

The U-boat as a commerce destroyer has caused 
losses so unprecedented that the submarine has 
become a factor in the grand tactics of the war. 

With this evidence of accomplishments it is not 
surprising that the submarine has seized upon the 
imagination. Nor has Germany, in furthering her 
ends, failed to take full advantage of the mys- 
tery surrounding underwater attack. It has been 
part of the German war plan to prepare and cir- 
culate submarine propaganda designed to strength- 
en hopes at home, and at the same time break 
down morak in enemy countries. This has re- 
sulted in a somewhat confused perspective; but 
it is important that we should search out the facts, 



122 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

reason to logical conclusions, and take the true 
measure of the U-boat. 

The outstanding characteristic of the sub- 
marine, as its name indicates, is its ability to 
navigate below the surface of the water. This 
enables it to evade the enemy, to make a surprise 
attack, and to escape by hiding. These faculties 
are manifestly suitable for the weaker belligerent 
to use against the stronger enemy. Navies that 
dominate, that have power to seek and destroy in 
the open, are not dependent upon abilities to 
evade and to hide. It is for this reason that Al- 
lied submarines have found their chief opportun- 
ity to strike in sea areas controlled by the fleets 
of the Central Powers, the Baltic, the Darda- 
nelles, and other waters close to Teutonic bases, 
while German submarines have been active in all 
other ocean areas within the cruising radius of 
their U-boats. Since the Allies control practically 
all the high seas, the field of the U-boat has been 
large, while the activities of Allied submarines 
have been confined to the relatively narrow coastal 
waters controlled by Germany, Austria, and Tur- 
key. 

Without depreciating the utility of the subma- 
rine, it may be truly said that if the Allies had 
not possessed a single one they would still, in all 
probability, have been able to enjoy the incalcu- 



SUBMARINE WARFARE 123 

lable advantages that surface control of the seas 
has given them. The German submarines, more- 
over, have not proved effective against enemy bat- 
tle fleets; and in order to facilitate their com- 
merce-destroying operations they have found it 
necessary, because of inherent weaknesses, to adopt 
methods in violation of the laws of civilised war- 
fare. Before going deeper into the uses and limi- 
tations of the submarine it might be well to touch 
briefly upon some of the rules governing its le- 
gitimate employment. 

The purpose of rules regulating ocean-borne in- 
tercourse in times of peace and governing both bel- 
ligerent and neutral conduct in time of war is to 
carry out practically the principles of the freedom 
of the seas, and it need hardly be added that 
these principles are identical with those govern- 
ing all rules of right conduct at sea and on shore ; 
namely, principles of liberty, justice, and hu- 
manity. 

As weapons and other conditions change, new 
situations arise which may require modifications 
in these rules; but both in time of peace and in 
time of war reason calls for a general concur- 
rence of Governments before a modified or new 
rule can become operative ; and any belligerent in- 
stituting methods in violation of previously estab- 
lished regulations assumes the burden of proof to 



IM NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

show that new conditions compel new rules in or- 
der to carry out the never-changing principles of 
the freedom of the seas. 

There is little room for confusion of thought 
on this point. Unfortunately, however, it is the 
experience of war-time practice that military ne- 
cessity and the doctrine of "might makes right" 
twist these rules into a bewildering tangle. One 
belligerent breaks a rule and attempts to justify 
his conduct. The enemy, as a matter of policy, 
turns a deaf ear to the arguments in justification, 
and, seeing only the broken rule, proceeds to re- 
talitate by breaking another rule on the ground 
that military necessity forces him to resort to this 
act of reprisal. And so one act of reprisal leads to 
another until unconscionable degrees of lawless- 
ness are reached. 

It has been suggested as a possible solution ob- 
viating the difficulties of drawing up a set of good 
working rules to govern naval operations against 
commerce that one sweeping sanction of immunity 
might suffice by whiCh all trade ships would be 
allowed to carry on their peaceful pursuits unmo- 
lested in time of war as in time of peace. The 
objection, however, to such a rule is, that when 
the world is divided between nations at peace and 
nations at war, this rule would satisfy peoples at 
peace and one side of the belligerents, but the 



SUBMARINE WARFARE V25 

other belligerents would find it discriminatory and 
would oppose it as an infringement upon their 
rights to use the seas in accordance with principles 
of equity and freedom. 

To deny belligerents, moreover, their right to 
use the seas for suppressing enemy commerce and 
imposing economic pressure in order to hasten the 
settlement of their differences, would deprive the 
world of what is generally looked upon, when con- 
ducted according to the rules of civilised warfare, 
as a humane method of re-establishing conditions 
of peace. It may be added that those who aim 
at a world peace secured by a concert of power 
may reasonably assert that, while the freedom of 
the seas is a foundation principle on which to make 
a world peace secure, naval power, by instituting 
blockades, may at times prove a humane and ef- 
fective means of compelling recalcitrant Govern- 
ments to observe the provisions of this peace. 

During a war, the maritime interests of bellig- 
erents and neutrals are bound to conflict; and it 
is impossible to give either of them unlicensed use 
of the seas without restricting the freedom of the 
other. Hence. a compromise is necessary, and so 
long as nations recognise a state of war as involv- 
ing conditions subject to law in which both bel- 
ligerents and neutrals have rights, it is manifest 
that rules are required to define and guarantee 



126 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

these rights. It will not be attempted here to ex- 
amine closely the many rules drawn to govern 
naval warfare, some of which were still subjects 
of controversy when the present war began; but, 
as an aid to the memory, a few of the recognised 
and established regulations affecting the use of 
the submarine will be briefly outlined : 

1. A blockade to be binding must be effective; that is, 
it must be maintained by a force sufficient to render in- 
gress to or egress from the enemy coast line dangerous. 

2. A blockade must not bar access to neutral ports or 
coasts. 

3. During the continuance of a state of blockade no 
vessels are allowed to enter or leave the blockaded place 
without consent of the blockading authority. 

4. The prohibition of contraband trade with the at- 
tendant adjudging of penalties is a belligerent right. 
This right can only be exercised upon the high seas and 
the territorial waters of the belligerents and in accord- 
ance with the rules and usages of international law. 
(Contraband of war may be defined as articles destined 
for the enemy and capable of use as an assistance to the 
enemy in carrying on war either ashore or afloat.) 

5. Lawfully commissioned public vessels of a bel- 
ligerent nation may exercise the right of visiting and 
searching merchant ships upon the high seas, whatever 
be the ship, the cargo, or the destination. If the exami- 
nation of ship's papers and search show fraud, contra- 
band, an offence in respect of blockade, or enemy service, 
the vessel may be seized. Force may be used to over- 



SUBMARINE WARFARE 127 

come either resistance or flight, but condemnation fol- 
lows forcible resistance alone. In exercising these rights 
belligerents must conform to the rules and usages of 
international law. 

6. When a vessel in action surrenders (usually indi- 
cated by hauling down the national flag or showing the 
white flag of truce), firing must cease on the part of the 
victor. To continue an attack after knowledge of sur- 
render, or to sink a vessel after submission, is a violation 
of the rules of civilised warfare only permissible in 
cases of treachery or renewal of the action. 

7. Absolute contraband, including guns, ammunition, 
and the like, is liable to capture on the high seas or in 
the territorial waters of the belligerents if it is shown 
to be destined to territory belonging to or occupied by 
the enemy, or to the armed forces of the enemy. It is 
immaterial whether the carriage of the goods is direct 
or entails transshipment, even at a neutral port, or a 
subsequent transport by land, although it may be through 
neutral territory. Also there must be a trial and judg- 
ment of a prize court of the captor having proper juris- 
diction in regard to the goods involved, whether de- 
stroyed or not. 

The status of armed merchantmen is generally 
misunderstood. Merchantmen have the right to 
arm for defence. A merchantman may repel an 
attack by any enemy ship, but only a man-of-war 
can attack men-of-war. 

According to international law the character of 
a ship is determined by her employment; and it is 



128 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

an established right of merchant vessels that they 
may carry arms — for defence only — without nec- 
essarily altering their status before the law as 
traders engaged in legitimate peaceful pursuits. 
This right is well established by precedent, and 
although prolific of complications, it has on the 
whole operated to sustain the principles of free- 
dom of the seas. Its usefulness was conspicuous 
in the days of piracy; and the "long toms" on 
board our clipper ships proved strong arguments 
in suppressing lawlessness. 

In the heat of war, moreover, belligerents are 
inclined to infringe the privileges of noncombat- 
ants, and experience has shown that the right of 
merchant vessels to arm for defence has tended 
to prevent belligerents from unlawful interference 
with peaceful traffic. The belligerent right to 
stop, visit, search, and capture merchantmen is a 
high sovereign power, and it seems reasonable 
to require that the vessels authorised to exercise 
it should possess potential strength. It would be 
a somewhat absurd condition, inviting abuse and 
irregularity, if rules were so framed as to permit 
a fast enemy motor boat, manned by three or four 
men armed with rifles, to stop, search, and cap- 
ture an ocean liner, without allowing the liner to 
attempt lawfully either flight or resistance. On 
the other hand, a motor boat, submarine, or any 



SUBMARINE WARFARE 129 

other duly commissioned and authorised man-of- 
war has the right to employ force to overcome re- 
sistance or to prevent flight ; and the merchantman 
has no redress for damage sustained during at- 
tempted flight or resistance. In the majority of 
cases, it is obvious that prudence will influence 
merchantmen to surrender promptly in the face of 
a respectably powerful man-of-war rather than 
forfeit immunity by attempting flight or resist- 
ance. 

If an armed merchantman of a neutral country 
on friendly terms with the warring nations should 
resist by force a belligerent man-of-war, the neu- 
tral Government would properly discountenance 
the act as incompatible with the relations of am- 
ity existing between the two countries. If, how- 
ever, neutral rights are violated to an intolerable 
degree a state of armed neutrality may supplant 
the relations of amity, and under these unusual 
conditions a Government has the right and may 
be in duty bound to preserve its neutrality by 
using such force as the circumstances may require ; 
but in this delicate situation care must be exer- 
cised that force is used only in defence of neutral 
rights. 

From the beginning of the war submarines have 
helped to prevent a close blockade of the coasts of 
the Central Powers, and the inability on the part 



130 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

of the Allied navies to institute a coast line block- 
ade strictly in accordance with the established 
rules of international law has led to what is gen- 
erally known as a distant blockade. The British 
Orders in Council regulating this distant blockade 
have lengthened the contraband lists and extended 
the doctrine of ultimate destination until Ger- 
many's commerce with non-contiguous countries 
has been practically cut off. 

As the effectiveness of the blockade increased, 
Germany retaliated by taking undue advantage 
of the war area doctrine, and claimed increasing 
latitude in the use of the U-boats. As in the case 
of the invasion of Belgium, Germany made mili- 
tary necessity the excuse for the illegal acts of 
the German Navy. Underwater attack against the 
blockading battle fleets met with little success ; but 
the unscrupulous use of the submarine as a com- 
merce destroyer brought better results. The vigor- 
ous protest of neutrals against the violation of 
their rights caused Germany, for a time to make 
an effort to comply with the rules and usages of in- 
ternational law; but this effort proved ineffectual. 
The vulnerability of the submarine, with the in- 
creasing efficacy of the ways and means developed 
to safeguard merchantmen from its attack, pre- 
sented to the German Government the alternative 
either of suffering a curtailment of submarine 



SUBMARINE WARFARE 131 

effectiveness or of abandoning lawful methods. 
Germany's decision to take the latter course was 
announced to the world by official notification that 
within a war zone embracing large areas of the 
high seas her submarines would sink all ships, neu- 
tral or belligerent. 

This unwarranted course has forced the United 
States into the war against Germany, and has 
aroused the hostility of a great part of the world. 
Even from the German point of view, the only 
thing that would make the result profitable would 
be to win a decision in the war by means of the 
U-boats. This Germany has not succeeded in ac- 
complishing. Although there have been enormous 
losses of shipping, the submarines have not suc- 
ceeded in shutting off transportation by sea. 

An energetic campaign has been undertaken 
against the U-boats by the Allied navies. This 
is the most important tactical problem in the pres- 
ent situation, and comment will be made upon the 
tactics of this campaign in the next chapter. 



CHAPTER X 

Anti-Submarine Tactics 

SECRECY is important in the development of 
certain kinds of anti-submarine tactics. Men- 
tion cannot be made of new devices, because to 
forewarn the enemy is to forearm him. But no 
harm will result from an outline discussion of the 
older though still effective methods of submarine 
defence which are now well known to the enemy. 
On the other hand, a clearer understanding of the 
question will stimulate interest in the wider devel- 
opment and practice of common-sense' methods 
against the submarine. These may contribute 
quite as much to the ultimate defeat of the U-boat 
as highly scientific inventions. 

In order to understand anti-submarine tactics 
it is necessary to know something of the tactical 
characteristics of the craft against which these 
counter-measures are directed. Of course, any 
very recent developments are not known, but there 
is no evidence at hand that radical advance has 
lately been made in U-boat construction. 

132 



ANTI-SUBMARINE TACTICS 133 

The cruising radius of the larger submarines is 
about 6,000 miles when steaming on the surface 
at a slow speed of six to ten knots. The newer 
boats are reported to have a maximum speed of 
eighteen knots, but economy of fuel is so impor- 
tant, and the consumption is so much greater for 
high speeds, that submarines use the economical 
slower speeds except perhaps for short spurts. It is 
obvious that submarines operating from distant 
bases cannot well afford to chase merchantmen un- 
less the latter happen to be slow ones. Their 
usual procedure is to lie in wait along the trade 
routes and attack the ships which run up to them. 

Submarines, after cruising a certain distance 
while submxcrged, are compelled to come to the 
surface to recharge their batteries. Here again the 
maximum submerged speed of about fourteen 
knots for the newer boats and about ten knots for 
the older t3^pes is extremely uneconomical. For 
example, approximately speaking, the average 
submarine when submerged can go four to five 
hours at ten knots, a total distance of about forty 
miles; or ten hours at about seven knots, a total 
distance of seventy miles; or thirty-six hours at 
about four knots, a total distance of 144 rhiles; 
or seventy-two hours at steerage way (about two 
and one-half knots), a total distance of 180 miles. 
It also has been rumoured that the most recent U- 



134 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

boats can go as far as 250 miles at a stretch with- 
out coming to the surface. But when the limit is 
reached, whatever it may be, the submarine must 
stop and wait for an opportunity to come to the 
surface to recharge batteries. 

It follows, then, that anti-submarine tactics 
which force the enemy to go comparatively long 
distances at high speeds tend to limit their activi- 
ties. It is reported that when the prospects are 
such as to promise considerable uneconomical 
cruising, either on the surface or submerged, sub- 
marine commanders usually abandon the attack. 
■ It may be mentioned here that it is extremely 
hard to control merchantmen and compel them to 
practice simple anti-submarine tactics — such as 
steering zigzag courses — calculated to embarrass 
the submarine in the accomplishment of its pur- 
pose. It is difficult for seamen who for years have 
navigated the usual lanes to understand and carry 
out instructions intended to safeguard them from 
a foe they cannot see. When the tangible proof of 
the enemy's presence arrives it is too late. Utmost 
vigilance is necessary at all times, and to get this 
requires a strict discipline which does not exist on 
board the majority of trading ships. The percent- 
age of torpedoed ships is not sufficiently high to 
spur the crews to great exertions. 

There are many influences inclining the indi- 



ANTI-SUBMARINE TACTICS 135 

viduals on board ships passing through the war 
zone to the opinion that getting safely by is large- 
ly a question of luck. There seems to be more or 
less prevalent a sort of fatalistic attitude toward 
the submarine, or the gambler's attitude of taking 
a chance against being torpedoed, with a resulting 
laxity in the observance of safeguarding measures. 
Whatever be the cause of this indifference to the 
practice of simple anti-submarine tactics of eva- 
sion, there is plenty of evidence that many a ship 
has played into the hands of the U-boat either by 
failure to carry out instructions, or by a poor look- 
out system, or by neglect to steer zigzag courses 
before sighting the submarine, or by stupid sea- 
manship after sighting it. This is unfortunate, 
but not surprising. The nature of the submarine 
enemy is such that to combat it successfully re- 
quires a personnel of a high order of intelligence, 
•well trained and well disciplined. 

The armament of the U-boats consists of both 
guns and torpedoes. The hull of the newer types 
is protected to some extent by armour, but is still 
so vulnerable that few U-boats will risk a gun en- 
gagement with a well-armed enemy. As nearly 
all ships are now armed, the torpedo has become 
the principal weapon of attack. 

The general characteristics of the torpedo are 
now pretty well known. It is a highly scientific 



136 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

mechanism consisting of many intricate parts in- 
geniously assembled in a metal shell about twelve 
to twenty feet long, twenty-one inches in diame- 
ter, weighing about one ton, and valued in this 
country at about $6,000. In appearance a tor- 
pedo somewhat resembles a small, elongated auto- 
submarine. It has horizontal and vertical rud- 
ders which can be so adjusted, in conjunction with 
an automatic steering device, as to make the tor- 
pedo keep at a certain depth and either travel 
straight or in a curve. The torpedo is propelled 
by a screw driven by an automatic compressed 
air engine, capable of giving a speed as high as 
thirty-six knots. By the act of launching from 
the tube a starting lever is tripped, which causes 
the propelling mechanism to go ahead at full 
speed. The head of the torpedo carries a power- 
ful bursting charge. The object of submarine tac- 
tics is to detonate this high explosive against the 
underwater body of the target ship. 

To accomplish this object the submarine com- 
mander has to make preliminary observations 
through his periscope, estimate the course, speed, 
and distance of the enemy, manoeuvre his boat to 
a favourable position, make the necessary firing 
adjustments, aim the torpedo, and then launch it. 

It is obvious that the closer the target the better 
the chances of scoring a hit. Torpedoes are rarely 



ANTI-SUBMARINE TACTICS 137 

fired by submarines at greater ranges than one 
thousand yards because the percentage of hits at 
longer ranges is comparatively small. Glancing 
hits, moreover, are not often effective. When the 
target ship is end on, the torpedo, even when cor- 
rectly aimed to hit, frequently glances off without 
exploding (bow wave and wake currents assist this 
deflection), or if it does explode fails to do much 
damage. Torpedoes are so expensive, the supply 
is so limited, and the U-boats themselves are so 
precious that every effort is made to avoid risk of 
failure and destruction. 

It is thus seen that submarine tactics are not al- 
together simple. If the target ship is fast, steers 
zigzag courses, keeps a bright lookout, carries 
guns, and is also attended by escort ships specially 
equipped for destroying submarines, the difficul- 
ties in the way of successful attack are consider- 
ably increased. 

The problem facing the U-boat Captain may be 
summarised as follows: 

Keeping in mind the importance of safeguard- 
ing his own ship and also the necessity of econo- 
mising in both fuel and torpedoes, he first studies 
the situation and if he is in a favourable position 
ahead of his quarry, he decides to attack. Assum- 
ing that the approaching vessel is armed he sub- 
merges before there is likelihood of discovery. 



138 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

He then observes at more or less frequent inter- 
vals through his periscope, takes bearings of the 
approaching target ship, and estimates her course, 
distance, and speed. His purpose is to avoid dis- 
covery and at the same time to manoeuvre into a 
j^avourable position for launching at about one 
aiousand yards' range a torpedo so aimed and ad- 
justed as to strike the enemy ship at an angle of 
incidence to her fore and aft line greater than 
thirty degrees. 

There are, of course, any number of variations 
in the methods of making a submarine attack, but 
as an illustration, suppose a U-boat submerged 
' and approaching from a bow bearing at a speed of 
six knots toward a target ship advancing at twelve 
knots. With fairly good glasses a periscope can 
be distinguished with reasonable certainty in com- 
paratively smooth water by an alert lookout at 
3,000 to 4,000 yards. 

As the ship can probably escape by manoeuvring 
if the periscope is seen before the torpedo is 
fired, it follows that the critical time for both the 
attacker and the attacked is during the interval of 
approach from the range of 4,000 yards to the 
firing range of about 1,000 yards. This interval 
will last approximately from seven to ten min- 
utes, depending upon the angle of approach and 
upon how accurately the submarine judges the 



ANTI-SUBMARINE TACTICS 139 

course of the target ship. Beginning at 4,000 
yards the submarine can be expected to show about 
one foot of periscope and observe for a period of 
about thirty seconds. After this four or five suc- 
cessive observations will probably be taken at in- 
tervals of about one minute, the period of time 
that the periscope is exposed diminishing gradual- 
ly to ten or twelve seconds. 

In the meanwhile the submarine will have 
closed to about 2,000 yards, and from now on 
only a few inches of periscope will be exposed, 
but at more frequent intervals, about every thirty 
seconds, and the length of time the periscope is 
shown will decrease to from ten to five seconds. 

At about one thousand yards the firing exposure 
will be made, and this will probably be for about 
twenty-five seconds in order to assure a well-aimed 
torpedo. 

The above procedure is not absolute — some sub- 
marine commanders show more periscope in at- 
tacking and others less — but it may be taken as 
typical. This means that from the time the sub- 
marine can be seen to the time the torpedo is fired 
about ten minutes elapse, during which there are 
about fifteen exposures of the periscope for gradu- 
ally diminishing periods of time, ranging from 
thirtv seconds down to five seconds, except the last 



140 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

exposure for firing, which lasts about twenty-five 
seconds. 

There has been some talk of a German inven- 
tion designed to enable a submarine to make a 
successful approach and attack without showing 
any periscope. It is improbable that any such 
device is in general use at present. 

Anti-submarine tactics comprise both methods 
to destroy enemy submarines and methods to 
evade their attack. Of course, the primary objec- 
tive is to destroy the enemy ships, but, since it is 
easier for the larger vessels, transports, and mer- 
chantmen to evade the attack, every effort should 
be made by the transports and merchantmxcn to 
develop tactics of evasion while the fighting navy 
is developing tactics to destroy. Cordial under- 
standing and co-operation, therefore, between the 
fighting navy and the merchant navy are of first 
importance in the successful development and 
practice of anti-submarine tactics. 

The chief means within the ship of frustrating 
submarine attack are the lookout, the manoeuvre, 
and the gun. A smoke screen has also been found 
useful to enable merchantmen to escape in cases 
where they are not sufficiently well armed to re- 
pel the gun attack of submarines manoeuvring on 
the surface of the water. Smoke-boxes for this 



ANTI-SUBMARINE TACTICS 141 

purpose have been used extensively by Allied mer- 
chantmen. 

An efficient lookout system is essential. A ship 
can usually avoid attack if the submarine or even 
the torpedo is sighted when still far enough away 
to permit a change of course before the torpedo 
can travel the intervening distance. Safety de- 
pends upon "seeing," and an alert lookout by gain- 
ing 200 or 300 yards in sighting a periscope may 
avert destruction. The need for a system of in- 
tensively trained and organised lookouts is too 
often neglected. 

Zigzag tactics make attack difficult. Also a 
quick manoeuvre the instant a periscope or torpedo 
is sighted will often save the ship. Alert seaman- 
ship is, therefore, a main reliance of capital ships 
in avoiding submarine attack. 

The gun is chiefly useful to compel a submarine 
to keep submerged. The presence of the gun is 
important to embarrass the attack; but to hit a 
periscope is difficult, and even if a lucky hit is 
scored no serious damage is done, as spare peri- 
scopes are carried by all U-boats. 

Tactics aiming to destroy the submarine can be 
best used by the destroyers and other small craft 
specially equipped for this work. Nets and other 
devices which have proved useful against the 
smaller type of submarine in comparative]}^ re- 



142 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

stricted areas are not effective against the larger 
seagoing U-boats. Under-water weapons such as 
bombs and plunging shell are needed to attack an 
under-water enemy. Plunging shell are somewhat 
similar in their operation to bombs. It may be 
supposed that such shell kept falling just short of 
a periscope by a well-directed gunfire and fused to 
burst both on contact and at a certain depth make 
it very uncomfortable for an attacking submarine. 

The seagoing destroyer appears to be the best 
type of anti-submarine craft so far developed. It 
combines abilities to scout, to escort, and to de- 
stroy. Seagoing craft of all descriptions approach- 
ing the characteristics of the destroyers and capable 
of carrying guns and bombs are useful. Yachts, 
fast tugs, and other comparatively small vessels 
capable of keeping the sea and making reasonable 
speed can all do good work in the war zone. 
Torpedo boats and the smaller submarine chas- 
ers and patrol boats, though not so useful as more 
seaworthy vessels, are still of value for operating 
nearer the shore. Mine sweepers also are needed. 

Seaplanes, dirigibles (Blimps), and kite bal- 
loons make good scouts because of the large areas 
they can cover. Weather conditions are seldom 
such that submarines entirely submerged can be 
seen by aircraft, but this does not make the latter 
less valuable for detecting periscopes and subma- 



ANTI-SUBMARINE TACTICS 143 

rines awash or on the surface. Also aircraft mark 
the spot where a periscope is sighted and so assist 
destroyers and patrols in the effective use of their 
bombs. 

Cruisers and converted cruisers are needed for 
distant convoy work, to carry seaplanes, to carry 
kite balloons, and also for various administrative 
and mothership duties. 

An anti-submarine force, therefore, includes 
cruisers, converted cruisers, destroyers, submarines, 
torpedo boats, patrol craft, mine sweepers, sea 
planes, dirigibles, and kite balloons, all supplied 
in as large numbers as can be obtained. 

As has already been remarked, the details of 
new equipment and new methods employed in an- 
ti-submarine tactics cannot be made public. It is 
better to let the U-boats find these out at their 
own cost. But as they learn of the increasing 
number and variety of schemes used to destroy 
them they realise that the chances against them 
have increased. This in itself is a restraint, which 
makes the U-boats more wary and consequently 
less effective. At best there is not much comfort 
or security in a long submarine cruise. The pros- 
pect of dying like a rat in a trap is not pleasant^ 
whether because of accident, or shipwreck, or hos- 
tile attack. The strain of constant guard against 



144 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

the devices of an alert enemy must tell on even the 
strongest nerves. Any method or contrivance 
which increases the anxieties and difBculties of 
the U-boats is thus helpful in checking their ac- 
tivities, and may contribute in unexpected ways to 
their destruction. 

The submarine menace is very real, and people 
are beginning to appreciate the facts and figures 
which show it to be a most important problem of 
the war. But anti-submarine tactics are being de- 
veloped right along, and, while the U-boat as a 
lawless commerce destroyer was unforeseen and 
countermeasures consequently not prepared dur- 
ing previous years of peace, still there is no doubt 
but that it will be successfully met by the navies 
which are upholding traditions handed down from 
Nelson, Suffren, John Paul Jones, Decatur, and 
Farragut. 



CHAPTER XI 

Naval Lessons of the War 

THE advance of naval science has increased 
the complexities of ships and guns. Conse- 
quently the problems to be solved are much more 
intricate and perplexing, both in preparing mate- 
rial and in the development of skill to operate the 
material. This has emphasised the need of wise 
naval management. One important lesson of the 
war is the necessity of good plans, well understood 
and well carried out. 

Every first class navy has its planning depart- 
ment. The duties of this department are deliber- 
ative; to draw knowledge from past and current 
events, to study strategy and tactics as practised 
now and in the past, at home and abroad; to ad- 
vise respecting navy yards, bases, and stations ; to 
make recommendations as to the size, composition, 
and disposition of fleets; to determine the char- 
acteristics of speed, armour, and armament for 
new ships; in short, to make plans both for naval 
preparations in time of peace and for employment 
of the fleets in time of war. 

145 



146 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

The present war has taught that an effective 
navy is the logical defence for a country situated 
like the United States. And by an effective navy 
is meant, not an impotent navy like that of Spain 
in 1898, nor a weaker navy like the one now pro- 
tecting Germany's im.mediate shores, but one ade- 
quate to seek and defeat enemy ships long before 
they can approach our coasts, thus protecting out- 
lying possessions and the sea-borne trade so neces- 
sary to our national life; in other words, by an 
effective navy is meant one which stands for world- 
wide respect for legitimate American interests ; one 
which is ready, if need be, to defend these inter- 
ests in all parts of the world. 

To determine what should be the composition 
of such a fleet is a difficult problem, to under- 
stand the details requires expert technical knowl- 
edge. These technical details are the province of 
the naval experts. The principles, however, from 
which these details are deduced are not hard to 
understand, and they are of first importance as the 
foundation on which the entire structure of naval 
defence rests. 

A fairly definite idea of the work which has 
to be done in order to make the sea power of the 
United States an effective guarantor of national 
security may be arrived at through a discussion 
of the various types of warships, noting briefly 



NAVAL LESSONS OF THE WAR 147 

their characteristics, their uses, and the propor- 
tionate numerical strength of each class required 
in building up a well-balanced United States 
Navy. The estimates which follow have to be 
made in the light of the best obtainable infor- 
mation. They are approximate and subject to 
modification from time to time to meet new condi- 
tions resulting from unforeseen developments. It 
is always to be remembered that the struggle for 
control of the seas is an ever-present spur to in- 
vention and progress in the development of the 
weapons used. Old ships are constantly being re- 
placed by new models. Hence the relative value 
of the respective units may vary somewhat from 
year to year. 

It is a race for the largest stakes that the world 
has to offer. Control of the seas is the objective, 
and the nation which gains this control is the one 
that maintains a fleet able to take and keep the seas 
in all weathers, and powerful enough to overcome 
the strongest enemy fleet that it may encounter. 
Although the particular kinds of ships and guns 
used in answering the demands of naval strength 
come and go in continual evolution, still, these 
broad general demands of sea power remain 
the same. It is better, therefore, to study the ab- 
stract requirements of sea power and to note the 
trend of naval development in meeting these re- 



148 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

quirements than to rivet attention on the par- 
ticular types of ships now in use as though they 
were immutable and incapable of being deposed. 

The cornerstone of naval power is the gun ; and 
the measure of a nation's sea power is the strength 
of her battleship fleet. In spite of the develop- 
ment of the mine and torpedo into important fac- 
tors, the high-power naval gun is still supreme; so 
it has been in the past; so it is now; and so it prob- 
ably will continue to be in the future. 

As has previousl)^ been pointed out, the only ef- 
fective naval defence is a fleet strong enough to 
keep the enemy at a distance. A navy adequate 
to defend must be sufficiently powerful either to 
defeat the enemy fleet on the high seas or to con- 
tain it in enemy home ports. The main reliance 
of such an effective navy is the long-range gun. 

There is general agreement among experts as 
to this principle, that the gun is the prime consid- 
eration in naval warfare; but the different types 
installed in the newest ships of the various coun- 
tries indicate somewhat divergent views as to what 
is the best design of naval gun. It is obvious that 
the heavier the projectile and the harder it hits 
the more will be the damage done. In a general 
way the principal considerations are: First, ac- 
curacy; second, high velocity; third, weight of 
projectile; fourth, capacity of the gun to sustain 



NAVAL LESSONS OF THE WAR 149 

continuous fire; and fifth, rapidity, or volume of 
fire. It is thus seen that the size of the projectile 
is limited by the efficiency of the propelling power 
and by the structural capacities of the- gun and 
mount. In other words, the heavier the shell, con- 
sistent with high velocity, long range, and ac- 
curacy, the better; but if the structural durability 
of the gun is threatened, or if velocity and ac- 
curacy are sacrificed in order to throw a heavier 
projectile, a point is soon reached where damaging 
power is lost instead of gained. 

The varying conditions of sea and visibility un- 
der which naval actions may be fought also tend 
to modify the effectiveness of the different sizes 
and designs of guns according to the circumstances 
which may exist at the time of any particular en- 
gagement. The gun which would win a fight at 
close range in misty weather might be defeated by 
the same enemy gun on a clear day at long range. 
At the shorter ranges the gun of moderate size 
might dominate a larger and more powerful enemy 
gun by greater rapidity and volume of fire. Al- 
though this is a contingency to be reckoned with, 
still, the present tendency is to increase the size 
of the projectile as fast as improvements in the 
powder and gun structure permit; and this tend- 
ency appears to be one likely to continue in the 
future. We may expect, therefore, that the size 



150 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

of naval guns will increase step by step with sci- 
entific improvements in gun construction and 
powder. 

It is always a good thing to reduce a problem 
to its simplest terms. It is fair to assume that 
overwhelming naval opinion is in favour of the 
fleet of battleships as the one great factor in sea 
power. There is also the same indorsement of 
gun power as the one greatest requisite of the fleet 
of battleships. Keeping these two things in mind, 
we should cast aside the dangerous temptation to 
have first in mind the present complicated 
structure that has been evolved into a bat- 
tleship, and we should also try to avoid the tend- 
ency to think in terms of the latest type of that 
unit. We should concentrate on the real terms 
of the problem-; that a fleet of battleships should 
be a number of mobile gun platforms, best adapted 
for mounting and maintaining the greatest number 
of powerful guns in position against the enemy. 

Conditions at sea demand an adequate mobility. 
The maintenance of the guns and the maintenance 
of their service, which includes all the material 
and personnel of the ship, must necessarily be con- 
tained in the gun platform — and conditions on the 
sea arbitrarily divide the guns into groups mounted 
on each battleship platform. Thus the problem 
of the battleship is reduced to finding the best 



NAVAL LESSONS OF THE WAR 151 

possible group of guns, self-maintained upon a 
properly mobile platform, that will act in unison 
with other similar gun platforms. Protection of 
the gun and its platform increases the efficiency of 
the gun on the sea. Consequently a battleship 
should be the best possible group of guns, ar- 
moured, and mounted upon an armoured gun plat- 
form that is self-maintaining and sufficiently mo- 
bile. Thinking in these terms, the three compo- 
nent factors of armament, armour, and speed, re- 
main in their right proportion. 

Since the gun is the prime consideration, the 
other characteristics of a battleship depend upon 
what design of ship is considered most serviceable 
for the purpose of the gun. Some idea of the re- 
quirements of a battleship may be had by keeping 
in mind that it is desirable to mount as many 
guns in one ship as is consistent with having a 
homogeneous fleet possessing tactical mobility, 
adequate speed, long cruising radius, seaworthi- 
ness, habitability, and protection from the blows 
of the enemy whether delivered from above or 
below the water. It requires careful weighing of 
proportionate advantages and disadvantages to 
harmonise these characteristics into the combina- 
tion which will produce the best possible type of 
battleship. 

The advantages of ships of large tonnage over 



152 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

smaller vessels are many; more heavy guns can be 
carried, the platform is steadier, the cruising ra- 
dius is larger, the habitability and seaworthiness 
are better, and more effective means of protection 
can be installed. On the other hand, there is a 
limit of size beyond which the advantages are out- 
weighed by the disadvantages; the question of ex- 
pense enters, and any very large increase in the 
size of warships might be argued against on the 
grounds that it would be like putting "too many 
eggs in one basket." Manoeuvring abilities are 
adversely affected by very large displacements, 
and the depths of the various waterways as well as 
the accommodations of canals and dry docks im- 
pose definite limits to the size of ships. 

On the whole it may be expected that the tend- 
ency to increase the tonnage of battleships will 
continue for some time. It would also appear an 
improvident policy for any country to increase the 
size of its battleships by radical changes of large 
increments, because this would entail expense 
and a bad effect upon the homogeneity of the fleet. 
These objections might easily outweigh the advan- 
tages gained. It may be assumed, therefore, that 
future increase in the size of warships will be a 
gradual growth, with a probably decreasing accel- 
eration. 

The fleet of battleships alone does not consti- 



NAVAL LESSONS OF THE WAR 153 

tute a navy. Scouts, destroyers, submarines and 
other auxiliaries are needed. In order that the 
United States may make good defense of her great 
surrounding oceans it is particularly important 
that her battle fleet should have a far flung service 
of scouts to give information of the movements 
of the enemy. Destroyers are needed to attack 
and confuse the enemy ships, and at the same time 
guard their own large ships from similar attacks. 
Submarines are necessary to help defend the coasts 
and also to operate as a tactical sub-division of 
the fleet. Mine layers are needed to harass and 
menace enemy ships, while mine sweepers and pa- 
trols are required to search for enemy mines and 
submarines. In addition to these combatant units, 
auxiliaries, including transports, repair ships, hos- 
pital ships, and supply ships, are essential to the 
life and vigour of a fighting navy. 

The floating instruments of sea power, more- 
over, must be backed by suitably situated and 
properly defended permanent bases and navy 
yards in which ships may seek rest and rehabili- 
tation. Strategically situated island possessions 
are also needed for naval bases, by which lines of 
communication may be kept open to such tempo- 
rary advance bases as the requirements of a par- 
ticular campaign may demand. 

It is thus seen that, while relative naval power 



154 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

is primarily measured by the strength of the re- 
spective battleship fleets of the various naval pow- 
ers a navy should also possess these necessary aux- 
iliaries in order to attain its maximum effective- 
ness. The first-mentioned auxiliaries, the scouts 
are a most important adjunct. 

The battle cruiser is the most powerful type of 
scout, and in addition to high speed has great 
offensive powers, together with endurance and a 
moderate protection of armour. While the chief 
function of this type is to get information, it has, 
because of these offensive and defensive charac- 
teristics, additional uses. The battle cruiser may 
fight for information and break through a hostile 
screen; she may support the lighter craft of her 
own fleet, beat back enemy scouts and guard the 
main body from surprise; she may be used to pro- 
tect national sea routes and attack those of the 
enemy; and in battle she may operate as a fast 
wing and take a position favourable for using both 
guns and torpedoes. 

But the chief utility of the battle cruiser is 
now held to be that of a scout and raider, possessed 
of the power to dominate any such craft of other 
type. Yet the gain of this advantage means that 
one unit has been built instead of several — and, 
as it would appear that a number of scouts is 
more useful than one individual, except in un- 



NAVAL LESSONS OF THE WAR 155 

usual conditions, the wisdom of building one bat- 
tle cruiser instead of several scouts is questionable. 
The information service of a fleet requires a 
large number of scouts, and in order to produce 
them without undue cost the light cruiser has been 
developed, small in size and lightly armoured, 
but with adequate speed and cruising radius for 
scout duty. As before stated, the unarmoured 
light cruiser, carrying torpedoes and intermediate 
guns, may be regarded as a development of the 
destroyer; it is larger, more habitable, carries 
larger guns, and is more useful as a scout. The 
ultimate development of the light cruiser would 
appear to be a larger unarmoured ship with great 
speed, carrying torpedoes and a few of the most 
powerful naval guns. Such a ship could outrun 
anything it could not fight, and it would take al- 
most an equal number of battle cruisers to deny 
information sought by a group of these big-gun 
fast scouts making determined efforts to break 
through or to go around the opposing battle cruis- 
ers. The thin armour of the battle cruiser would 
afford protection against the small guns of light 
cruisers, but would be of no avail against the 
heavy guns of this new type of scout. In fact, 
the lessons of the war give good ground for belief 
that such thin armour, particularly in turrets, 



156 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

might increase the chances of disaster, if hits were 
made by heavy guns. 

There has been talk of such a ship to be devel- 
oped in this country, its characteristics being ex- 
treme speed and maximum gun power without ar- 
mour protection. Those that favour this type 
hold that, just as the armoured cruiser fell into 
discredit, so will the battle cruiser fall into dis- 
credit upon the advent of this type of scout. The 
idea is that the battleship is for the main strength 
of the lighting line, having extreme gun power 
and extreme endurance and armour protection; 
that the logical auxiliary of such a battle fleet is 
a class of ships having extreme speed and extreme 
gun power without armour protection; that any 
compromise between these two, such as a battle 
cruiser, is unsound from the essential standpoint 
of getting best results from money expended. 

The destroyer, a familiar and popular fighting 
ship, the usefulness of which the experience of 
the present war has clearly demonstrated, dis- 
places about 1,000 tons, has no armour protection, 
carries torpedoes and small-calibre guns, and pos- 
sesses high speed, quick manoeuvring qualities, and 
sufficient radius to permit cruising with the fleet. 
Destroyers have a wide range of employment, in- 
cluding scouting, patrolling, convoying, and fight- 
ing. They are almost indispensable to the battle- 



NAVAL LESSONS OF THE WAR 157 

ship fleet. While cruising both during the day 
and at night the destroyers help screen the capital 
ships and are ready for any kind of emergency 
duty. 

When the time of battle comes it would be 
hard to overestimate the value of destroyers in 
making attack on the enemy capital ships, in 
breaking up the projected attacks of enemy de- 
stroyers, in delivering the deathblow to crippled 
enemy ships, and making smoke screens for tac- 
tical purposes, either to confuse the enemy or to 
envelop and protect any of their own ships which 
may happen to be hard pressed. 

An excerpt from the report of the Naval Gen- 
eral Board dated Nov. 17, 1914, reads as follows: 
"After mature consideration of all the elements 
involved the General Board concluded that a well- 
balanced fighting fleet for all purposes of offence 
or defence calls for a relative proportion of four 
destroyers to one battleship." 

In addition to this proved value as an auxiliary 
of the fleet, the destro}Tr is now recognised as the 
best weapon against the U-boat. So evident is 
this that the demand for these craft is most ur- 
gent, and it may be said that seldom has any type 
of naval construction won so deserved a recog- 
nition in the actual test of warfare. 

Auxiliaries less distinctively combative, but 



158 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

still necessary to the maintenance of a fighting 
navy, include colliers, oil-fuel ships, repair ships, 
mother ships for submarines and aircraft, trans- 
ports, and hospital- ships. The characteristics and 
uses of these vessels are obvious, and the respec- 
tive number needed may be determined by logis- 
tical calculations. Lesser naval units, including 
mine layers, mine sweepers, patrol ships, and sub- 
marine chasers, also have work to do in modern 
warfare and must be provided for in adequate 
numbers. 

In making a brief survey of the naval activities 
of the war, it is seen that the submarine has been 
of no great value to the superior navies control- 
ling the seas, but has been practically the most 
effective naval weapon of the inferior fleets. 
When used against the enemy battle squadrons 
it has influenced strategy and tactics and scored 
successes in sinking some of the older men-of-war, 
but generally speaking has produced no very im- 
portant results. When used against merchant 
ships the submarine has been unable to attain ef- 
fectiveness while complying with the rules and 
usages of international law, but by resorting to 
unscrupulous methods it has become a dangerous 
commerce destroyer such as never has been seen, 
and has become of great importance in the war. 

The war has shown that the chief tactical value 



NAVAL LESSONS OF THE WAR 159 

of the submarine in actual naval warfare is for 
defence, to hold the enemy at a distance. The 
fleet submarine has also demonstrated an offensive 
value which may be useful in attaining a tactical 
advantage. It may be inferred, therefore, that the 
United States needs submarines both to help de- 
fend her coasts and to operate as a tactical subdi- 
vision of the fleet. 

The evolution of the submarine appears to be 
toward the submersible battleship; but the con- 
sensus of naval opinion at present seems to be that 
a super-submersible capable of navigating under 
the water and also strong enough to fight battle- 
ships on the surface involves an almost prohibi- 
tive cost, which would be out of proportion to the 
advantages gained. By increasing the tonnage of 
the submarine its mechanical difficulties are aggra- 
vated. On the other hand, the large tonnage of 
the surface battleship is like a reserve of wealth, 
which may be expended in any desirable way; if 
under-water attack is a serious menace to the bat- 
tleship some of this tonnage can be drawn upon 
to supply suitable protection, such as a series of 
outer and inner bottoms so constructed and subdi- 
vided as to make the ship practically nonsinkable; 
or, if attack from the air is dangerous, reserve ton- 
nage may be drawn upon for aero defence — and 
so on. In estimating the value of the submarine 



160 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

in wars to come it would appear safe, therefore, 
to assume that in future struggles for control of 
the seas the role of the submarine will always be 
secondary to that of surface ships. 



APPENDIX 

Comparative Strength of Navies 

Excerpts from a compilation by T. G. Frothingham^ 
reprinted by courtesy of ''Current History." — Table pre- 
pared and arranged by C. H. Foster, U. S. N. A. — Table 
published by the Office of U. S. Naval Intelligence. 

^T^HE four deck plans, Fig. i, Fig. 2, Fig. 3, Fig. 4, 
A show practically all the variations in the construc- 
tion of dreadnoughts, and also of battle cruisers. Keep- 
ing them in mind will help in the following estimate of 
the navies of Great Britain, Germany, United States, 
France, Japan, Russia, Italy, and Austria-Hungary. 
These will be given in their order of tonnage. 

The United States Navy has taken a leading part in 
the development of the modern naval gun. This has re- 
sulted in a gun with an increased length in proportion to 
its calibre, and a high muzzle velocity without undue 
erosion. Our 12-inch naval gun, increased from 45 
calibre to 50 calibre, with a projectile of 870 pounds 
and an initial velocity of 2,950 foot-seconds, is the most 
powerful naval gun of its class. Our next step, the 45- 
calibre 14-inch naval gun, has a projectile of 1,400 
pounds and initial velocity of 2,600 foot-seconds. This 
gun has been increased to 50 calibre for the three new 
dreadnoughts of the Mississippi class. For the later 
classes of dreadnoughts authorised by Congress a 16-inci 

161 





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164 APPENDIX 

gun has been designed. These guns will be the standard 
of comparison for armaments when considering the for- 
eign navies. 

THE BRITISH NAVY 

The British Navy is much the strongest in the world, 
because, to retain control of the seas, Great Britain has 
made it her policy to maintain a navy powerful enough 
to fight any two naval powers that might combine against 
her. This is the origin of the term "a two-power navy," 
now so frequently used in our country. 

The British strength, in the recognised first essentials 
of sea power, known to be built and building is as fol- 
lows: 

BRITISH NAVY— SHIPS BUILT AND BUILDING 

Dreadnoughts _. 38' 

Predreadnought battleships 31 

Battle cruisers 7 

1 3S ships, regular programme, 2 Turkish and i Chilean (building in England) 
' aken over early in the war. 

Of the 38 dreadnoughts built and building the follow- 
ing is the list of recent construction in the programme, 
with the dates of completion originally planned for each 
ship: 

BRITISH NAVY— NEW CONSTRUCTION— DREADNOUGHT TYPE 

Compl'd Displace- 
in — Name ment Main armament Speed 

1914. .Queen Elizabeth 27,500 ) f 25 o 

1914 .Warspite 27,500 25 o 

1915. .Barham 27,500 [ 8 is-inch i 25 

1015. .Valiant 27,500 | 250 

1915.. Malaya 27,500 J I 25 o 

1915. .Royal Sovereign ... 25,750] [ 220 

1915. .Royal Oak 25,750 220 

1916. .Ramillies 25,75° t 8 is-inch ■( 22 o 

1916. .Resolution 25,750 22 o 

1916. .Revenge 25,750 J [ 22 o 

1917. .One Ship 27,500 815-inch 250 

1917. .Renown 25,750 ] 

1917. .Repulse 25.750 > 8 is-inch 22 o 

1917. .Resistance 25,750 J 




165 



APPENDIX 167 

The dreadnought strength of the British fleet in the 
battle of Jutland (May 31-June 1, 1916) is authorita- 
tively given as 29. In view of this, it seems improbable 
that at the date of the battle Great Britain had made any 
great additions to the dreadnoughts in her known pro- 
gramme. Great Britain is known to have increased her 
dreadnoughts by the one Chilean and two Turkish war- 
ships taken over early in the war. 

The following is the list of British battle cruisers at 
the time of the battle, with dates of completion: 

BRITISH NAVY— BATTLE CRUISERS BEFORE THE BATTLE OF 
JUTLAND 

Compl'd Displace- 
in — Name ment Main armament Speed 

1908. .Indomitable 17,250] f 26 

1908 Inflexible 17.250 i 8 12-inch ] 26 

1908 . . Invmcible 17,250 J I 26 

1911 Indefatigable 18,750 812-inch 25 

19 n .Lion 26,350 \ o ■ , f 28 >: 

1912. .PnncessRoyal 26,350/ » i3.S-inch i ^gr 

1912. .New Zealand 18,800 1 o • 1. / 250 

19 13 .Australia 19.200 / ^ ""'"'^h { 260 

1913- .Queen Mary 27.000 813.5-inch 28.0 

1914 Tiger 28,500 813.5-inch 28.0 

There were nine battle cruisers with the British fleet 
in the battle of Jutland, and it is known that every one 
of these is in the list above given. Of these, three bat- 
tle cruisers were lost in this battle. Indefatigable, Queen 
Mary, and Invincible, leaving the present total seven, 
as given in the table. 

In the months that have followed the battle it is 
probable that there has been an increase of the fleet of 
dreadnoughts, but, realising the other demands on the 
British yards, it is doubtful if the increase has been 
abnormal. 

Great Britain has been obliged to increase greatly her 
fleet of light cruisers, destroyers, patrols, &c., to meet 



168 APPENDIX 

the submarine danger. It is known that a great deal of 
her building capacity has been used in construction of 
the monitor type. It has recently been given out that 
the British Government is building a large number of 
cargo ships, and the demands on the yards for repairs of 
the fleet, for supply and transport service, &c., must also 
be considered. Add to this the great drain on British 
labour to provide munitions, and the indicated lack of 
great increase to the fleet would be explained. Conse- 
quently, it would be reasonable to conclude that in 1917 
the British fleet of dreadnoughts does not greatly ex- 
ceed the total given in the regular building programme. 
Undoubtedly there has been a continuance of the future 
building programme, and many ships have been laid 
down. 

From the deck plan of the Queen Elizabeth (Fig. 5) 
it will be seen that the placing of the turrets follows 
the design of U. S. S. Michigan (Fig. 4). All of the 
fourteen ships given in the list of new construction have 
this arrangement of turrets. Sixteen of the remaining 
dreadnoughts also have their turrets aligned over the 
keel. The other seven have the less efficient designs of 
the Dreadnought (Fig. 1) and Neptune (Fig. 3). 

Great Britain originated the battle cruiser. The plans 
show the design of the Lion class (Fig. 7) and the ear- 
lier Invincible class (Fig. 6). It will be seen in the list 
of recent construction that Great Britain did not add to 
her programme any battle cruisers for completion after 
1914. The five 25-knot dreadnoughts {Queen Eliza- 
beth class) were for 1914 and 1915. After that for 
1916 and 1917 there is only one 25-knot ship — all the 
rest are 22-knot. 



APPENDIX 169 

For armament eleven dreadnoughts carry 1 2-inch guns, 
twelve 13.5-inch, and fourteen 15-inch, The Chilean 
warship, now called the Canada, carries 14-inch guns. 
The English 15-inch projectile is very heavy, weighing 
some 500 pounds more than the American 14-inch pro- 
jectile, but the initial velocity of this heavier shell is 
much less than that of our 14-inch. 

It is rumoured, and it is very probable, that still 
larger English naval guns have been designed — even as 
large as 18-inch. But, in view of the British programme 
of construction, it seems most likely that such guns are 
for the monitors. 

Great Britain has built floating batteries of the moni- 
tor type. These are for use against shore guns and in 
places where ships are exposed to torpedoes and mines. 
There is much mystery maintained about them, but it is 
known that some have very heavy guns, and that they 
have a specially devised cushioned protection against 
mines and torpedoes. 

In all the auxiliaries of a great fleet the British Navy 
is well equipped — and when one realises that this means 
cruisers, scouts, supply ships of all kinds, destroyers, sub- 
marines, aircraft, &c., with the additional burden of 
patrols, mine sweepers, and transport service, all of 
which are necessary to maintain British control of the 
seas, the total is astonishing. 

THE GERMAN NAVY 

Germany became the second naval power of the world 
in the years that succeeded the laying down of the 
Dreadnought (1906). This was a time of great activity 



170 APPENDIX 

in the foreign navies. In 1907 Germany had laid down 
four dreadnoughts, in 1908 four, in 1909-10 five, in 1911 
four. In the same years the United States Navy had 
been restricted to the two-battleships-a-year policy — and 
had yielded second place to Germany. 

The known strength of the German Navy is : 

GERMAN NAVY— BUILT AND BUILDING 

Dreadnoughts 20 

Predreadnought battleships , I9 

Battle cruisers -ji 

^ Six, regular programme; one battle cruiser building taken over from Greece. 

As in the case of the British Navy, absolutely no 
German naval information has been given out since the 
start of the war. Concerning the German Navy also sen- 
sational stories of increased strength have been circulated. 
It was related that the ships were being rearmed with 
new guns of great power, that there had been secret con- 
struction, and that an unexpected strength had been de- 
veloped, but at the battle of Jutland it was the same 
story. Germany brought out her whole fleet — and there 
was no new element of strength. 

The twenty German dreadnoughts in the known pro- 
gramme consist of thirteen ships, and the following new 
construction is given with proposed dates of completion: 

GERMAN NAVY— NEW CONSTRUCTION— DREADNOUGHT TYPE 

Compl'd Displace- 
in — Name ment Main armament Speed 

19 14. .Grosser Kurfurst 25,388] f 22.0 

i9i4..Markgraf ^5,388 ( • . I 22.0 

i9i4..K6nig 25,388 \^° i2-mch < 22.0 

1915. .Kronprinz 25,388 J I 22.0 

l9i6.."T" 28,500] I 23.0 

1916. .Ersatz Worth 28,500 [ 815-inch \ 23.0 

1917. .Ersatz Fr'd'h III 28,500 J [ 23.0 





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APPENDIX 173 

The German battle cruisers in the known building pro- 
gramme were as follows at the date of the battle of 
Jutland: 

GERMAN NAVY— BATTLE CRUISERS 

Compl'd Displace- 
in — Name ment Main armament Speed 

1910. . Von der Tann 19,100 8 ii-inch 27.6 

ipiL.Moltke 22.632 1 -, f 28.4 

iQia.Seydlitz 24.38S I '° ii-»nch | ^9.2 

1914. . DerfBinger 28,000] ( 27.0 

1915 Lutzow 28,000 I o ., in.u I 27.0 

1916. .Ersatz Hertha 28.000 f » 12-mcn ^70 

1917. .E'tz Vic'a Louise 28,000 J 1 27 

To the above must be added the battle cruiser Salamis, 
building for Greece, which the Germans took over early 
in the war. 

In the battle of Jutland the German High Seas Fleet 
is given as sixteen dreadnoughts, five battle cruisers, and 
six predreadnoughts. The battle cruiser Liitzow was lost 
in the battle. The details of the remaining ships are 
shown in the above list. 

In the months that have followed Jutland it is im- 
probable that any great addition has been made to the 
building programme of the German fleet, but Germany 
has built some new light cruisers, some destroyers and 
numerous air craft. There must have been a strong tax 
on their yards for repairs ; the original ships of the pro- 
gramme were to be completed, and there must have been 
a great effort to turn out submarines for their latest 
offensive. As in the case of the British fleet, it is prob- 
ably safe to conclude that there has been no abnormal 
increase of their fighting fleet. 

The German dreadnoughts are known to be well built 
and able ships, but in many of them the arrangement 
of the turrets hampers the guns. Eight dreadnoughts 
have the design of the Helgoland (Fig. 2), five {Kaiser 



174 APPENDIX 

class, Fig. 8) have the echelon arrangement shown in the 
diagrams, and seven have the turrets aligned over the 
keel. 

The German predreadnought battleships, although 
they are valuable assets to the German Navy, are not as 
good as the corresponding British ships and American 
ships of the same date. 

Of the German dreadnoughts four carry ii-inch guns, 
thirteen carry 1 2-inch guns, and three 15-inch guns. 
These last are the ships of the Ersatz Worth class (Fig. 
9) in the list given, and, from the evidence of Jutland, 
it is doubtful if all are completed. These twenty Ger- 
man dreadnoughts built and building carry forty-eight 
11 -inch, one hundred and thirty 12-inch, and, when the 
three Ersatz Worths are completed, twenty- four 15-inch 
guns. 

THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

The United States Navy has been the leader in the de- 
velopment of the "all-big-gun" battleship of to-day, 
called the "dreadnought." From the first single-turret 
ship, the Monitor, to the two-turret monitors, then to the 
U. S. S. Roanoke (Fig. 10) — these were the three great 
strides in such ships designed by the United States Navy 
in the epoch-making times of the civil war, which led to 
the plan of big guns in turrets aligned over the keel. 

In the recognised first essentials of sea power the 
strength of the United States Navy is given as follows : 

UNITED STATES NAVY-BUILT AND BUILDING 

Dreadnoughts 17 

Predreadnought battleships ai 

The United States Navy has no battle cruisers. 



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FIG. 10— U. S. S. ROANOKE, 1863 
( Sea-going Turret X'^essel) 

Armament, two t 5-inch, two ii-inch, two iso-pdr. rifled guns. Armor, 
1 14 in. wrought-iron deck in two layers of ^ in. each, and side armor, 
4^ in. at top. 3V2 in. at bottom; wrought-iron plates 4 ft. below and 6 ft. 
above water-line. 




FIG. IT— U. S. 



:^' 



MICHIGAN, 1909 
R. 



Armament, eight 12-in. 45 cal. B.C. R., twenty-two 3-in. 50 cal. R. F., 
four 3-pdr. saluting. Armor belt. 10 in., 11 in., 12 in., at top; 8 in., 9 in. 
10 in., at bottom. Casemate, 8 in. at top; 10 in. at bottom. Side platinu 
forward and aft, i!^-in. nickel steel. Protective deck forward, i^-in., 
aft. 3-in. nickel steel.^ 

' By courtesy of U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings. 



175 




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176 



APPENDIX 177 

As the object of this article is to give the strength 
of the navies at corresponding stages of their building 
programmes, two of the dreadnoughts should be omitted 
from this list, the Tennessee and California, as their per- 
centage completed is small. The three ships of the class 
of the Mississippi, recently launched, should be included 
on this basis, as these three ships might be hurried to com- 
pletion. Consequently, the dreadnoughts in the corre- 
sponding programme of the United States Navy should 
be fifteen. 

In Fig. 13 is given the plan of U. S. S. Pennsylvania. 
As will be seen, this ship is the developed design of the 
Michigan, with three guns in each turret instead of two. 
The recent building programme of our first-line dread- 
nought battleships is given below: 

Comp'd Displace- Speed 

in — Name ment Armament Knots 

191 2. .Arkansas ^^'^^^ W2 12 in / 21.05 

1912. .Wyoming 26,000/ i-«-"i ^ 21.22 

1913.. Texas 27,000 10 14-in 21.0 

1914. . New York 27,000 10 14-in 21.0 

I9is-Nevada 27.S00 \ • / 20.5 

1915- -Oklahoma.. 27.500 f '" ^4-m ^ ^o.os 

19 16 . . Pennsylvania 31 ,400 1 

1916.. Arizona 31,400/^2 14-in 21.05 

Idaho 32,000 I 

Mississippi 32,000 ^ 12 14-in 21. 

New Mexico 32,000 J 

The twelve dreadnoughts completed of the battle fleet 
carry sixty-four 1 2-inch guns and sixty-four 14-inch 
guns. The three ships of the Mississippi class will add 
thirty-six 14-inch guns to this total. 

In addition to these, the two ships of the Michigan 
class carry sixteen 12-inch guns. Of the other pre- 
dreadnought battleships six carry twenty-four 45-calibre 
12-inch guns, and eight carry thirty-two 40-calibre 12- 
inch guns. 




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178 



APPENDIX 



179 



UNITED STATES VESSELS BUILDING AND AUTHORISED 



Displace- 
ment 



Speed 



32,300 
32,300 

32,600 



Name 
Battleships 
Tennessee .... 
California. . .. 

Colorado 

Maryland. . . . 
Washington . . 
W. Virginia . . , 

No. 49 
SO 

5^ j. Characteristics not determined 

52 

S3 

54 
Battle Cruisers 
No. 

35 10 14-in. 



Main 
battery 

12 14-in. 
12 14-in. 

8 i6-in. 



, .35,000 



. Characteristics not determined. 



Scout Cruisers 



Where 
building 

New York 

Mare Island 

Camden 

Newport News 

Camden 

Newport News 



No. 



Seattle 



35 



, . Characteristics not determined 



From the foregoing table it will be seen that a great in- 
crease of the United States Navy has been authorised. 
As this is for future years it has nothing to do with 
the present comparison. It should be added that many 
destroyers are also being rushed to completion. 

THE FRENCH NAVY 

The French Navy was for many years second only 
to the British Navy, but in the abnormal increase from 
1906 to 1911 there was no effort made to keep pace with 
Great Britain and Germany — and this was probably wise 
from the peculiar situation of France. The strength of 
the French Navy in the main accepted essentials is as 
follows : 




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APPENDIX 181 

FRENCH NAVY— BUILT AND BUILDING 

Dreadnoughts I2 

Predreadnought battleships ." 17 

The French Navy has no battle cruisers. 

The known recent building programme is as follows: 

Cotnp'd Displace- Speed 

in — Name merit Armament Knots 

1915. . Bretagne 23,172 1 

191S ..Loraine 23,172 ^ 10 I3.4inch 20.0 

1915 . . Provence 23,172 I 

1916. . Normandie 24,828 | 

1916. .Langxiedoc 24.828 

1916. .Flandre 24,828 [12 13.4-inch 21.5 

1916. .Gascogne 24,828 

1917 . . Beam 24,828 J 

As will be seen from the plans of the Normandie 
given in Fig. 14, the French have three turrets aligned 
over the keel — but with four guns in each turret. No 
other navy has adopted this arrangement of guns. The 
French have always designed and built good battleships 
— and French ships have been of great use in the Medi- 
terranean and elsewhere. It is now known that equality 
in heavy artillery on the western battle front was only 
established by use of the French naval guns (Fig. 15). 

In auxiliaries of the battle fleet France is well 
equipped. Her submarines in particular are known to be 
very good, although, as has been the case with the British 
Navy, there has not been much chance to use them. 

THE JAPANESE NAVY 

The strength of the Japanese Navy in the first essen- 
tials in the known building programme is as follows : 

JAPANESE NAVY— BUILT AND BUILDING 

Dreadnoughts 6 

Predreadnought battleships 13 

Battle cruisers 4 




FIG. 15— FRENCH NAVAL GUN AT WESTERN FRONT. 
182 



APPENDIX 183 

The recent building programme, so far as known, is 
as follows : 

DREADNOUGHTS 

Comp'd Displace- Speed 

in — Name ment Armament Knots 

•Kawachi 20,800 1 jj^ 

. Settsu 20,800 I -^ 

. Fu-So 30,600 

. Yamashiro 30.600 ^^ -.-mch 22.0 

. Ise 30,600 I 

. Hinga 30,600 J 

BATTLE CRUISERS 

1013.. Kongo 27.500 1 8 T. inch / ^^^ 

ioi4..Hiyei 27,500 f »i4-incn ^ ^7.0 

1014- Kirishima 27,500 \ o , . in^t, 

iji5..Haruna 27,500/ »i4-mcn.... 



1912 
1912 
1915 
1016 
1916 
1917 



28.0 
28.0 



The first two dreadnoughts have the arrangement of 
the turrets of the German Helgoland class (Fig. 2). 
The four dreadnoughts of the Fu-So class (Fig. 16) are 
formidable battleships which have followed the design 
of the U. S. S. Arkansas (Fig. 12). As a matter of 
course Japan, like the other nations at war, has given 
out no naval information since she entered the war. Un- 
doubtedly there has been a great increase of the Japanese 
building programme, but it is not probable that any new 
capital ships are ready for service. 

As in the case of the British Navy, it will be noted 
that the Japanese naval programme did not include bat- 
tle cruisers for completion later than 1915. Whether 
or not other ships of this class have been recently laid 
down is not known. The four battle cruisers in the 
Japanese building programme probably make up the most 
powerful squadron of their class afloat to-day. 

In all the auxiliaries of the battle fleet it may be as- 
sumed that the progressive Japanese are well equipped. 




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185 



186 APPENDIX 

In guns It is probable that they are going to larger cali- 
bres, as is the United States Navy. 



THE RUSSIAN NAVY 

In the matter of sea power Russia has been at a dis- 
advantage through being obliged to maintain two sepa- 
rate navies — the Baltic fleet and the Black Sea fleet. 
This unusual condition has come from closing the Darda- 
nelles to Russian warships. Their strength in first es- 
sentials is as follows: 

RUSSIAN NAVY— BUILT AND BUILDING 

Dreadnoughts 7 

Predreadnought battleships 7 

Battle cruisers 4 

The known building programme of dreadnoughts is as 
follows : 

Comp'd Displace- Speed 

in — Name ment Armament Knots 

1914. .Sevastopol 23,026 1 

i9i4..Petropavlovsk l^lfA 12 12-inch 23.0 

1914. .Poltava 23,026 I "^ 

1914. .Gangoot 23,026 i 

1914. . Imp'sa Maria 22,435 | 

1915. .Imp. Alex III 22,435 [ 12 12-inch 21. 

1915 . . Ekaterina II 22,435 J 

Of these the last three are for the Black Sea fleet. It 
will be observed that the Russian dreadnoughts (Fig. 
18) carry four turrets in the centre line with three guns 
in each turret. 

RUSSIAN BATTLE CRUISERS 

Comp'd Displace- Speed 

in — Name ment Armament Knots 

1916. .Navarin 32,000 

1916. .Borodino 32,ooo I • , _ 

1916.. Ismail 32,000 <^^ 14-incn 25.0 

1916. .Kinbum 32,000 , 









187 



188 APPENDIX 

In these Russian battle cruisers we find again the de- 
sign of three guns in each turret instead of two. 

Knowing the pressure that the war has brought upon 
Russia, it seems impossible that this building programme, 
of dreadnoughts and battle cruisers has been completed 
in any degree that would make the Russian Navy a fac- 
tor in the balance of sea power at this time. 

Russia, however, is well provided with destroyers, 
having an unusual number of these craft for a navy of 
its size. 

THE ITALIAN NAVY 

The corresponding strength of the Italian Navy is as 
follows : 

ITALIAN NAVY— BUILT AND BUILDING 

Dreadnoughts 9 

Predreadnought battleships 7 

The Italian Navy has no battle cruisers. The latest 
construction in the known building programme is as fol- 
lows : 

Comp'd Displace- Annament Speed 

in — Name ment Knots 

1913. .Giulio Cesare 22,022 13 12-inch 22.5 

1914. .C'ti di Cavour 22,022 13 12-inch 22.5 

1915.. Andrea Doria ll'fA] IZ 12-inch 22.5 

igiS-.Duilio 22,5641 •^ ^ 

1917. .Carraciolo 30,000 | 

1917. .Mar'o-Collona 30,000 I gie-inch 2K a 

i9i7..C'ro-Colombo 30,000 M ^S men 25.0 

1917. .F'co-Morosini 30,000 J 

The Italian naval constructors have been very skilful 
— and the above is an advanced programme calculated 
to make Italy, if not a great naval power, a valuable ally 
to any naval power. The turret plan shown in Fig. 19 
should be noted, as it provides an ingenious way of 












w 






(0 

5"^ 




189 



190 APPENDIX 

mounting thirteen heavy guns — and it is unique among 
the navies of the world. 

But, again in the case of Italy, it must be realised that 
the country has "probably been too much occupied in other 
fields to carry out this ambitious naval programme. 

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN NAVY 

Austria-Hungary's known strength in first essentials of 
sea power is given as follows : 

Dreadnoughts 8 

Predreadn ought battleships 6 

The Austro-Hungarian Navy has no battle cruisers. 
The recent known building programme is as follows : 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN NAVY— BUILT AND BUILDING 

Comp'd Displace- Speed 

in — Name ment Armament Knots 

1912. .Viribus Unitis 20,010 ] 

1913. .Tegetthoff 20,010 [12 12-inch 21.0 

1914 . . Prinz Eugen 20,010 J 

1914. .Szent Istvan 20,010 12 12-inch 21.0 

(1) One ship 24,500 1 

(1).... One ship 24,500 •, 

(1).... One ship 24,500 p° i3.S-mcti 21.0 

(1) One ship 24,500 J 

* Time due to be completed unknown. 

It is improbable that this programme has been carried 
through to any degree. It is much more likely that with 
German assistance Austria-Hungary has been devoting 
her energies to submarines — and has thus become a fac- 
tor in the war of destruction now being waged in the 
Mediterranean. 



For details of naval construction of these Principal 
Powers see the following tables : 



>r 




/ 




s-n 






n 3 




/ III 


WW 




/ III 


o" ^ 






1 *. »-i 






o o 




/ iSsSsom 


« a\ • 






" M 




1 bUKIs 


.5-1 




o>«up 


> 




f5 ^|UUL 


d 




/JBb^w. 


C/5 




w V vHf 


H 




iMflOff 


W 




iS^BF 


o 


*N 


/^^\ 


a 
•2i 




^ o 




N 


;arian 

Tieatn: 
roadside 


ff>. 


'io 

:^5o 


•• 00 


o>. 


■^M 




1 ^ M 


». 


3 






H 


^•" o 


^^ 


Cf ' 


5- § 


«>. 


v^ 


d 


X 


X 


c 


«>. 


^ 


w 




H 






< 












W 












2 w 




fjM 


r 






N J)l| 


k 


^o. c 




1 ffil 


M 


-1 3 -^ 




I ^ 


w 


3 g M 




n 




"fn" ^ 




n 






191 



192 



APPENDIX 

NAVAL STRENGTH, JULY. 1914 





Great Britain 


Germany 




Built 


Building 


Built 


Building 




No. 


Tons 


No. 


Tons 


No. 


Tons 


No. 


Tons 


Dreadnoughts .... 

Battleships 

Battle Cruisers. . . 
Armored Cruisers. 

Cruisers 

Destroyers 

Submarines 


20 

40 

9 

34 
74 
167 

75 


423,350 
589,385 
187,800 
406,800 
382,815 
125,850 
30,362 


16 

I 

17 
21 
22 


421,750 

28,500 

67,000 
21,770 
17,236 


13 

20 
4 
9 

41 
130 

27 


285,770 
242,800 
88,749 
94.245 
150,747 
67,094 
14,140 


7 

4 

5 
24 
18 


187,164 

112,000 

26,900 
14,400 
14,400 


Total Tonnage all 


2,714,106 


1,306,577 






Guns 11" to 15".. . 


564 


320 


Active Personnel . . 


150,609 


79,197 


Appropriation for 
1913-14 


1237,530,459 


$112,091,125 



The above table was prepared and arranged by C. H. Foster, U. S. N. A. 
(References: Navy Year Book 1914: Brassey: Reports published by office of 
U. S. Naval Intelligence, etc., etc.) 



APPENDIX 193 

\AVAL STRENGTH. JULY. 1914 (Cotttinued) 





France 






Austria-Hungary 




Russia 




Built 


Building 


Built 


Building 


Built 


Building 


No. 


Tons 

92,368 
262,67s 

201,724 
46,09s 
3S.8I2 
27,940 


No. 


Tons 


Xo. 


Tons 


No. 


Tons 


No. 


Tons 


No. 


Tons 


4 
18 

20 
9 

64 


8 

3 

22 


193.656 

2,6s.? 
14.766 


3 

6 

2 
5 
18 
6 


60.030 
74.613 

13.380 

13.815 

9,450 

1,686 


4 

5 
6 


93.SIO 

21,216 
5.370 


7 

6 

9 

91 

30 


98,750 

63,500 

52,845 

36,748 

6,506 


7 

4 

8 
44 
l9 


159,409 

128,000 

53.600 
53.664 
13.284 


899.9IS 


347.508 


678,818 


204 


90 


160 


63,846 


19.331 


52,463 


$90,164,625 


529,928.575 ' 


Si 17.508.657 



» Estimates given in the Fleet Annual, 1914, page 112. 



WARSHIP TONNAGE OF THE PRINCIPAL NAVAL POWERS 

NUMBER AND DISPLACEMENT OF WARSHIPS, BUILT AND BUILDING, OF i,soo OR MORE TONS, AND OF TORPEDO CRAFT OF MORE THAN so TONS 

[Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department Treble 25, July l, 1916.*] 





Great Britain' 1 Germany 


United States,^ corrected to 
Oct. I, 1916 


France 


Japan 


Russia 


Italy 


Austria-Hungary 


Type of vessel 


Built 


Building 


Built 


Building 


Built 


Building 


Built 


Building 


Built 


Building 


Built 


Building 


Built 


Building 


Built 


Building 




No. 


Tons 


No. 


Tons 
(esti- 
mated) 


No. 


Tons 


No. 


Tons 
(esti- 
mated) 


No. 


Tons 


No. 


Tons 
(esti- 
mated) 


No. 


Tons 


No. 


Tons 
(esti- 
mated) 


No. 


Tons 


No. 


Tons 

(esti- 
mated) 


No. 


Tons 


No. 


Tons 
(esti- 
mated) 


No. 


Tons 


No. 


Tons 
(esti- 
mated) 


No. 


Tons 


No. 


Tons 
(esti- 
mated) 




20 

40 


423.350 
589,385 


16 


421,000 


13 

4 

9 

41 

130 


285,770 
242,800 
8,168 
88,749 
94.245 
150,747 
67,094 


7 


187,052 


12 

21 
4 


307,450 

297.936 

12,900 


5 


160.600 


3 

18 

I 


69.276 

262,67s 

8,800 


9 


216.748 


13 
2 

13 
13 
50 

27 
13 


41,600 
191.380 
9.086 
55.000 
138,483 
57.915 
20.487 
3,017 
2,672 


4 


122,400 






7 


159,409 


3 
8 


62,644 
96,100 


7 


187,150 


3 

6 
6 


60,030 
74.613 
41.700 


5 


iiS.oio 




7 


98.750 
10,380 




































9 

34 
74 
167 
49 
75 


188.200 
408.200 
382,815 
125,850 
11,488 
30.362 


I 


28,500 


4 


110,17s 










^ 


55,000 


4 


128.000 
















10 

14 

54 


140,080 
66,410 
45.877 






9 
84 
I3S 
64 


201,724 
46,095 
3S,8I2 
13.426 
27,940 






6 
9 
91 
14 
30 


63,500 
52,845 
36,748 
2,132 
6,so6 


9 
6 
36 
68 
19 


74,020 
18,830 
16,807 
11,584 
5,475 


2 

IS 

8 


4,888 ' 

14,203 

272 

5,842 


2 

s 

l3 
39 
6 


13.380 
I3,8IS 
9,450 
6,852 
1,686 


S 

24 
6 






17 


67,000 
21,770 


5 
24 


26,900 
14,400 














8 

44 


53,600 
53.664 






9 


9,911 


3 


2,6S3 


^ 


1,676 




lorpedo boat aes y 


5,886 
5,370 


Submarines 


22 


17,236 


27 


14.140 


18 


14,400 


44 




31 




22 


14,766 


2 


1,200 


19 


13.284 






2.188.250 




555.506 








352,927 




870,653 




170.su 




665,748 




234.167 




519,640 




180,276 





270,861 




407,957 




285,460 




212,355 




221,526 












1 








1.304.640 


1.041,164 


899.91S 


699,916 


678.818 


407.8IS 


372,008 





































































* Due to the European war no official information regarding naval matters of the belligerents 
can be obtained; therefore, this table is published as of July I, 1914. 

1 Colonial vessels included. 

2 Does not include ships of current program for which contracts have not been awarded. 

' Battleships having a main battery of all big guns (11 inches or more in caliber), except South 
Carolina and Michigan, which are not considered as dreadnoughts because of low speed. 

* Battleships of (about) 10.000 or more tons displacement, whose main batteries are of more than 
one caliber; also U. S. S. South Carolina and Michigan. 

6 Includes smaller battleships and monitors. . 

' Armored cruisers having guns of largest caliber in main battery and capable of takmg their 
place in line of battle with the battleships. They have an increase of speed at the expense of car- 
rying fewer guns in main battery and a decrease in armor protection. 



' All unarmored warships of more than 1. 500 tons are classed as cruisers. Scouts are considered as 
cruisers in which battery and protection have been sacrificed to secure extreme speed. The word 
"protected " has been omitted because all cruisers except the smallest and oldest now have protec- 
tive decks. 

The following vessels are not included in the tables: 

Ships over 20 years old from date of launch, unle'ss they have been reconstructed and rearmed 
within S years. 

Torpedo craft over 15 years old. 

Those not actually begun or ordered, although authorized. 

Transports, colliers, repair ships, torpedo ships, or other auxiliaries. 

Vessels of less tha'n I,SOO tons, except torpedo craft. 

Torpedo craft of less than SO tons. 

Vessels undergoing trials are considered as completed. 



"EMDEN" EXPLOITS 

Excerpts from articles by Commander L. A. Cotton, 
U.S.N., and Lieutenant H. von Miicke (Executive officer 
of "Emden"), the latter translated by Lieutenant-Com- 
mander J. H. Klein, Jr., U. S. N. — reprinted by courtesy 
of the U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings. 

IN a war of the size and extent of the Great World 
War, the magnitude and importance of the major 
operations are apt to make one overlook operations of 
lesser military importance in other fields that may be 
very instructive to those interested in the art of war, and 
that may illustrate principles of universal application. 
Of such a nature seem to be the exploits of the Emden 
in the Far East during the first few months of the war. 

The Emden was a small German cruiser of 3600 tons 
displacement, having two masts and three funnels and 
armed with ten 4.1 -inch and eight 5-pounder guns and 
two submerged torpedo tubes. Her speed was about 25 
knots and her maximum coal capacity 900 tons. 

In the early days of August, 1914, the little Emden was 
in the harbour of Tsingtao in the German leased territory 
of Kiaochow in the province of Shantung, China. She did 
not remain there for many days, however, for on August 
6 she inaugurated her war career by capturing a Russian 
volunteer-fleet vessel near Ouelpart Island. The Emden 

195 



196 APPENDIX 

accompanied her prize into Tsingtao, filled her bunkers 
and got out at sunrise the next morning. 

Of the Emdens subsequent movements her Executive 
officer writes: "During the evening of August 12, we 
came in the neighbourhood of the island where we ex- 
pected to meet the cruiser squadron and found the out- 
post vessels. In the middle lay the powerful cruisers 
Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, with colliers alongside busy 
coaling. Farther to the left the slender Nurnberg, also 
engaged in coaling. Scattered about in the harbour were 
a number of large and small tenders and auxiliaries of 
the squadron. The Emden was ordered to anchor in the 
right half of the harbour, close to the flagship. Rousing 
cheers were exchanged between ships as we passed the 
other vessels and soon thereafter our anchor splashed — 
the last time for a long while. 

"The captain reported aboard the flagship for orders 
from the squadron commander, and made the proposal to 
him to detach the Emden from the squadron and to send 
her to the Indian Ocean to carry on a cruise of 'com- 
merce destruction.' 

"The next day saw the squadron in column, followed 
by the colliers, on an easterly course. The squadron 
commander had not yet made known his decision in re- 
gard to our captain's proposal and we were all eager to 
know what his conclusions were. Along toward midday 
several signals were hoisted high on the flagship : 'Em- 
den detached, wish you much success,' read the signal. 
In an elegant turn our ship sheered out of column, a 
'thank-you' signal for the squadron commander's wishes 
at the mast head, then a semaphore to the Markomannia, 
'Remain with Emden,' and soon, on an opposite course, 



APPENDIX 197 

we lost sight of the other ships of the squadron. All 
knew that we had seen each other for the last time. 

"We had now reached the point where, in order to 
reach the open ocean, we had to pass through the narrow 
straits. These straits swarmed with fishing craft and 
such other small ships. The nights being bright moon- 
light, the Emden was visible for a considerable distance. 
The captain did not relish the idea of meeting so many 
sailing vessels. He spoke to me about it, saying that he 
wished to avoid meeting any sort of ship for fear our 
presence and course in those waters would become known 
to everybody. All the English men-of-war had either 
two or four smokepipes ; none had three like the Emden. 
Then I conceived the idea of building us a fourth smoke- 
pipe. Immediately I had all the deck-strips brought out. 
These are rolls of heavy sail cloth, about two meters 
wide, laid on the decks as a protection to the linoleum. 
In the upper end we sewed a wooden batten and then 
hoisted this improvised smokepipe forward of our regu- 
lar forward smokepipe. As viewed from the side the 
effect was good. But from forward its appearance was 
exceedingly faulty; it did not have the necessary thick- 
ness of its step-brothers. It was only a few millimeters 
thick. But in the hurry of that first night, nothing bet- 
ter could be accomplished. I proposed to the captain to 
build a better fourth smokepipe, to which he agreed. 
And the next day we began the work. Soon we had built, 
by means of wooden laths and sail cloth, an elegant 
smokepipe, and when this was in place we resembled the 
English cruiser Yarmouth. I purposely had the smoke- 
pipe made oval as the Yarmouth had one that shape. 
Our trailer Markomanma was ordered out to a position 



198 APPENDIX 

on our beam, and according to her suggestions (by sig- 
nal) we improved the position of the fourth smokepipe. 
We then painted the marks to simulate overheating of 
the outer casting of the smokepipe, so that from now on 
we could, at any time, day or night, hoist our fake. 

"And so we arrived in the Bay of Bengal at the end 
of the first week in September. For about five days an 
English warship, probably the Minotaur, steamed 
parallel to and close by us, as we knew by the strength of 
her radio signals. By and by her signals became weaker 
until they ceased entirely. We did not sight her." 

The next time the Emden was heard from she was in 
the Bay of Bengal, a matter of 4000 miles from Tsingtao 
even by direct route and in what may be termed the heart 
of the enemy's sea area. On September 14 the Italian 
S. S. Loredoro arrived off Calcutta and reported that she 
had on the previous day been held up by the Emden, and 
on September 16 the British S. S. Kabinga arrived with 
the crews of five other British steamers that had been 
sunk by the Emden in the Bay of Bengal between Septem- 
ber 10 and 14. 

Since there was no German prize court available, the 
Emden proceeded with her captures as follows : The 
first ship captured was manned with a prize crew and 
forced to accompany the Emden. Then when the sec- 
ond capture was made the more valuable of the two cap- 
tured ships was sunk by a mine or by gun fire, after the 
crew had been removed to the other vessel or to the 
Emden. This procedure was followed with each subse- 
quent capture until the captured personnel became too 



APPENDIX 199 

numerous to be accommodated when they were all placed 
upon the one remaining ship and she was released. 

On September 16 it was learned that the Emden had 
coaled on the previous day in False Bay (British) about 
120 miles from Calcutta. Three British cruisers and 
three French destroyers were sent in pursuit, a pursuit 
that proved to be long if not merry. 

On September 18 the quarry was located — but not by 
a man-of-war — about 20 miles off the mouth of Rangoon 
River, she having sunk the day before the British S. S. 
Clan Matheson. One Japanese cruiser now joined in 
the chase, which proceeded apace. 

Doubling back across the Bay of Bengal the Emden 
appeared next about a mile off the harbour of Madras at 
nine o'clock at night on September 22. The Madras light 
was lighted and working, and the lights of the city were 
all ablaze. The first intimation to those on shore that 
an enemy was near was the turning on of the search- 
lights of the Emden. Quickly picking up the large oil 
tanks of the Burma Oil Company she opened fire upon 
them. A few salvos and they were burning briskly. Fir- 
ing ceased, search-lights were extinguished and the Em- 
den disappeared into the darkness whence she had come. 
She had in these few minutes inflicted a damage of more 
than $100,000. 

From Madras she steamed slowly down the coast, ap- 
pearing off Pondicherry on September 24, having cap- 
tured and sunk five more British steamers in the mean- 
time. At this stage a British cruiser seems to have been 
within 50 miles of the Emden, but the latter appeared 
to be able to determine with fatalistic accuracy .alike 



200 APPENDIX 

where enemy merchantmen were and men-of-war were 
not. 

About this time, a Russian cruiser joined in the 
"Emden hunt," but unrestrained the Emden passed out 
of the Bay of Bengal, around Ceylon, and lay athwart 
the Aden-Colombo trade route. To the westward of 
Ceylon up to September 27 she sank five more British 
steamers and captured a collier with 7000 tons of Welsh 
coal. 

During the first two weeks of October the Emden was 
rumoured to be in the Makassar Strait, each of Borneo, at 
Padang on the Straits of Malakka and southeast of 
Sumatra, but in reality she seems to have been far away 
at Diego Garcia in the Chagos Archipelago. There she 
cleaned her boilers, was heeled over and had her bottom 
scraped and painted as far as practicable. Then she 
steamed north again to near the Laccadive Islands. 
Here from October 15 to 19 she sank five more steamers 
and a large Tasmanian dredger and captured another 
large collier. Meanwhile two more Japanese cruisers and 
one more Russian cruiser joined the searching force. 

All trace of the Emden was lost for ten days, and she 
made her next appearance 1700 miles from where she had 
been last reported. 

At early dawn on October 29 the quiet of a sultry sum- 
mer night still hung over the harbour of Penang (Brit- 
ish). The puffing little tugs and launches and the many 
sampans that give to eastern harbours their appearance 
of unusual animation, lay moored to the wharves or an- 
chored near by, and sleep still held alike the people 
ashore and afloat. It was the hour so well known to all 
sailors at which a lamp is worse than useless, yet without 



APPENDIX 201 

which objects can be seen but dimly. The mist of the 
tropical morning began to lift from the harbour, slowly 
rolling up as though it were a curtain being lifted from 
a mammoth stage whereon some terrible tragedy was 
soon to be enacted. 

Slowly from around the point to the eastward a steamer 
appeared, indistinct as to details and vague as to char- 
acteristics, but to the trained eye clearly a man-of-war. 
Any naval officer can picture to himself what followed on 
board the Russian cruiser Jemtchug peacefully lying at 
anchor in the harbour. Suddenly the quartermaster on 
watch sings out "Man-of-war standing in from the east- 
ward, sir!" "Make her out," replies the officer of the 
watch, started from the boredom of the first part of the 
morning watch. For a moment the quartermaster gazes 
through his spy glass, and answers "Two-masted cruiser, 
with four funnels, sir!" "\'ery well," comes from the 
officer of the watch, with an admonition to keep a bright 
lookout on the incoming cruiser, and report her actions. 
Doubtless the officer of the watch was momentarily 
alarmed when the ship was first sighted, but he was 
quickly reassured, for the only cruisers with four funnels 
in the waters of the Far East were British and Japanese, 
both friends. Of course, the ship slowly standing in 
around the point must be the British cruiser Yarmouth, 
thought he, or one of the Chikuma class of Japanese 
cruisers, all known to be in near-by waters. Slowly and 
with outward calm the stranger stood in for the usual 
anchorage of the Yarmouth, next the berth of the 
Jemtchug. Now she has reached a point on the 
Jemtchug's beam and only about 300 yards away. On 
the stranger all are tense and alert, while on the Jemtchug 



202 APPENDIX 

sleep still holds the crew and officers — the last sleep for 
many, the next few moments proved. Suddenly the Ger- 
man ensign fluttered from the stranger's truck, a flash of 
light rippled along her broadside and a salvo hurled death 
and destruction into the inert Jemtchug. The tragedy 
had begun. As those on the Jemtchug sprang from their 
bunks to the sound of steel crashing through steel, of 
bursting shell and shrieks of pain, a torpedo sent a quiver 
throughout the ship as it let loose its energy beneath her. 
Torn by shell and sundered by torpedo and listing badly, 
the Jemtchug began to sink at once, but a few more salvos 
in rapid succession and a second torpedo made assur- 
ance doubly sure as the curtain of smoke rolled down 
where the curtain of mist had so recently lifted. When 
in turn the curtain of smoke began to lift, only the masts 
of the Jemtchug were visible above the blood-stained 
water, as the struggling survivors cried for help, which 
the now wide-awake harbour promptly gave. Disappear- 
ing out the western entrance of the harbour was the in- 
strument of destruction, the Emden, for the stranger 
was none other than she. With the aid of a dummy 
funnel and the artistic use of paint and canvas she had 
succeeded in her disguise as the Yarmouth in the early 
morning light, and now was rapidly disappearing from 
view unscathed and undaunted. 

The engagement, if engagement it may be called, lasted 
scarcely a quarter of an hour, but the destruction of the 
Jemtchug was complete. Her casualties reached the total 
of one officer and 84 men killed and two officers and 
112 men wounded, being approximately 60 per cent of 
her complement. 

As the Emden steamed out of the harbour she fired on 



APPENDIX 203 

a patrol boat, but only damaged her slightly. Outside 
she came upon the outer-patrol, the French destroyer 
Mousquet, and quickly sank her by gun fire. She stopped 
long enough to pick up the survivors of the Mousquet, 36 
men and officers, and further out stopped a British 
steamer to which she transferred them. Then she again 
disappeared into her habitat, the high sea. Two French 
destroyers at anchor in Penang harbour quickly raised 
steam and gave chase, but in vain, for the Emden was 
not seen again for more than 10 days. 

After the Penang raid, two more cruisers, two gun- 
boats, three destroyers and an armed merchant cruiser 
were added to those exclusively engaged in searching 
for the Emden. This brought the number so engaged 
up to 19 all told, and in addition a large force was being 
used in convoy duty in the Far East, almost entirely 
on account of the Emden s activities. 

The next exploit of the Emden brought to an end her 
eventful career. At daylight on November 9 she ran in 
for the harbour on South Keeling Island in the Cocos or 
Keeling group. She still had her dummy funnel rigged, 
but its effectiveness as a disguise had vanished with the 
Penang exploit. The harbour on South Keeling is an 
important British submarine cable and radio station. As 
soon as the Emden was sighted, the word was cabled to 
London, Adelaide, Perth and Singapore, but what was 
more important, it was flashed into the air by radio that 
all who could might hear. 

Passing near the Cocos Islands was an army exf)edi- 
tion from Australia, bound for the Suez Canal and with 
it, thanks largely to the Emden menace, was a strong 
naval convoy. The Em,den used her radio outfit to the 



204 APPENDIX 

best of her ability to interfere with the message being 
sent, but the keen ear of the radio operator on the Brit- 
ish cruiser Minotaur caught it just the same. One of the 
units of the convoy was the Australian cruiser Sydney. 
Faster, larger and more powerful than the Emden, she 
was just the ship for the job at hand, and away she 
steamed full speed for South Keeling and the Emden. 

Meanwhile the Emden had entered the harbour and 
immediately landed a party of five officers, seven petty 
officers and 35 men, who proceeded to destroy the radio 
and cable-stations. The F.mden stood back to the har- 
bour entrance to keep watch. Apparently her captain 
was somewhat worried about the radio message that had 
been sent, for at 8.45 he steamed in again and recalled 
his landing force by flag signals and by siren. The party 
did not respond promptly enough, and at 9.30 the Em- 
den, leaving her landing party behind, headed out at 
full speed as the Sydney came charging up.^ 

The action began at the harbour entrance at a range 
of only about 4000 yards. Before she turned to head 
away, the Emden fired a broadside salvo that injured 
both fire control stations on the Sydney and destroyed 
one of her range finders. Then she turned and the chase 
began, and the fight continued bow to stern. The Syd- 
ney had 2 knots superiority in speed, and 6-inch guns 
against the Emden' s 4.1 -pounders. Slowly the Sydney 

^The Emden landing force consisting of five officers, seven 
petty officers and thirty-seven men, seized the schooner Ayesha, 
and sailed for Arabia. On the i6th of December the Ayesha, 
was wrecked in Seaflower Channel and the crew transferred 
to the Lloyd liner Choising. Finally they were landed on the 
Arabian coast of the Red Sea, made their way overland t(v 
Turkey, and thence back to Germany. 



APPENDIX 205 

hauled out and up, and brought her broadside to bear, 
almost out of range of the Emdens battery. Soon the 
Emden lost a funnel, and almost immediately thereafter 
a mast. Then another funnel went by the board, and 
fire broke out aft. Handicapped by her landing party left 
ashore, outranged and outstripped by her larger adver- 
sary, the Emden ran on the reef at North Keeling. With 
flag still flying, and burning fiercely, she still continued 
firing her one available gun, and not until the Sydney 
had reluctantly fired three more salvos into her, was the 
flag hauled down on the mass of blackened and twisted 
steel that had been the Emden. She made a game fight 
against heavy odds, as is freely admitted by her van- 
quishers. 

The casualties on the Emden, as is usual with the van- 
quished in a naval action, were enormous, only four 
officers and about 75 men being saved, and a number of 
these were wounded. The Sydney was but little dam- 
aged, and her casualties amounted only to three killed 
and 15 wounded. 

ITINERARY OF EMDEN 
Location 19 14 Remarks 

Yellow Sea August 2 Outbreak of war 

Tsingtao (arrived) August s > 

Tsingtao (left) August 7 

Met fleet, probably at Lamo- August 12 

trek Island (Caroline group) 
Entered Bay of Bengal September 4 i Route uncertain, Aug. 12- 

Sept. 4 

Off Calcutta, India September 10-14 

Off Rangoon September 18 1 

Madras September 22 Bombardment 

Off Colombo September 30 

Diego Garcia October 5-10 » 

Off Minokoi Island October 15-20 

Penang October 28 Sank Zemtchug and Mous- 

quel 

Straits of Sunda November 1-6 ' 

Keeling, Cocos Island November 9 Destroyed by Australian 

cruiser Sydney 

* Indicates approximate dates. 

The Emden caused in all a direct monetary loss of more than $25,000,000. 



AMERICA'S PART IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
NAVAL WEAPONS AND TACTICS 

By T. G. Frothingham, reprinted by courtesy of the 
United States Naval Institute Proceedings. 

ALTHOUGH most of us know that American tac- 
tics are being used in this great war, few realise 
the important part taken by weapons and tactics which 
had their origin in America. On land the European for- 
mal battles and formal fortresses have been superseded 
by armies manoeuvring and intrenching, as developed in 
our American wars. On the sea American ideas have 
been even more universally adopted. In their effect on 
methods and weapons of warfare, our three great wars, 
the American Revolution, the War of 1812, and the 
Civil War, are beyond comparison. 

Our war for independence, the American Revolution, 
was destined to differ in tactics from any previous war, 
and for these new tactics on land and sea the Colonists 
were well prepared. This is very little understood, even 
by those who have some historical knowledge ; but a care- 
ful study of the history of the Revolution shows that, al- 
though the Colonists were poor in resources, the Ameri- 
can soldiers and sailors had acquired the qualities that 
gave them victory. 

On land, the idea that "embattled farmers' sprang 
forth fully armed is wrong from every historical point of 
view. The "French wars" had given our people the 

206 




U. S. S. "CONSTITUTION" ("OLD IRONSIDES") 

From the Print by Bowen in the Collection of the Marine 
Museum, Boston, Mass. By Courtesy of the Society. 

The Symbol of the Spirit of the United States Navy. 
The Ancestor of the Modern Dreadnought. 

U. S. S. "Constitution" 1797 

U. S. S. "Niagara" 1856 

U. S. S. "Monitor" 1862 

U. S. S. "Roanoke" 1863 

U. S. S. "Michigan" 1909 

U. S. S. "Pennsylvania" 1916 

207 



208 APPENDIX 

right preparation for the Revolution. Scattered through 
all the Colonies were officers and men who had served in 
the French and Indian War. Consequently, from Wash- 
ington down, through the personnel of our Continental 
Army, were men who had learned the lesson of tactics 
adapted to this continent. They had also learned, many 
of them from bitter experience, that such tactics were 
very effective against the British Army. On the sea the 
Colonists had another element of preparedness which is 
not generally appreciated. Nowhere in the world were 
there hardier and more intelligent seamen. Their ships 
had been on every sea, and American designers were al- 
ready noted for the speed of their ships. American sail- 
ors all over the world had gained the experience that 
was destined to make them so resourceful against their 
enemies. Many of them had been fighting in every kind 
of naval warfare. They were thus especially well 
equipped for war against a superior naval power, in 
which ingenuity and daring were necessary qualities. 

On land, the first action of the Revolutionary War was 
prophetic of great changes of tactics. The Lexington and 
Concord fight showed the helplessness of the old formal 
school against a line of battle in extended order, taking 
advantage of every natural shelter, never giving a set 
battle but attacking, here, there, and everywhere. 

On the sea, it was the same story. Harassing tactics 
were adopted by the Americans in naval warfare. With 
the poor resources at their command, the Colonists could 
not hope for a strong navy, and the number of ships 
commissioned in the United States Navy was small. 
But American naval vessels boldly sailed into the well 
guarded British seas, and actually harried the British 



APPENDIX 209 

coasts. These raids, culminating in the exploits of Paul 
Jones and the fight off Flamborough Head, had a serious 
effect on the British public. 

Our Navy also did damage to British commerce, and 
here another class of American ships was of great tacti- 
cal value. There being so few naval ships to give service 
to our seamen, private enterprise began to fit out ships. 
Soon a swarm of privateers was scattered over the seas, 
preying on the British merchant marine. English insur- 
ance rates were raised, and merchants were even deterred 
from shipping goods at any rate of insurance. The 
American privateers captured or destroyed about six hun- 
dred British ships of the value of $18,000,000 — very 
great losses for those days. 

"In all the memorials presented to Parliament the 
argument used to bring about peace was the unprece- 
dented destruction of English commerce," ^ and many au- 
thorities believe this argument of commerce destroying by 
the United States Navy and American privateers did 
more to gain independence than any other factor in the 
war. 

Probably, however, the most extraordinary event in 
the Revolution, in relation to the present war, was the 
first use of the torpedo and the submarine. \'arious 
forms of mines had been tried before with indifferent suc- 
cess, but nothing approaching the torpedo as used in the 
present war. 

In 1775 David Bushnell of Connecticut, who gradu- 
ated from Yale that year, built the "diving boat" known 
as the "American Turtle." Its design was astonishingly 
modern in many ways. It was made of iron plates, 

^ Maclay. 



210 APPENDIX 

propelled by a screw, and guided by a compass made 
visible by phosphorus. The torpedo was carried outside, 
to be attached to the enemy ship, and then cast loose. 
The action of casting off started a clockwork, which gave 
the submarine time to get away to a safe distance. 

This submarine and torpedo were first tried against 
the Eagle, a 64-gun ship, lying off New York. The oper- 
ator in the submarine found difficulty in attaching the 
torpedo, which contained 100 lbs. of powder, and the 
explosion was not near enough to the Eagle to cause any 
damage. It was again tried against the Cerberus at New 
London. The submarine missed the large ship, but blew 
up a schooner that lay near her, with several of her 
people killed. It was Bushnell who in 1778 set afloat 
torpedoes against the British shipping in the Delaware 
River near Philadelphia. They were in kegs and did lit- 
tle damage, but inspired the amusing poem "The Battle 
of the Kegs," written at the time. 

These attempts with the submarine and the torpedo, al- 
though they did very little actual harm, caused so much 
alarm and kept the enemy ships away from narrow waters 
to such an extent, that it is perfectly fair to say that the 
submarine and torpedo had a tactical value in the Revo- 
lutionary War, 

Thus it will be seen that in American warfare on the 
seas, in the Revolution, are found the germs of many of 
the most important naval tactics of the present war — 
tactical use of the torpedo, tactical use of the submarine, 
commerce destroying as a factor in war, raids upon the 
enemy's coasts by a weaker navy. 

Our second war with England, the War of 1812, 




AMERICAN LETTER OF MARQUE BRIG "GRAND TURK" (14 
GUNS) OF SALEM SALUTING MARSEILLES, 1815 

From the Painting by Roux in the Collection of the East India 
Marine Society of Salem. By Courtesy of the Society. 



found the Americans totally unprepared on land. The 
generation of the Revolution had passed away. There 
was no element in the population with any experience in 
war, except a few Indian fighters in the western part of 
the United States. On the sea, things were very different. 
Our seamen had become even more expert in the interval 
between the two wars, our ships had maintained their 
superiority in speed, and our privateers repeated the dam- 
age of the Revolution, but on a larger scale. The Ameri- 
can privateers captured or destroyed in this war no less 
than thirteen hundred British vessels of the value of 



212 APPENDIX 

$39,000,000. Such losses were unprecedented, and this 
destruction of commerce won us an advantageous peace. 

The following from the London Times is enough to 
show the effect of these losses on the public mind: 

"Lloyd's list contains notices of upward of five hun- 
dred British vessels captured in seven months by the 
Americans, Five hundred merchantmen and three frig- 
ates ! Can these statements be true ? And can the 
English people hear them unmoved?" The reference to 
the loss of "three frigates" is comment on another offen- 
sive developed by the Americans on the sea, which was 
the beginning of great changes in naval tactics. 

The United States Navy had only twenty-three ves- 
sels in commission in the War of 1812, including the 
squadrons of Perry and McDonough on the lakes, but 
in this small navy were concentrated skilled officers and 
men. Our Navy had gained experience of warfare in 
the Tripolitan War, etc., and it was far ahead of its time 
in construction and armament. 

Our naval constructors, with an intuition almost pro- 
phetic, had built a class of frigates, of which the Consti- 
tution is best known, and placed 24 pounders on them. 
Such an armament was ridiculed abroad, and it was pre- 
dicted that such ships would be useless — but, in the War 
of 1812, these frigates became the wonder of the world. 
Another extract from the London Times shows again the 
state of the public mind — "The fact seems to be estab- 
lished that the Americans have some superior mode of 
firing." The "fact" that the Times could not under- 
stand was the great advance in naval construction shown 
by these frigates of the United States Navy. This ad- 




AMERICAN ARMED BRIG "TENEDOS," OF BOSTON, AT 
SMYRNA, JULY 4, 1834. 



vanced design. by American naval constructors was the 
birth of the "All big-gun ship" idea, which was destined 
to dominate naval construction ; and the Constitution 
may fairly be called the ancestor of the modern dread- 
nought. 

In the War of 1812 the American inventions of the 
torpedo and the submarine were of tactical value, al- 
though not in actual use. Robert Fulton had attempted 
to develop the Bushnell inventions, at first for the French 
and then for the English ; but he had returned to Amer- 
ica discouraged. There was some aid voted for his ma- 
chines, but nothing was ever done with them in actual 
warfare. However, as in the Revolution, the idea that 
the Americans possessed such dangerous weapons proved 
a good defence for portions of our coast. 

In the Mexican War, as there was no navy to oppose 
213 




U. S. S. "NIAGARA" 

From the lithograph by Currier and Ives in the collection of the 
Marine Museum, Boston, Mass. By Courtesy of the Society. 

Carries 12 Dahlgren Guns, weighing 14 tons, each 11 inches in 
diameter in the bore, throwing a solid shot of 270 lbs. or a shell of 
180 lbs. a distance of four miles. This was a very powerful arma- 
ment for the times. 

our operations, the use of our navy, although important, 
did not develop tactical changes. Yet it is a curious fact 
that steamers were then first used in naval warfare.^ In 
the same spirit of progress that had placed the heavy 
guns on the Constitution, the United States Navy built 
steam frigates, the Niagara, Wabash, etc., which 
had the most powerful armament of their class, holding 
' Soley. 

214 



■ B)yia i«an>inaagiBftrj>- 








AMERICAN ARMED BARQUE "STAMBOUL," OF BOSTON, AT 
MARSEILLES, 1844. 



fast to our Navy's consistent policy of making the gun 
all-important. 

The Civil War brought about still greater advances 
in American heavily armed warships, which revolution- 
ised naval ships and naval tactics throughout the world. 
The attack in Hampton Roads on the Union fleet by the 
Alerrimac, converted into the casemate ironclad Virginia 
by the Confederates, showed decisively the helplessness 
of wooden ships against armoured ships. The fight that 
followed between the Virginia and the first turret ship, 
the Monitor, was the first challenge to guns in casemates 
by guns in turrets. The construction of the epoch-mak- 
ing Monitor had been hurried, and she was defective in 
many ways. Consequently, although the Monitor saved 
the Union fleet, the question of superiority between the 
two types remained undecided in many minds. 

215 




U. S. S. "PENNSYLVANIA" (ist) 1837, Ship-of-the-line 
(three decker) 

From the Lithograph by N. Currier in the Collection of the Marine 
Museum, Boston, Mass. By Courtesy of the Society. 

Rate, 120 guns. 16, 8 in. 104, 32 pr. Total, 120. Complemen:.. 
1,100. Tonnage, 3,241. Laid down, 1822. Completed, 1837, Phila- 
delphia. Cost, $694,500. Annual cost in commission, $382,432. 
Note: Originally this Pennsylvania carried 140 guns. The above 
data is quoted from the Navy Register of July 1, 1850. 

The less known fight in Wassaw Sound in 1863 estab- 
lished the superiority of a few big guns in turrets over 
a greater number in casemates. The Atlanta, a Con- 
federate casemate ironclad of the type of the Virginia, 
came out to destroy two monitors, with two excursion 
steamers to watch the destruction. The monitor Wee- 
hazvken fired just five shots — and the contest was ended 

216 




Copyrighl, E. Muller 



U. S. S. -PENNSYLVANIA," 1916 

Guns — 12, 14 in. 22, 5 in. Total, 34. Complement, 1,100. Ton- 
nage, 32.567. Laid down, 1913. Completed, 1916. Built at New- 
port News. Cost, $14,000,000. 

217 



218 APPENDIX 

for all time in favour of big guns in turrets. The all-big- 
gun ship commands the sea in this war — and the big guns 
in turrets have never been supplanted. 

In the Monitor type, from one to two turrets was but a 
step, and many such monitors were built. Then came 
the Roanoke (1863), another stage in the development 
of the Monitor. The Roanoke was a "sea-going turret 
vessel" with three turrets, all aligned over the keel. 
Here were the essentials of the dreadnought of to-day,^ 
and this American design of big guns in turrets, aligned 
over the keel, has prevailed over all other types of ar- 
moured warships. 

Foreign navies have been reluctant to accept this de- 
sign. They have built all kinds of armoured ships, and on 
their turret vessels used various arrangements of the 
turrets. English and German dreadnoughts, designed 
less than ten years ago, have other dispositions of the 
turrets; but, in the latest classes of dreadnoughts, all 
foreign naval constructors have conformed to the Ameri- 
can design of turrets aligned over the keel, from which 
we have never swerved in mounting our heavy guns. 

From the Constitution to the first Pennsylvania, to the 
Niagara, to the Monitor, to the Roanoke, to the Michigan, 
to the present fleet flagship Pennsylvania, are but steps in 
the American idea of the all-big-gun-ship. 



In the Civil War there was also a great development 
of the torpedo,* and of the submarine. The use of tor- 

^ "For one nowadays to see a drawing of the battery plan of 
the U. S. S. Roanoke is to be reminded that there is nothing 
new under the sun." Lieut. Com. W. P. Cronan, U. S. N., in 
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings. 



APPENDIX 219 

pedoes by the Confederates was of real tactical value to 
them. Their torpedoes were placed, as are mines in the 
present war, to protect narrow waters and harbours. 
Covered by artillery fire, these mine fields undoubtedly 
proved a good defence in many cases against the superior 
naval power of the North. Many Federal warships were 
destroyed by them, among these the monitors Tecumseh 
and Petapsco. In fact they were a long step toward the 
great mine fields, which now defend the German bases 
against the stronger British fleet. 

There was also tactical use of the torpedo as a weapon 
of offence, the Confederate ram Albemarle being the 
most important warship so destroyed. The Albemarle 
was torpedoed in Cushing's daring night attack. As is 
well known, with a volunteer crew, he attacked in a 
launch with the torpedo rigged on a spar. This torpedo 
was exploded by pulling a lanyard. 

The Confederates also made great strides in the de- 
velopment of the submarine. Under-sea boats approach- 
ing the modern type were built, especially at Charleston. 
The torpedo was thrust out forward on a spar instead 
of being ejected from a tube. One type had an engine, 
but the best known submarine, used at Charleston, was 
propelled by the crew who sat along the shaft and re- 
volved it by hand. These submarines were fearfully 
dangerous to their crews, and many crews were drowned 
in this type of boat. But the Confederates, by the use of 
the submarine, destroyed one good Federal cruiser, the 
U. S. sloop of war Housatonic, off Charleston in 1864. 

This Confederate development of the original Ameri- 
can idea of the submarine undoubtedly paved the way 
for Holland, Lake and others, and led to the recent high 



220 APPENDIX 

efficiency of the U-boat, which has become so important 
a factor in the grand tactics of the present war. As a 
dangerous commerce destroyer, nothing approaching the 
U-boats has ever been seen. 

The other commerce destroyers, the light German crui- 
sers, which made such destructive raids on British ship- 
ping, closely followed the tactics of the Confederate Navy 
in the Civil War, which was the first navy to make com- 
merce destroying a factor in war after the passing of the 
privateer.^ 

At the outbreak of the Civil War the Confederate 
Government hoped to create a fleet of privateers. This 
proved impossible. The South did not have the ships, 
and privateering was not of much importance in the war. 
The South then tried new tactics, and the Confederate 
Navy commissioned warships whose mission was com- 
merce-destroying. 

These cruisers, Sumpter, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, 
etc., almost drove the United States flag from the seas. 
With the command of the sea hopelessly against them, 
their raids were carried on with the greatest ingenuity and 
daring, and it was very difficult to catch them. 

In the present war the German cruisers imitated the 
tactics of these Confederate commerce-destroyers, and did 
a great amount of damage, with the same control of the 
sea against them. The Alabama and the Emden will 
always be associated in their kinship of successful au- 
dacity. 

For the Federals on the sea the hardest task was the 
blockade of the Confederate coast. Blockades had been 

^ "Privateering is and remains abolished." Declaration of 
Paris, 1856. 



APPENDIX 221 

used before in warfare, and the status of a blockade was 
well defined.* What the United States Navy accom- 
plished was no "cabinet blockade," but an effective block- 
ade such as had never been seen. 

Here was one of the longest coast-lines in the world, 
where harbours and inlets gave every advantage to the 
blockade-runner. The United States Navy had not ships 
enough to carry out the task, but, with characteristic 
energy all kinds of craft were utilised. The steamer 
Circassian, one of the most valuable prizes of the war, 
was actually captured by a Fulton ferry-boat. At first 
the blockade was de facto, as different portions of the 
coast were policed and notified of the blockade, but in 
an astonishingly short time the long coast-line was ef- 
fectively hemmed in. "As to the legal efficiency of the 
blockade after the first six months there can be no ques- 
tion." 2 

This was only the beginning of the undertaking. 
Great profits offered inducements to blockade-runners. 
After the blockade became stringent and ships were be- 
ing constantly seized on the high seas, attempts were 
made to evade capture by clearing for one of the avail- 
able neutral ports, touching there, and then trying to run 
into a Confederate port, Bermuda, Nassau, Havana, and 
Matamoras were these ports, of which Nassau was much 
the most active. The idea was that the claim of neutral 
destination would protect the ship for most of its voyage, 
and it would only be in danger in the short run between 
the neutral port and the Southern port. 

' "A blockade to be legal must be effective." Declaration of 
Paris. 
2 Prof. J. R. Soley, U. S. N. 



222 APPENDIX 

This practice proved easy to stop, as the character of 
cargo and evidence of final destination brought condem- 
nation in the courts. This evidence was most difficult 
in the case of Matamoras, the only town of importance 
on the Confederate southern border, but so general be- 
came the forfeiture of ships and cargoes that some other 
evasion was necessary. 

The next scheme tried was clearance for the neutral 
ports, and then trans-shipment at the neutral port. The 
return cargoes were to be handled in the same way. 
"But here again the courts stepped in, and held that 
though a trans-shipment was made, even after landing 
the cargo and going through a form of sale, the two 
voyages were parts of one and the same transaction, and 
the cargo from the outset was liable to condemnation, if 
the original intention had been to forward the goods to 
a blockaded port. Nor did the decision stop here. As 
all property, both ship and cargo, is confiscated upon 
proof of breach of blockade, it was held that ships carry- 
ing on this traffic to neutral ports were confiscable, pro- 
vided the ultimate destination of the cargo to a block- 
aded port was known to the owner. In the words of the 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, 'The ships are 
planks of the same bridge.' " ^ 

The last resort of the blockade-runners was most in- 
genious, to break the voyage by shipping to a Federal 
port, then to a neutral port, then to the Confederate port. 
Goods were shipped to New York by regular steamship 
lines, thence to Nassau, to be sent to the South. This 
was ended, when it was observed that trade with Nassau 
and Bermuda was abnormal, by orders issued to the col- 

' Soley. 



APPENDIX 223 

lectors of customs to refuse clearance to vessels whose 
cargoes were in danger of falling into the hands of the 
enemy, and to require owners to give ample security 
where there was ground for apprehension that cargoes 
were destined for the enemy's use. 

These orders were general and named no particular 
ports. Yet the "Merchants of Nassau" complained of 
this "unjust discrimination" and persuaded Earl Russell 
to take up the subject diplomatically. The correspond- 
ence that followed showed so plainly that "the trade of 
the Bahamas" was blockade-running, that the British 
Government "derived little satisfaction," and the traffic 
was ended. 

Thus were overcome difficulties, physical and legal, 
that seemed insuperable. The amount of harm done to 
the South by these perfected blockading tactics cannot be 
estimated. 

This well established case of successful legal blockad- 
ing tactics was at the command of the British Govern- 
ment at the outbreak of this war. Enforcement of a legal 
blockade against the Teutonic alliance would have been 
very difficult. Instead of trying this, Great Britain at- 
tempted in the beginning of the war to keep goods from 
the Teutonic allies by using her command of the sea, 
and an increasing list of contraband. Great Britain is 
now avowedly trying to imitate the blockade of our Civil 
War. 

The American invention and development of the aero- 
plane is so recent that there is no need to describe it. 

It is impressive to sum up these American contribu- 
tions to the naval weapons and tactics of to-day. 

The development of the all-big-gun ship. 



224 APPENDIX 

The tactical superiority of the armoured ship. 
The tactical superiority of guns in turrets — and of 
turrets aligned over the keel. 
The tactical use of the torpedo. 
The tactical use of the submarine. 
Commerce destroying as a factor in warfare. 
Raids of an enemy's coasts by an inferior navy. 
Establishment of a legal blockade of a long coast line. 
The invention and development of the airplane. 



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